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I Theoretical Part 
1. Introduction 
One of the most remarkable achievements of evolution is the human’s ability to learn:  
Learning is an enduring change in the mechanisms of behaviour involving specific 
stimuli and/or responses that results from prior experience with those or similar stimuli and 
responses. (Domjan, 2003, p. 14).  
As becomes evident from this definition, learning allows an organism to flexibly adapt 
to changing environmental conditions. In doing so, an individual has to continuously monitor 
their performance to detect discrepancies between intended and actual responses (i.e., 
errors) and to adjust behaviour accordingly. Experience- (or feedback-) based learning thus 
requires the ability to evaluate the outcomes of one’s behaviour. The motivational and 
affective significance of action outcomes, however, can vary considerably. For instance, 
some errors place the individual in serious danger or threaten a person’s self-worth whilst 
others have virtually no consequences. In order to meet specific situational demands, an 
efficient performance monitoring system should take into account the affective and 
motivational context of an action. Nevertheless, the question of how motivational and 
affective processes interact with performance monitoring has received surprisingly little 
attention thus far (Pessoa, 2008, 2009). Evidence from electrophysiological research 
suggests that the motivational and affective value of on-going events has a substantial 
impact on error- and feedback processing (Falkenstein, Hoormann, Christ & Hohnsbein, 
2000; Gehring, Goss, Coles, Meyer, & Donchin, 1993; Hajcak, Moser, Yeung, & Simons, 
2005; Olvet & Hajcak, 2011; Wiswede, Münte, Goschke, & Rüsseler, 2009a; Wiswede, 
Münte, & Rüsseler, 2009b). However, it remains largely unknown from the existing literature 
how these context-specific modulations in error- and feedback processing relate to flexible 
behavioural adaptation. The present thesis addressed this essential question by utilizing the 
high temporal resolution of event-related potentials (ERPs) to track the impact of motivational 
and affective manipulations on the neural mechanisms of error and feedback processing 
during reinforcement learning. 
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This thesis compromises a theoretical and an empirical part. The theoretical part first 
gives an overview of contemporary accounts on reinforcement learning and its neural 
underpinnings. This overview is followed by a chapter highlighting the role of emotional and 
motivational processes in reinforcement learning and action selection. Afterwards, I will 
review empirical evidence indicating how theoretical approaches to performance monitoring 
and learning are informed by electrophysiological research. I conclude with a summary of the 
general aims of this thesis and an outline of the three experiments it includes. The empirical 
part starts with a formulation of the specific research goals of Experiments 1 and 2, followed 
by the deduction of the research hypotheses and a description of study design and methods. 
The results will be presented consecutively for Experiment 1 and 2. After an interim 
discussion of the combined findings of Experiment 1 und 2, I will give an outline of 
Experiment 3, including the corresponding research goals and hypotheses. The description 
of design and methods is followed by a presentation of the results and a discussion of the 
findings of Experiment 3. The empirical part closes with a general discussion of the main 
findings from the three experiments in the context of the relevant literature. 
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2. Review of Literature 
Overview 
The literature review is structured into five main parts: In the first part, I will introduce 
basic theoretical concepts and theories of reinforcement learning. The second part 
addresses the neural underpinnings of reinforcement learning, particularly the role that has 
been attributed to dopaminergic mechanisms in coding a learning signal that is referred to as 
“reward prediction error”. In the third section, I will summarize theoretical considerations and 
empirical findings emphasising the significance of motivational and affective processes in 
learning and adaptive decision making. Part four describes components in the event-related 
potential (ERP) that are thought to reflect the activity of a generic performance monitoring 
system: the error negativity (Ne), the feedback-related negativity (FRN), and the error 
positivity (Pe). As will be outlined in the fifth section, integrative neurocomputational models 
on performance monitoring conceptualize the Ne and the FRN in terms of learning or conflict 
signals mediating goal-directed behavioural adjustments. 
Theoretical Accounts on Reinforcement Learning 
Towards a Definition of Reinforcement Learning 
Imagine a child coming home from kindergarten and showing their mother a picture 
painted by themselves. The mother will most likely praise the child and this makes them feel 
proud and happy. A few days later, however, the child is painting the wall of the living room 
with crayons while the mother is preparing dinner. Probably to the child’s surprise, the 
mother’s reaction to their work will now be less pleasant. Obviously, the consequences of the 
child’s action are more or less desirable, depending upon the specific situation in which the 
behaviour occurs. Thus, in order to satisfy their needs and desires as well as to avoid harm 
and punishment, an individual has to learn which action to select in a given situation. This 
fundamental process is commonly referred to as reinforcement learning (RL). 
The foundations of modern theories on RL were laid by the pioneering work of E. L. 
Thorndike. On the basis of his laboratory studies on “animal intelligence”, Thorndike 
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formulated the “Law of Effect” (Thorndike, 1911). According to this “law”, the association 
between a situation and a certain behaviour is strengthened if the behaviour is followed by a 
satisfying state. By comparison, if the behaviour is followed by discomfort, the association 
between situation and behaviour is weakened. Although Thorndike’s assertion that behaviour 
is controlled by the association between situation and response has been challenged by later 
studies, the Law of Effect highlights two key characteristics of RL (Sutton & Barto, 1998). 
First, it states that RL involves the selection of a particular behaviour, that is, the subject has 
to discover rewarding responses by trial and error, enabling them to adapt to unknown 
situations. Second, the Law of Effect implies that RL is associative in nature. The 
associationistic view is still inherent to most neurophysiological models of RL. On the neural 
level, synaptic plasticity is widely assumed to be a substrate of associative learning (Stefan 
et al., 2000). In the following sections, I will provide essential information about the basic 
elements of RL and the different types of associations that can be learned. Then I will 
introduce the contemporary computational theories of RL this thesis relies on. 
States, Actions, and Reinforcements 
The associative structure of RL comprises relations between states, actions1, and 
outcomes. In the RL framework, the term ‘state’ refers to the representation of the current 
situation (e.g., Sutton & Barto, 1998). It should be noted that the state potentially involves a 
broad range of relevant information that are not restricted to a specific set of sensory stimuli. 
Specifically, states may include motivational and emotional aspects of the situation. Given a 
particular state, an individual has to choose between several potential actions, each of which 
is usually followed by specific consequences and hence results in a new state. If the 
outcome of an action increases the future probability for the same action to be performed, it 
is called a reinforcer2
                                                 
1 The term ‘action’ refers to intentional, goal-directed behaviours, whereas the term ‘response’ emphasizes that a 
certain behaviour is elicited by a stimulus. 
 (Skinner, 1953) or reward. Note that this definition includes both the 
occurrence of pleasant states (positive reinforcement) and the avoidance or termination of 
2 While early researchers thought of reinforcers as specific stimuli, the term has been expanded to responses that 
have been assigned a specific role in the adaptation to environmental constraints. 
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unpleasant states (negative reinforcement). Conversely, an outcome that decreases the 
future probability for the action to be performed is termed a punisher (Azrin & Holz, 1966), 
either denoting the occurrence of an unpleasant outcome (positive punishment) or the 
withdrawal of pleasant consequences (negative punishment). 
Instrumental vs. Classical Conditioning 
Learned associations have traditionally been divided into two basic categories: (1) 
associations between different stimuli or events and (2) associations between stimuli/events 
and behaviour. This distinction is closely related to the investigation of learning processes 
using the paradigms of classical vs. instrumental conditioning. In classical (or Pavlovian) 
conditioning two types of stimuli are distinguished based on the behavioural response they 
elicit on first presentation, that is, without prior learning (cf. Domjan, 2003). The 
unconditioned stimulus (US) effectively evokes a specific response called unconditioned 
response (UR). Hence, the association between US and UR is an innate reflex (Pavlov, 
1927). The second class of stimuli is referred to as conditioned stimuli (CSs). In contrast to 
the US, the CS does not evoke a specific behavioural reaction on first presentation, but 
comes to do so after repeated pairing with the US. This reaction upon presentation of the 
previously “neutral” CS is called the conditioned response (CR). For conditioning to occur the 
CS has to be predictive of the US, that is, the CS has to be presented before the US or 
simultaneously with it (e.g., Bower & Hilgard, 1981). Crucially, learning about the relation 
between stimuli allows the subject to predict future events and to engage in anticipatory 
responses. 
However, successful behavioural adaptation in a changing environment does not only 
require the ability to predict an event but also to control the results of one’s own behaviour 
(cf. Balleine, 2001). This latter form of behaviour is usually called goal-directed or 
instrumental. Instrumental conditioning includes three basic components: (1) a response, (2) 
a response outcome (or reinforcer), and (3) a relation between response and outcome, also 
termed response-reinforcer (or instrumental) contingency (cf. Domjan, 2003). The 
instrumental contingency denotes the extent to which a particular reinforcer is more likely to 
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occur if it is preceded by the instrumental response. In case of a perfect contingency, the 
reinforcer is not delivered unless the instrumental response is made. Thus, in contrast to UR 
and CR in classical conditioning, the instrumental response is controlled by its consequences 
(Grindley, 1932). Yet, Thorndike already emphasized the importance of the situation or 
stimulus context for determining which instrumental response should occur. As will be 
pointed out below, evidence has accumulated for the notion that stimulus context, 
instrumental response, and response outcome are connected in instrumental conditioning. In 
particular, the expectation of future reinforcements has been ascribed a pivotal role in 
motivating instrumental behaviour. Contemporary theories of RL thus rely on research from 
the field of both classical and instrumental conditioning. 
Motivational Mechanisms in Instrumental Learning 
Goal-Directed Actions vs. Habits 
Early theories of learning were inspired by the study of animal behaviour and focused 
mainly on the establishment of stimulus-response (S–R) associations, thereby implying that a 
specific behaviour is directly elicited by a stimulus. This notion contrasts with the commonly 
held view that instrumental behaviour is controlled by its consequences. Indeed, evidence 
from outcome devaluation studies has strongly suggested that instrumental conditioning also 
results in the learning of response-outcome (R-O) associations (for a review, see Dickinson 
& Balleine, 1995). In these studies, the instrumental conditioning procedure is followed by a 
manipulation of the outcome value. For example, a food- and water-deprived rat is trained to 
press a lever to obtain food pellets and to pull a chain to obtain a sucrose solution (or vice 
versa). Subsequently, the rat gains direct access to either the food or the liquid and a taste 
aversion is conditioned by injecting the animal with a toxic substance. In the final test phase, 
the rat is exposed to the two response devices again, but pressing the button or pulling the 
chain does result in any outcome. Despite the fact that the outcome devaluation should not 
affect the previously learned S-R association, the rat produces fewer lever presses if the 
pellets have been associated with illness, but pulls the chain less often if the liquid has been 
associated with illness (Colwill & Rescorla, 1985). This finding clearly indicates that the 
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animal has learned to associate the action with its specific consequences. Similarly, 
instrumental behaviour is generally sensitive to degrading the response-outcome 
contingency and vanishes if it is no longer followed by the reinforcing outcome (extinction; 
e.g., Domjan, 2003). Even in case of unchanged reward probability, instrumental behaviour 
has been shown to become less frequent if the contingency between response and reinforcer 
is reduced (Hammond, 1980). Behaviour that is (a) guided by the knowledge of the relation 
to some outcome and (b) susceptible to alterations in the value of those outcomes is called 
goal-directed (cf. Balleine, Liljeholm, & Ostlund, 2009). 
Devaluation studies have also shown that instrumental conditioning can result in the 
learning of S-R associations that are insensitive to changes in outcome value (Dickinson, 
1985). These associations arise, for example, from extensive overlearning as behaviour 
becomes more and more habitual (Adams, 1981) and thus are commonly referred to as 
habits. In contrast to goal-directed actions, habits are relatively unaffected by changes in the 
response-outcome contingency (e.g., Dickinson, Squire, Varga, & Smith, 1998) and may 
persist even if followed by negative consequences, as illustrated by drug seeking behaviour 
(Nelson & Killcross, 2006; Schoenbaum & Setlow, 2005). Importantly, accumulating evidence 
indicates that habitual and goal-directed learning constitute distinct processes that are 
dissociable at both the functional and the neural level (Balleine et al., 2009; Redgrave et al., 
2010; Yin & Knowlton, 2002). This distinction is critical for the current study because the 
learning task applied has been shown to recruit both the habitual and the goal-directed 
system (Doll et al., 2009; Huys & Dayan, 2009). 
Expectancy of Outcomes: The Role of S-O Associations or Pavlovian-Instrumental Transfer 
 Given the principles of learning that have been inferred from classical conditioning, it 
is reasonable to assume that the associative structure in instrumental learning is not 
restricted to S-R and R-O associations, but also includes the development of stimulus-
outcome (S-O) associations. Indeed, it has been suggested that an organism learns to 
predict a particular outcome during instrumental conditioning by means of an association 
between a situation and an outcome (Hull, 1930; Spence, 1956). The two-process theory 
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(Rescorla & Solomon, 1967) states that the predictive stimulus (cue) induces the 
instrumental response by eliciting an outcome-specific affective state such as hope for food 
or fear of pain. Alternatively, it has been suggested that an S-(O)-R association is formed 
(Trapold & Overier, 1972). According to this view, the expectancy of the outcome acts as an 
internal stimulus and hence becomes directly associated with the response. Research on 
Pavlovian-instrumental transfer has provided ample evidence for the notion that instrumental 
performance depends on S-O associations (Domjan, 1993). There is also evidence, 
however, that this may only be the case if the cue conveys reliable information about the 
upcoming outcome (e.g., Delamater, 1995). More recently, Berridge (2001) posited that the 
cue does not only trigger the process of “wanting” the outcome, but in itself acquires an 
incentive value as well. It has been shown that this kind of Pavlovian incentive value of the 
cue can be distinguished from a more complex cognitive expectation of the incentive value of 
the outcome, i.e., “the desire for the outcome” (Berridge, 2001). 
Competition and Cooperation of Goal-directed and Habitual Control 
 From our every-day life we know that there are many instances in which the goal-
directed action-outcome (A-O) system and the S-R habit system compete to gain control of 
behaviour. For example, if a deer suddenly jumps out in front of your car you have to 
suppress the habitual tendency to swerve. Instead, you should switch to a goal-directed 
mode of control that enables you to straighten the steering wheel, to brake firmly, and to take 
the foot off the brake as you impact. The relative dominance of habitual vs. goal-directed 
control has been found to depend on several conditions. As I pointed out above, habits are 
established as a result of overlearning. The stronger the S-R association grows, the more 
likely the stimulus becomes to guide response selection, particularly under time pressure and 
other stressful conditions (Schwabe, Wolf, & Oitzl, 2010). Furthermore, acute and chronic 
stress has been found to favour the habit learning system over the goal-directed learning 
system (Dias-Ferreira et al., 2009; Schwabe & Wolf, 2009). Conversely, the goal-directed 
system can quickly exert control over habitual response tendencies in the face of unexpected 
events, i.e., if habitual control turns out to be inappropriate (Hikosaka & Isoda, 2010). 
 9 
 In most cases, however, the two learning systems appear to work in a complementary 
rather than competitive fashion. Under stable environmental conditions, habitual control can 
be highly efficient, as it requires only few processing resources and thus allows for the 
simultaneous execution of several behavioural routines. Indeed, it has been suggested that 
action selection is a multi-step process in which stimulus-response associations (including O-
R associations) largely determine the initial choice of a response option and thereby initiate 
the evaluation of this option through the retrieval of the corresponding response-outcome 
association. Feed-forward response selection and feedback evaluative processes finally 
converge in the supra-threshold activation of a specific response representation (Balleine et 
al., 2009). This raises the question how disambiguation is accomplished if the two action 
controllers generate conflicting response tendencies. Adopting a computational RL 
framework, Daw, Niv, and Dayan (2005, 2006) proposed that the relative uncertainty of the 
predictions of the two learning systems determines whether habitual or goal-directed control 
is favoured. While habits are assumed to be implemented by a computational simple but 
inflexible model-free RL algorithm, the goal-directed system is assumed to instantiate a 
flexible and adaptive but computationally costly model-based algorithm. Both RL methods 
are discussed in more detail below. 
Computational Models of Reinforcement Learning 
 Computational approaches to RL where first considered in the 50s of the last century 
and have proven to be powerful tools for both explaining and predicting behavioural and 
neural correlates of learning over the last decades (Niv & Montague, 2008). Within the 
framework of RL algorithms, behavioural choice relies on the establishment of an optimal 
policy that maps a particular state s on the optimal action a, i.e., the action that leads to the 
largest expected sum of future rewards (Maia, 2009). A policy p(s,a) indicates the probability 
of choosing action a in state s and hence represents the strength of the S-R association. The 
learning of optimal policies can be accomplished via either model-free or model-based 
approaches. Model-based RL involves the development of an experience-based internal 
model of how the environment changes upon an agent’ s actions. Specifically, the agent 
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learns the conditional probability that an initial state s1 is followed by a state s2 when 
performing an action a (transition function,  T(s1, a, s2)) as well as the conditional probability 
of the corresponding reinforcements (reward function,  R(s1, a, s2)). The knowledge and 
continuous updating of the environmental dynamics do not only allow the agent to select 
appropriate actions, i.e., to find an optimal policy, but also enable them to flexibly adapt to 
changes in outcome value or transition contingencies (Dayan & Niv, 2008). In model-free RL, 
an optimal policy is estimated via trial-and-error, that is, without prior learning of an 
environmental model. Instead, behavioural choice relies on a recency-weighted average 
across successive “samples” of state-action-state sequences (Maia, 2009). Since transition 
probabilities and reward function are not explicitly learned, model-free RL does not allow for 
flexible adjustments to outcome revaluation or dynamic contingencies (Dayan & Niv, 2008). 
Model-free methods of behavioural choice involve error-correcting learning mechanisms that 
operate on inconsistencies between what has been predicted and what is actually 
happening. This concept can be traced back to the influential model of animal learning by 
Robert Rescorla and Allan Wagner (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972). 
The Rescorla-Wagner Model and the Importance of Expectancy in Learning 
 The Rescorla-Wagner model (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972) significantly advanced 
theoretical accounts on learning in highlighting the importance of expectancy. Specifically, 
Rescorla and Wagner suggested that learning only occurs if an event differs from what has 
been expected. More formally, the model states that changes in the associative strength V of 
a CS can be described by the following rule (Niv & Montague, 2008): 
Δ𝑉(𝐶𝑆𝑖) =  𝜂(𝐶𝑆𝑖,𝑈𝑆) �𝜆(𝑈𝑆) −�𝑉(𝐶𝑆𝑖
𝑖
)�. 
 According to this equation, learning only occurs if a difference exists between the 
prediction of the US due to all conditioned stimuli present in the situation (∑ V(CSii )) and the 
maximal associative strength possible with the given US (λ(US)). The parameter  η(CSi, US) 
denotes the learning rate that depends on the salience of both CS and US (η ≤ 1). Although 
the Rescorla-Wagner model made an important contribution to the field of RL by assuming 
 11 
that expectancy deviations are necessary for learning to take place, some findings are 
difficult to reconcile with its assumptions (for examples, see Domjan, 2003). In particular, the 
model does not address the critical aspect of temporal factors in conditioning. This decisive 
drawback led to the proposal of the so-called temporal-difference learning rule (Sutton & 
Barto, 1988) that extended the Rescorla-Wagner model to the time domain. 
Temporal Difference Learning and Prediction Errors 
 In temporal-difference (TD) learning, the agent estimates the value of states, i.e., the 
average sum of future rewards that can be obtained when choosing appropriate actions in 
the given state. The standard TD learning principle can be described by the following 
equation (Niv & Montague, 2008): 
Δ𝑉(𝑆𝑡) =  𝜂 �𝑟(𝑡) + 𝛾 � 𝑉�𝑆𝑘,𝑡+1� − 
𝑆𝑘,𝑡+1 �𝑉�𝑆𝑗,𝑡�𝑆𝑗,𝑡 �. 
 In contrast to the Rescorla-Wagner model, each time point t within a trial constitutes a 
specific state for which a value  V(St) is learned. Moreover, the stimuli Sj present at time  t  
are assumed to predict not only the immediate reward  r(t) but also the value of the following 
state  V(St+1), i.e., future rewards that are themselves predicted by the stimuli Sk present at  t + 1. The parameter  γ ≤ 1 denotes a discounting factor. Learning progresses as 
differences are evident between predicted (∑ V(Sj,t)Sj,t ) and actually obtained (r(t) +
γ∑ V�Sk,t+1�Sk,t+1 ) rewards. Therefore, the term  r(t) + γ∑ V�Sk,t+1�  − Sk,t+1 ∑ V�Sj,t�Sj,t  is also 
referred to as prediction error (PE)  δ(t). Note that the PE reflects both the reinforcement 
obtained at time t as well as the difference in value between state  St and the subsequent 
state St+1. Hence, a positive PE can indicate either the unexpected occurrence of a reward 
or the transition to a state with a higher value than was predicted. That is, external 
reinforcement signals are not necessary for the PE to be different from zero. Conversely, a 
negative PE simply means that an event is “worse than expected”. At the beginning of 
learning  V(St) is set to some initial value and then iteratively improved or “updated” across 
successive trials (≙ samples) according to (Niv & Montague, 2008): 
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V(St)new =  V(St)old + ηδ(t). 
 Thus, the PE is zero and no further learning occurs if both the immediate 
reinforcement and the value of V(St)new =  V(St)old + ηδ(t) are predicted exactly. In order to 
select optimal actions, however, the agent needs to know not only the value of a particular 
state but also what subsequent states the available actions lead to. In model-free RL, these 
transition probabilities remain unknown. One solution to this fundamental problem was 
provided by actor-critic methods that used the PE to improve both state value predictions and 
policies (Barto, 1995; Barto, Sutton, & Anderson, 1983). 
 
Figure 1: Schematic illustration of the actor/critic architecture. The critic computes the PE (δ(t)) based on 
information about the state (St) and the reward (r(t)). The PE is used by the critic to improve its own state value 
predictions V(St) and by the actor to improve the policy p(s,a). Figure adapted from Niv (2009). 
The Actor-Critic Architecture 
 The actor-critic consists of two basic units: the “adaptive critic” learns the state-value 
function according to TD principles and the “actor” learns action preferences for a given 
state, i.e., the policy (Maia, 2009). The critic calculates a PE that is used by the actor to 
improve action selection. A positive PE increases the probability of a recently chosen action 
a to be performed in state St, whereas a negative PE decreases this probability. The 
updating of the policy can be described as follows (Niv & Montage, 2008), 
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p(a|St)new =  p(a|St)old + ηpδ(t), 
with the parameter ηp ≤ 1  denoting the policy-specific learning rate. As can be seen from the 
equation, the actor applies the same TD rule to improve the policy as the critic does to 
update value estimation. Figure 1 illustrates the basic principles underlying actor-critic 
architectures. 
Computational Accounts of Model-based Reinforcement Learning 
 The computational principles underlying goal-directed action selection in model-based 
RL have been explored far less extensively than model-free methods, such as the TD 
algorithms described above (Botvinick & An, 2009; Hasselmo, 2005). As Daw and colleagues 
(Daw, Niv, & Dayan, 2005) have pointed out, model-based RL requires the agent to estimate 
the parameters of both the transition function and the reward function that in conjunction with 
the corresponding sets of states and actions constitute a model of the environment. Action 
selection is then achieved through exploring the model, i.e., searching for the optimal path in 
a complex tree-like structure of possible successor states (Dayan & Niv, 2008). The 
acquisition and application of this knowledge can be modelled within a Bayesian framework 
in which experience about transitions and rewards is used to update prior distributions over 
the parameters of the functions T and R (Tenenbaum, Griffiths, & Kemp, 2006; Toussaint & 
Storkey, 2006). The posterior distribution over T and R for any parameter values within the 
defined range indicates how likely they are to represent the true parameter values given the 
data observed so far. In the next iteration, this posterior distribution serves as the prior 
distribution and is updated again. Since prior and posterior distributions converge very 
quickly, the Bayesian approach provides appropriate estimates of transition and reward 
probabilities even in case of unstable environments. 
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Summary and Implications for the Present Study 
Research on both classical and instrumental conditioning has indicated that 
individuals rely on expectancies about the potential outcomes of situations in the course of 
RL. According to the Rescorla-Wagner model (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972) these 
expectancies are of primary importance as only surprising events that defy expectations can 
lead to successful learning. Modern computational accounts of RL have extended this basic 
claim to the time domain by invoking TD learning rules that define learning more broadly in 
terms of evaluating differences between predicted and actual values of subsequent states. 
Unexpectedly rewarding outcomes or high state values lead to a positive PE whereas a 
negative PE indicates that an outcome was worse than expected. Actions associated with a 
positive PE will consequently be performed more frequently in the future while the likelihood 
of actions corresponding to a negative PE decreases. 
 The present thesis is largely based on a neurocomputational model, has establishes 
a link between the PE and an ERP-components that are elicited when participants make 
mistakes and are presented with error feedback during RL tasks (Holroyd & Coles, 2002). 
Specifically, the model asserts that these components directly reflect negative PEs, making 
them suitable tools to examine the time-course of RL. 
Reinforcement Learning in the Brain 
 Computational models of RL have gained increasing popularity among 
neuroscientists during the last two decades, as the brain appears to implement some of the 
basic mechanisms and elements of these normative models (Niv & Montague, 2008). Most 
notably, electrophysiological recordings in non-human primates have revealed that phasic 
activity of midbrain dopamine (DA) neurons seems to code a PE signal during classical and 
instrumental conditioning (for reviews see Schultz, 2000, 2006, 2007, 2010). Moreover, 
functional neuroimaging studies in humans have provided evidence for PE signals in main 
cortical and subcortical projection areas of the midbrain DA system such as the prefrontal 
cortex (PFC) and the basal ganglia (BG) (O’Doherty et al., 2004; Pessiglione et al. 2006; 
Schönberg et al., 2007). The objective of the following section is to give an overview of the 
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dopamine reward prediction error hypothesis (Montague et al., 1996; Schultz et al., 1997) 
and how it relates to the neural implementation of RL. 
 
The Dopamine Reward Prediction Error Hypothesis 
The dopamine reward prediction error (DA-RPE) hypothesis was largely inspired by 
the work of Wolfram Schultz and colleagues that demonstrated a striking similarity between 
the phasic firing patterns of single dopaminergic neurons in the ventral tegmental area (VTA) 
of monkeys and the characteristics of TD prediction errors (Schultz et al. 1997). After the 
presentation of unexpected primary rewards or reward-predicting stimuli these neurons 
typically show a phasic increase in activation. Importantly, the response of these DA neurons 
does not appear to primarily relate to general processes of attention or arousal since it 
differentiates between rewards and salient non-rewarding events such as aversive stimuli 
(e.g., Mirenowicz & Schultz, 1996). The most striking finding, however, was that the 
dopaminergic firing pattern changed systematically over the course of learning in simple 
Pavlovian or instrumental conditioning tasks. 
 
Figure 2: Firing patterns of DA neurons from the VTA during instrumental learning. Top: Phasic increase in activity 
of DA neurons after an unpredicted reward (R). Middle: After learning, the phasic increase in activity of DA 
neurons occurs after the presentation of reward-predicting stimulus (CS), whereas DA neurons are no longer 
activated by the reward (R) itself. Bottom: If the predicted reward is not delivered (no R), activity of DA neurons is 
phasically depressed at the same time the reward should have occurred. (Figure adapted from Schultz, 1997). 
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Figure 2 illustrates that during the initial stages of instrumental learning the 
unpredicted reward elicits a phasic burst of DA neurons. After some practise with the task, 
cells respond to both the reward and the reward-predicting cue. Once learning is completed, 
DA neurons are only activated by the cue and no longer by the fully predicted reward. 
Instead, dopaminergic activity transiently drops below baseline if the predicted reward is 
unexpectedly omitted. This shift of the phasic DA response from the primary reward to the 
reward-predicting cue exactly mirrors the properties of a TD reward prediction error in that 
phasic increases and decreases code whether states are “better or worse than expected” 
(see also Bayer & Glimcher, 2005; Bayer, Lau, & Glimcher, 2007). Learning-related phasic 
dopaminergic signals have been shown to occur with latencies of less than 100 ms and 
durations of less than 200 ms (for reviews, see Schultz, 2007, 2010) and are thought to be 
functionally distinct from slower changes in tonic levels of extra-synaptic DA (e.g., Niv, 2007; 
Seamans & Yang, 2004). More recent studies have provided additional support for the DA-
RPE hypothesis by showing that the dopaminergic response reflects the magnitude and 
probability of expected rewards (Fiorillo et al. 2003, Tobler et al. 2005) as well as temporal 
discounting of delayed rewards (Roesch et al. 2007), and is consistent with behavioural 
phenomena like the blocking effect (Waelti et al., 2001). 
In humans, most evidence for the existence of a dopaminergic RPE signal has been 
inferred from functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies on reward learning. 
Correlates of RPEs have been found in areas that constitute major targets of dopaminergic 
afferents, such as the ventral and dorsal striatum (O’Doherty et al., 2004; Tanaka et al., 
2006) and prefrontal areas, including the orbitofrontal, dorsolateral, and ventrolateral cortex 
(Cohen, 2007; McClure et al., 2003; Rolls, McCabe, & Redoute, 2008). Moreover, it has 
been shown that RPE-related activity in the striatum correlates with learning performance 
(Schönberg et al., 2007) and that both the RPE-signal in the striatum and behavioural 
choices are modulated by the administration of DA agonists and antagonists (Pessiglione, 
Seymour, Flandin, Dolan, & Frith, 2006). Recent advances in imaging techniques have also 
revealed RPE-like activity directly in the human midbrain dopaminergic nuclei (D’Ardenne, 
McClure, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008) However, dopaminergic signals have been shown to 
subserve dissociable functions not only at different time-courses but also in different target 
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areas (Schultz, 2000; 2007), with distinct roles for phasic DA input to the PFC and the BG 
(Cools & D’Esposito, 2011; van Schouwenburg, Aaarts, & Colls, 2010). 
Dissociable Roles of Dopamine in the Basal Ganglia and the Prefrontal Cortex 
Midbrain dopaminergic activity is thought to influence neural processing through three 
major pathways (Björklund & Dunnett, 2007). The nigrostriatal pathway arises from DA cells 
in the zona compacta of the substantia nigra (SNc) that project mainly to the dorsal striatum. 
The mesolimbic and mesocortical pathways denote projections from the VTA to limbic 
regions, including the nucleus accumbens (ventral striatum), amygdala, and hippocampus 
(mesolimbic system) and frontal cortical regions, including the medial prefrontal, cingulate, 
and perirhinal cortex (mesocortical system).  
The Basal Ganglia and Action Selection 
Research on RL largely focused on dopaminergic projections to the striatum that is 
considered one of the two main input structures of the BG. The BG are a group of subcortical 
nuclei that have been assigned a pivotal role in action selection, specifically in the acquisition 
and expression of habits (for reviews, see Redgrave et al., 2010; Seger & Spiering, 2011; Yin 
& Knowlton, 2006). Indeed, early accounts assumed that the BG and reward-related 
dopaminergic input directly implement S-R learning as described by the Law of Effect, with 
reward-related information conveyed by dopaminergic input (e.g., Mishkin, Malamut, & 
Bachevalier, 1984). One of the most influential views on the BG architecture and function 
holds that the intrinsic connectivity pattern of the nuclei comprises a ‘direct’, a ‘indirect’, and a 
‘hyperdirect’ pathway (Albin, Young, & Penney, 1989). Crucially, it has been suggested that 
the ‘direct’ pathway facilitates the execution of appropriate actions in a given state, whereas 
the ‘indirect’ pathway inhibits inappropriate actions. Dopaminergic signals from VTA and SNr 
are thought to control the relative dominance of the two pathways (Albin et al., 1989; 
Redgrave et al., 2010). Recent computational models established a direct link between the 
‘gating’ function of the BG and the DA-RPE hypothesis in proposing that phasic DA bursts 
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and dips mediate RL in the BG circuits by strengthening or weakening synaptic plasticity 
within the ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ pathway, respectively (Maia & Frank, 2011). 
Different Cortico-Basal Ganglia-Cortical Loops Contribute to Reinforcement Learning 
The BG are connected with the cerebral cortex through parallel albeit partly 
overlapping cortico-basal ganglia-cortical loops, constituting functionally distinct networks 
processing motivational and affective (limbic network), cognitive (associative network), and 
sensorimotor-related information (Alexander, DeLong, & Strick, 1986; Draganski et al., 2008; 
see Figure 3). In the limbic network, the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), ventral PFC, and anterior 
cingulate cortex (ACC) project to more ventromedial regions of the striatum. The associative 
network involves projections from the prefontal and parietal association cortices (most 
notably the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, dlPFC) to the dorsomedial striatum, whereas the 
dorsolateral striatum receives major input from sensorimotor cortices (Draganski et al., 2008; 
Postuma & Dagher, 2006; Saint-Cyr, 2003). 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Corticobasal ganglia-cortical loops. Left: Schematic illustration of the parallel loops, conveying limbic 
(red), associative (yellow-green), and sensorimotor (blue-white) information. Right: The ring shows limbic (red), 
associative (yellow-green), and sensorimotor (blue-white) cortical regions. Within the ring the subdivisions of the 
striatum are depicted. Colors code subregions that receive the strongest input from the corresponding cortical 
regions. (Figure adapted from Redgrave et al., 2010). 
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In line with this structural organization, sensorimotor and associative systems are 
thought to mediate habitual S-R learning and goal-directed A-O learning, respectively (Yin & 
Knowlton, 2006). The limbic network has been implicated mainly in the learning of Pavlovian 
state values and is assumed to mediate motivational influences on both types of learning via 
inputs to the sensorimotor and associative loop (Balleine & O’Doherty, 2010). According to a 
related view (Ito & Doya, 2011), the ventral and dorsomedial striatum are critically involved in 
implementing model-based RL, while the dorsolateral striatum is considered a primary locus 
in mediating model-free RL. 
In support of this notion, human fMRI studies have revealed increased activation of 
the dorsomedial striatum, the OFC, and the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) for training on 
schedules promoting goal-directed responding (high A-O contingency) compared to training 
on schedules promoting habitual responding (low A-O contingency) (Hampton, Bossaerts, & 
O’Doherty, 2006; Tanaka, Balleine, & O’Doherty, 2008). Moreover, Valentin and colleagues 
(2007) demonstrated that activity in the OFC exhibited sensitivity to outcome devaluation in 
instrumental learning, which is consistent with the presumed role of this region in 
representing the value of goals and action outcomes (Kringelbach et al., 2003; O’Doherty et 
al., 2001; Plassmann et al., 2007). Conversely, activity in the dorsolateral striatum has been 
shown to track the progression from goal-directed to habitual responding (Tricomi et al., 
2009).  
Within the framework of actor-critic architectures, the dorsolateral striatum has been 
assigned the role of the actor that learns the policy (S-R associations). The critic, which 
learns state values (S-O associations) and calculates the RPE has been associated with the 
ventral striatum (O’Doherty et al., 2004), possibly working in tandem with the OFC and the 
amygdala (Maia, 2009) - two structures that are closely connected to both the ventral 
striatum and the midbrain DA system (Rempel-Clower, 2007). This implies that ventral and 
dorsolateral striatum should be differentially engaged in Pavlovian and instrumental 
conditioning, as only the latter involves outcome-guided action selection. In support of the 
assertion that the ventral and dorsal striatum are concerned with outcome prediction and 
instrumental responding, respectively, a number of fMRI studies found RPE-like signals in 
the ventral striatum during both types of learning whereas RPE-like signals in the dorsal 
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striatum arose only during instrumental learning (O’ Doherty et al., 2004; Tricomi, et al., 
2009; Valentin & O’Doherty, 2009). Moreover, recent evidence indicated that the ventral 
striatum was involved in both reward-based and punishment-based RL (Robinson et al., 
2010, Delgado, Jou, & Phelps, 2011). Although the actor/critic RL model implies that the 
computational function of dopaminergic signals is confined to habit learning, the involvement 
of the dorsomedial striatum in action-outcome learning as well as the strong dopaminergic 
projections to the PFC suggest that DA also contributes to goal-directed behavioural control. 
The Role of Dopamine in the Prefrontal Cortex 
The PFC is comprised of a collection of heterogeneous structures that have been 
assigned distinct functional roles in RL. Cytoarchitecturally, the PFC can be divided into the 
following subregions (Ridderinkhof, van Wildenberg, Segalowitz, & Carter, 2004): (1) the 
OFC, (2) the lateral PFC, including the dorsolateral PFC (BA3
It should be noted that DA-mediated effects on PFC neurons have been shown to be 
relatively long-lasting and thus do not appear to match the functional properties of a PE 
signal (Seamans & Yang, 2004). Theoretical and empirical work has instead indicated 
complementary functions for DA in the BG and the PFC (Frank & Claus, 2006; Hazy, Frank; 
& O’Reilly, 2006; Leber, Turk-Browne, & Chun, 2008; McNab & Klingberg, 2008). 
Specifically, it has been suggested that striatal DA may promote flexible updating of mental 
9/46, 46, and 8a), and (3) 
medial frontal cortex (MFC), including the ACC (BA 24, 25 and 32). The PFC, including 
orbitofrontal, dorsolateral, and anterior cingulate regions, is richly innervated by midbrain DA 
neurons via the mesocortical pathway (for reviews, see Arnsten, 1998; Floresco & Magyar, 
2006; Cools & D’Esposito, 2011). Dopamine neurotransmission in prefrontal regions has 
been shown to exert strongly modulatory influences on a variety of cognitive and executive 
functions such as working memory, behavioural flexibility, decision making, and attentional 
control (for reviews, see Cohen, Braver, & Brown, 2002; & D’Esposito, 2011; Floresco & 
Magyar, 2006). 
                                                 
3 Brodmann Area 
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representations in the PFC, whereas frontal DA has been linked to stable maintenance of 
current representations (Cools & D’Esposito, 2011). 
 Substantial evidence for a role of frontal DA in the stabilization of working memory 
representations has been provided by human fMRI studies which demonstrated that 
functionally selective improvements and impairments of working memory performance due to 
DA agonists and antagonists are accompanied by activity changes in dlPFC, cingulate 
cortex, and insula (e.g., Gibbs & D’Esposito, 2005). At the cellular level, DA receptor 
stimulation in the PFC has been proposed to increase the signal-to-noise ratio in terms of 
attenuating neuronal firing associated with all but the most strongly activated memory states 
(Seamans & Yang, 2004; Thurley, Senn, & Luscher, 2008; Williams & Goldman-Rakic, 
1995). DA transmission to the PFC might hence support the stable maintenance of task-
relevant information, protecting those representations from interference by task-irrelevant 
distractors. In support of this notion, the Val/Met polymorphism in the catechol-O-
methyltransferase (COMT) gene, which is thought to determine prefrontal DA levels in 
humans, has been shown to predict individual differences in working memory performance. 
Met-allele carriers which are characterized by low COMT activity and high prefrontal DA 
levels perform better in tasks requiring the persistent stabilization of task-relevant 
presentations than Val-allele carriers characterized by high COMT activity and low prefrontal 
DA (Frank, Moustafa, Haughey, Curran, & Hutchison, 2007a; Meyer-Lindenberg et al., 2005).  
As I pointed out earlier, the BG are thought to subserve a dynamic gating function for 
information flow to the cortex via cortico-basal ganglia-cortical loops. In particular, phasic 
bursts and dips in DA are assumed to increase and decrease the likelihood of an action 
being performed through modulations of plasticity in the direct and indirect pathway, 
respectively (Frank, 2005). The described architecture of the cortico-basal ganglia-cortical 
circuits renders it likely that the BG gate not only motor programs (sensorimotor loop), but 
also cognitive information (associative loop) to the PFC (Frank, 2005). In line with this view, 
increased striatal activation has been observed during tasks requiring rapid updating of 
cognitive representations such as reversal learning and task switching (Leber, Turk-Browne, 
& Chun, 2008; Cools, Clark, & Robbins, 2004). Notably, performance in those tasks is also 
susceptible to DA agonists and antagonists that appear to selectively influence BG activity 
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during flexible updating in response to new input and PFC activity during active maintenance 
(Cools et al., 2007; Dodds et al., 2009). Consistent with the proposed functional dichotomy, a 
reciprocal relationship has been observed between DA levels in the striatum and the PFC 
(Meyer-Lindenberg et al., 2005). 
Alternatively, it has been suggested that the balance between stable maintenance 
and appropriate updating of task-relevant representations may be regulated by phasic vs. 
tonic dopaminergic activity (Cohen, Braver, & Brown, 2002). According to this view, phasic 
increases in DA trigger the transient gating of new information into the PFC and thereby also 
provide a RL signal for learning when to update, whereas DA dips rapidly deactivate the PFC 
and thus “clear” working memory contents. By comparison, tonic DA levels are assumed to 
stabilize currently active working memory representations. Biophysically sophisticated 
models, however, have challenged this account by emphasizing the prevalence of tonic DA 
in PFC functioning (Brunel & Wang, 2001; Durstewitz & Seamans, 2002). In particular, 
several researchers have posited that the kinetics of DA transmission in the mesocortical 
pathway do not match the requirements of a phasic learning signal that triggers rapid 
updating of PFC representations4
Either way, the PFC has been strongly implicated in model-based learning and is 
assumed to exert a top-down biasing influence on the activity of the model-free RL system, 
possibly mediated by hierarchical interactions between dorsomedial and dorsolateral cortico-
striatal loops (Daw et al., 2005; 2006a; Frank et al., 2007a; Miller & Cohen, 2001). This is in 
line with the observation that value-related signals in OFC and MFC vary as a function of 
response-outcome contingencies and outcome devaluation (Hampton et al., 2006; Tanaka et 
al., 2008). Moreover, it has been suggested that the PFC, most notably the ACC, is not only 
a recipient of phasic dopaminergic effects but also drives phasic activity of the midbrain DA 
 (Jocham & Ullsperger, 2009; Seaman & Yang, 2004). 
                                                 
4 In an attempt to resolve these inconsistencies, Cohen and colleagues (2002) argued that two distinct receptor 
types mediate phasic and tonic effects of DA in the PFC. The authors associated the tonic maintenance effects 
with the slow acting D1 receptor type and the phasic updating and RL effects with the more rapidly acting D2 
receptor type (Seamans, Gorelova, Durstewitz, & Yang, 2001; Semans & Yang, 2004). Given that the number of 
D2 receptors is much larger in the striatum than in the PFC (Seamans & Yang, 2004), however, it seems 
reasonable to assign a pivotal role in updating PFC representations to the cortico-striatal circuits rather than the 
“direct” mesocortical DA pathway. 
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system (Frank et al., 2005; Jocham & Ullsperger, 2009; Strafella, Paus, Barrett, & Dagher, 
2001). The following section summarizes some compelling demonstrations of how activity in 
the PFC might impact RL in a top-down (or model-based) manner. 
Rapid Trial-To-Trial Learning in the Hippocampus-Prefrontal Cortex System 
 On the basis of the theoretical and empirical work that has established a close link 
between the PFC and adaptive action selection, Frank and colleagues (Doll, Jacobs, Sanfey, 
& Frank, 2009; Frank & Claus, 2006) suggested that the active maintenance of task-relevant 
information in the PFC is likely to exert a top-down influence on response selection mediated 
by the more slowly learning BG system. Specifically, they proposed that the OFC maintains 
information concerning the magnitude of recent response outcomes in working memory, 
thereby biasing behavioural adaptation on a trial-by-trial basis. By comparison, the dlPFC is 
usually assigned a key role in the maintenance of task set, particularly in the implementation 
of behavioural goals and rules (Miller & Cohen, 2001; Tanji & Hoshi, 2008). 
In several genetics studies, Frank and colleagues demonstrated that COMT genotype 
determined trial-to-trial behavioural adjustments in probabilistic reinforcement learning tasks 
(Frank et al., 2007a; Frank, D’Lauro, & Curran, 2007b; Frank et al., 2009). For example, Met-
allele carriers, which are characterized by higher prefrontal DA levels, showed a greater 
tendency to slow down and switch their response after negative feedback than did Val-allele 
carriers with lower prefrontal DA levels (Frank et al., 2007a). The authors explained this 
finding in terms of Met-allele carriers being able to better maintain the outcome of a particular 
response across several intervening trials. Furthermore, a recent study used spectral 
Granger causality analyses to demonstrate a stronger top-down-directed functional 
connectivity between the MFC, most likely the ACC, and the ventral striatum when rewards 
were anticipated compared to a no-reward condition (Cohen et al, 2011). The notion of a top-
down biasing influence of the PFC is also consistent with reports of performance deficits 
during early stages of probabilistic learning in patients with OFC lesions (Chase et al., 2008). 
Rapid behavioural adaptation after the reversal of the response-outcome contingencies is 
assumed to rely strongly on robust working memory representations of recent outcomes. 
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Nonetheless, the OFC-lesioned patients were able to respond appropriately after extensive 
training on the new rule, suggesting that the habitual learning system is spared. 
A similar dissociation has been observed for patients with lesions of the medial 
temporal lobe (MTL) memory system (Bayley, Frascino, & Squire, 2005; Shohamy, Myers, 
Kalanithi, & Gluck, 2008). The hippocampus and the surrounding MTL have been extensively 
studied within the framework of episodic memory (Eichenbaum & Cohen, 2001) and are 
thought to be significantly involved in explicit, non-incremental learning processes (Shohamy 
et al., 2008; Shohamy & Adcock, 2010). In particular, the MTL memory system supports the 
rapid (“one-trial”) formation of conjunctive representations linking multiple aspects of an 
event. Interestingly, hippocampal function also appears to be directly modulated by 
dopaminergic input, reflected in a DA-dependent facilitation of episodic memory formation 
(Adcock et al., 2006; Krebs et al., 2009). In RL tasks, hippocampus and MTL might thus 
support explicit memorizing of correct and incorrect choices after a single trial in which a 
certain stimulus-response pairing is followed by a rewarding vs. non-rewarding outcome. 
Indeed, several findings have indicated that during early stages of learning the MTL memory 
system contributes to the development of explicit rules for responding (Frank et al., 2004; 
Frank, O’Reilly, & Curran, 2006; Poldrack et al., 2001). 
Whereas hippocampus and MTL have been associated with the encoding and 
storage of these rules, the PFC is assumed to be critically involved in the retrieval and active 
maintenance of abstract rules and explicit contingencies5
                                                 
5 Note, however, that the PFC has also been implicated in other aspects of episodic memory, e.g. during 
encoding (for review, see Paller & Wagner, 2002). 
 (Badre, Kayser, & D’Esposito, 
2011; Bunge & Souza, 2008). Combining computational modelling with analyses of genetic 
variants of dopaminergic neurotransmission, Doll and colleagues (Doll et al. 2009; Doll, 
Hutchison, & Frank, 2011) showed that rule-like representations in the PFC might lead to a 
confirmatory bias, so that rule-consistent evidence is overweighed, whereas rule-inconsistent 
evidence is discounted by the BG system. Moreover, these cognitive strategies are 
accompanied by systematic changes in striatal activity in reward-based learning (Delgado, 
Gillis, & Phelps, 2008). In line with the above findings, recent evidence from human 
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neuroimaging indicated that the PE signal in the ventral striatum reflected not only model-
free but also model-based evaluation (i.e., learned rules) indicating close interactions 
between the different learning systems (Daw et al., 2011). 
In sum, potential dopaminergic influences on RL are apparently not restricted to PE 
signalling in the striatum and model-free habitual behavioural control. Instead, DA also 
modulates working memory functions and explicit rule learning and acts on regions like the 
PFC and the hippocampus that have been associated with model-based, goal-directed 
control. Moreover, a highly integrated architecture underlies RL, implemented by 
corticostriatal interactions through hierarchical spiraling connections between corticostriatal 
loops from ventromedial (limbic) via dorsomedial (associative) to dorsolateral (sensorimotor) 
subregions (Haber, Fudge, & MacFarland, 2000). 
The Integration of Cognition, Emotion, and Action in the Anterior Cingulate Cortex 
 Alongside the BG, the ACC is considered one of the key structures implementing RL 
and adaptive decision-making. One of the most characteristic features of this brain region is 
its involvement in a broad range of functions, including emotion and motivation, autonomic 
control, pain, and action selection (for reviews, see Bush, Luu, & Posner, 2000; Rushworth & 
Behrens, 2008; Paus, 2001; Shackman et al., 2011). Neuroanatomically, the ACC is ideally 
positioned to synthesize behaviourally relevant information from multiple sources through its 
reciprocal interconnections with OFC, ventral striatum, hippocampus, amygdala, insula, and 
the midbrain DA nuclei. In addition, the ACC’s strong connectivity with the lateral PFC, 
premotor and motor cortices implies that this information can be directly integrated with 
current behavioural goals in order to guide instrumental behaviours. Indeed, it is increasingly 
acknowledged that the ACC uses reinforcement information to implement adaptive 
behavioural control (Rushworth & Behrens, 2008; Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Holroyd & Yeung, 
2011; Shackman et al., 2011). 
 Considerable evidence for an evaluative function of the ACC has been inferred from 
human electrophysiological studies on performance monitoring and learning. In particular, 
significant insight has been gained from examining two components in the scalp-recorded 
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electroencephalogram (EEG), sometimes termed the error negativity (Falkenstein, 
Hohnsbein, & Hoormann, 1990) and feedback-related negativity (Miltner et al., 1997), that 
are elicited when participants make mistakes and are presented with error feedback, 
respectively. Both components are thought to be generated in the ACC (Debener et al., 
2005) and might reflect PE-like signals that are used to flexibly adjust behaviour after 
response errors or negative feedback (Chase et al., 2011; Cohen & Ranganath, 2007; 
Holroyd & Coles, 2002; van der Helden, Boksem, & Blom, 2010). The ACC thus appears to 
be critically involved in the detection and correction of discrepancies between the intended or 
anticipated and the actual outcomes of an action – a key component of cognitive control that 
is commonly referred to as performance (or action) monitoring. 
The Anterior Cingulate Cortex Encodes Action Values 
 Theoretical accounts on ACC functioning, however, disagree with respect to what 
exactly is monitored, with proposals including errors, error likelihood, response conflict, and 
several other phenomena (Brown, 2009; Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Yeung, Botvinick, & Cohen, 
2004). Moreover, there is some debate as to whether the functional role of the ACC is 
restricted to detecting the need for control that is mediated by other brain regions, e.g., the 
dlPFC (Gehring & Knight, 2000; Yeung et al., 2004) or directly involves the implementation of 
control in order to optimize behavioural choice (Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Holroyd & Yeung, 
2011; Mansouri, Tanaka, & Buckley, 2009). The latter view is supported by the ACC’s dense 
connectivity with motor areas as well as human neuroimaging and lesion studies indicating 
its fundamental contribution to voluntary action generation (Paus, 2001). Notably, the ACC 
has been proposed to provide the neural substrate for uncertainty-based arbitration between 
model-free and model based control (Daw et al., 2005) and high-level behavioural option 
selection (Holroyd & Yeung, 2011). 
 These controversies notwithstanding, previous research demonstrated that the ACC 
encodes a type of PE signal in a variety of learning tasks in both humans and monkeys 
(Amiez, Joseph, & Procyk, 2006; Hester, Barre, Murphy, Silk, & Mattingley, 2008; Jocham, 
Neumann, Klein, Danielmeier, & Ullsperger, 2009; Kennerley, Walton, Behrens, Buckley, & 
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Rushworth, 2006; Matsumoto, Matsumoto, Abe & Tanaka, 2007; Schiller, Levy, Niv, LeDoux, 
& Phelps, 2008). In support of this notion, human fMRI studies showed that error-related 
ACC activation predicted future performance in an associative learning task (Hester et al., 
2008). Moreover, negative PE-related activity in the ACC was directly related to learning rate, 
i.e., to the weight of the PE in updating action values (Jocham et al., 2009). Interestingly, 
faster learning rates have been observed in rapidly changing environments, when subjects 
had to rely more strongly on recent response outcomes (Rushworth & Behrens, 2008). In 
addition, Behrens and colleagues (2007) observed a correlation between individual estimates 
of this environmental volatility and outcome-related ACC activation. Hence, the ACC might 
encode the behavioural impact or informative value of a given action outcome in accordance 
with the specific environmental demands. 
Further evidence for a specific link between the PE-like activity in the ACC and action 
selection comes from studies comparing the effects of OFC vs. ACC lesions on Pavlovian vs. 
instrumental reversal-learning (Kennerley & Walton, 2011). In one of these studies, 
Rudebeck and colleagues (2008) found that ACC-lesioned animals were severely impaired in 
learning instrumental reversals but showed virtually no deficits when the task required an 
update of stimulus-reward associations. By contrast, animals with OFC lesions showed the 
opposite pattern in that their performance was unaffected when action-reward associations 
were to be learned but strongly disrupted in the stimulus-reinforcement reversal-learning 
task. These findings substantiate the notion that ACC and OFC differentially contribute to 
adaptive decision-making: whereas the ACC appears to be more strongly involved in linking 
action-reinforcement history to future action selection, the OFC seems to be critical for the 
representation of the expected value of stimuli (Rushworth, Behrens, Rudebeck, & Walton, 
2007). In line with the cited animal research, ACC lesions in humans are generally 
accompanied by deficits in error detection and error-related remedial actions (Di Pellegrino, 
Ciaramelli, & Làdavas, 2007; Stemmer, Segalowitz, Witzke, & Schonle, 2004; Swick & 
Turken, 2002). Patients with OFC damage, in contrast, are principally impaired in detecting 
changes in the reward value of stimuli (Hornak et al., 2004). However, recent evidence from 
human neuroimaging indicated that the medial OFC also encodes action-related value 
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representations and is involved in action-based reversal learning, suggesting a general role 
for this structure in goal-directed behaviour (Gläscher, Hampton, & O’Doherty, 2009). 
The above section has highlighted the ACC’s potential contribution to reinforcement-
guided action selection. Yet, this region is also known to play an important part in emotion 
and motivation. In the following section I will first sketch a highly influential account on 
functional segregation within the ACC. Then I will discuss the ‘adaptive control hypothesis’ 
that has been formulated by Shackman and colleagues (2011) in an attempt to provide an 
integrative account on the ACC’s activity based on recent challenges to the segregationist 
view. 
The Anterior Cingulate Cortex Contributes to Emotional and Motivational Processing 
The ACC is not a homogeneous cortical structure, but can be divided into different 
subdivisions with distinct cytoarchitectural properties and connectivity patterns (Vogt et al., 
1992). A prominent view on functional segregation within the ACC holds that the rostral-
ventral division (rACC) is mainly involved affective processing, whereas the dorsal division 
(dACC) subserves cognitive functions (Bush, Luu, & Posner, 2000; Devinsky et al., 1995; 
see Figure 4). 
 
 
Figure 4: The segregationist model of ACC functioning: cognitive division (red) vs. the affective division (blue) 
(Figure adapted from Bush et al., 2000) 
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The segregationist model draws on neuroanatomical and functional neuroimaging 
evidence. As Bush and colleagues (2000) pointed out, the rostral ‘affective’ subdivision 
receives massive input from limbic regions, including associated structures like the OFC and 
the ventral striatum, and projects to the autonomic and visceral system. Hence, the rACC is 
well positioned to process the affective and motivational salience of an event and to regulate 
emotional responses. By comparison, the dACC has been suggested to maintain only few 
connections to “affect- and motivation-related” brain regions and instead is richly 
interconnected with lateral prefrontal, parietal, and motor regions. Accordingly, the dACC is 
assumed to subserve a variety of executive control functions, including performance 
monitoring, working memory, and effort-related decision-making. Bush and colleagues 
(2000) reviewed several fMRI findings and meta-analyses that support their proposal. More 
recently, two fMRI studies reported increased phasic rACC activation in response to errors 
that were financially penalized compared to errors that did not result in monetary losses, 
whereas phasic dACC activation did not differentiate between these error types (Simões-
Franklin, Hester, Shpaner, Foxe, & Garavan, 2010; Taylor et al., 2006). 
Using the advanced technique of coordinate-based meta-analysis, Shackman and 
colleagues (2011), however, provided evidence for a considerable overlap of neural 
activation foci for a large database including 192 imaging studies of cognitive control, 
negative affect, and pain. The identified cluster of activation overlap roughly corresponded to 
the rostral cingulate zone (RCZ), a premotor area lying in the vicinity of the cingulate sulcus 
(Morecraft & Tanji, 2009). Note that the RCZ belongs to the ‘cognitive’ division of the ACC 
according to the segregationist model of Bush and coworkers (2000). Shackman and 
colleagues (2011) reviewed neuroanatomical and functional evidence indicating that the 
ACC, including the RCZ, is a ‘hub-like’ convergence zone in which affectively and 
motivationally relevant information is linked to motor areas involved in implementing and 
synchronizing instrumental motor output. Specifically, their ‘adaptive control hypothesis’ 
holds that the ACC implements a domain-general function of integrating punishment-related 
information in order to bias instrumental responding and to arbitrate between competing 
motor controllers, particularly in unstable and threatening environments when habitual control 
fails to effectively guide behaviour. Consistent with this notion, the ACC has been found to 
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encode a PE signal in several studies using aversive learning procedures (Menon et al., 
2007; Schiller et al., 2008; Seymour et al., 2004). Considerable evidence, however, points to 
an additional involvement of the ACC in reward-related processing and positive affect (for 
reviews, see Haber & Knutson, 2010; Liu, Hairston, Schrier, & Fan, 2010), encouraging the 
view that this structure might contribute to the evaluation of both positive and negative 
response outcomes in the service of signalling the need for behavioural change (cf. Magno, 
Simões-Franklin, Robertson, & Garavan, 2008). 
Summary and Implications for the Present Study 
The DA-RPE hypothesis posits that phasic activity of midbrain DA neurons code a PE 
signal during classical and instrumental conditioning (Schultz, 2000; 2006; 2007; 2010). 
Functional neuroimaging research in humans corroborated the notion that activity in a 
network of cortical and subcortical dopaminergic systems reflects RL mechanisms involved 
in the estimation and utilization of PE. Whereas sensorimotor and associative cortico-striatal 
loops are thought to mediate habitual S-R learning and goal-directed A-O learning (Yin & 
Knowlton, 2006), the ventral striatum and the OFC have been implicated in the learning of 
Pavlovian state values and the computation of PEs (O’Doherty et al., 2004; Tricomi, et al., 
2009; Valentin & O’Doherty, 2009). It has been suggested that phasic dopaminergic 
transmission to the BG promotes flexible updating of mental representations in the PFC, 
whereas frontal DA has been linked to stable maintenance of current representations (Cools 
& D’Esposito, 2011). Moreover, prefrontal and MTL regions have been associated with 
explicit rule learning (model-based learning) and are thought to exert a top-down biasing 
influence on model-free incremental RL in the BG (Daw et al., 2005; Doll, Jacobs, Sanfey, & 
Frank, 2009; Frank & Claus, 2006). In particular, neuroimaging and electrophysiological 
research has indicated a prominent role for the ACC in RL, which acts as an interface 
between affective/motivational and cognitive processing and can thus mediate the flexible 
adjustment of behaviour in response to errors and/or negative feedback according to specific 
situational demands. Of note, the ACC is also thought to underlie the generation of the ERP-
correlates of error and feedback processing this thesis focuses on. 
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On the Significance of Affective and Motivational Context in Learning and Adaptive 
Decision Making 
 The above discussion on the functional properties of the ACC underlines the need to 
explore the performance-monitoring system in terms of both cognitive and motivational-
emotional mechanisms. Indeed, researchers have increasingly acknowledged the close 
interaction between cognitive, motivational, and emotional processes in mediating adaptive 
behavioural control (Etkin & Egner, & Kalisch, 2010; Pessoa, 2008; 2009; Pessoa & 
Engelmann, 2010). Moreover, it has been suggested that there is no clear distinction 
between cognition and emotion at both the functional and the neuroanatomical level 
(Pessoa, 2008; Salzman & Fusi, 2008). In the following sections, I will briefly introduce the 
concepts of ‘motivation’ and ‘emotion’. This overview is followed by a sketch of how 
motivational and emotional processes are incorporated into cognitive control and learning. 
Basic Concepts 
 The terms ‘emotion’ and ‘motivation’ denote two closely linked, complex constructs 
referring to abstract inner states of an individual (LeDoux, 2002; Roseman, 2008). Emotions 
are commonly thought to provide an evaluation of the relationship between an organism and 
its environment whereas motivation concerns temporal aspects (initiation, maintenance, 
stopping), intensity, and direction of behavioural responses (LeDoux, 2002; Pessoa, 2009; 
Roseman, 2008; Rothermund & Eder, 2011). Emotions have been assigned a critical role in 
the regulation of motivated behaviours and are assumed to activate specific behavioural 
tendencies, most notably appetitive and aversive motivational circuits (Lang & Bradley, 
2008). Hence, emotions themselves appear to be ‘motivators’. Since it has been proven 
difficult to find clear definitions of both motivation and emotion and to distinguish these 
concepts from cognition, I will use the terms for partly overlapping processes in the following. 
Concepts of Motivation and their Relevance for Learning 
 Early theories of motivation were intimately linked to the concepts of drive and 
homeostasis (Berridge, 2004; Rothermund & Eder, 2011). According to these theoretical 
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accounts, unspecific internal states of tension (drives) push an organism to engage in 
behaviours that results in the reduction of this tension (drive reduction), thereby restoring a 
state of physiological equilibrium that has survival value. Drives are thought to arise from 
specific, biologically determined needs (physiological depletion states) and are perceived as 
aversive by an organism, whereas drive reduction is associated with satisfaction and 
pleasure. Learning theorists soon recognized the usefulness of the drive concept as an 
intervening “organism” variable in S-R explanations of behaviour (e.g., Hull, 1943; Tolman, 
1932). For instance, Hull’s motivation theory (1943) proposed that frequency and intensity of 
a behavioural response to a specific stimulus depend on both the association strength and 
the drive strength. In later versions of the model, the concept of incentive expectations, i.e., 
learned expectations of hedonic reward, was additionally incorporated as a motivational 
component (Hull, 1952). Hull assumed that drives only have an unspecific energizing 
function, whereas the learned S-R association determines the direction of behaviour. 
However, some kind of motivation is still necessary for RL to occur. Thorndike (1913) already 
introduced the concept of “preparedness” to explain the observation that food does not 
support the establishment of new S-R associations, unless the animal has been deprived of 
nutrition. As I have pointed out above, learned S-O expectations play a critical role in 
motivating instrumental behaviour. Modern concepts of incentive motivation suggest that 
physiological depletion states specifically increase the incentive value of the corresponding 
rewards and reward-predicting stimuli (e.g., Toates, 1986).  
 Incentive motivation is closely related to the concept of valence that can be traced 
back to Lewin’s Field Theory of Learning (Lewin, 1942). According to Lewin, behaviour is a 
function of both the person and the environment in which learning takes place. Objects in the 
environment gain affordance character - or positive valence - if they have the potential to 
satisfy psychological needs. Conversely, elements of the environment can also repel an 
individual and hence have negative valence. This dichotomy roughly corresponds to the 
fundamental distinction of approach vs. avoidance motivation thought to underlie adaptive 
decisions (Elliott, 2008). The concepts of valence and expectancy have been integrated in 
expectancy-value theories of motivation (Atkinson, 1957; Eccles et al., 1983; Wigfield, 1994). 
A common denominator of these cognitive-rational accounts is the assumption that the 
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resulting behavioural tendency is a function of (1) the value an individual assigns to the 
predicted outcome of an action, including the perceived instrumentality of an action to attain 
current and future goals, and (2) the subjective degree of confidence that the action will 
actually lead to the predicted outcome. These and similar ideas highlight the close relation 
between contemporary theories of motivation and goal-directed, model-based learning. 
Emotions as Dispositions for Actions 
 Several attempts have been made to distinguish emotions from other affective 6
 The cognitive component of emotions refers directly to the information they convey 
about the specific value that is assigned to any object, including states and actions (Clore & 
Huntsinger, 2007). Hence, it signifies the critical role of emotions in guiding instrumental 
behaviours. Moreover, affective states have been proposed to promote specific modes of 
information processing (Clore & Huntsinger, 2007; Gray, 2004). For instance, the ‘affect-as-
information’-hypothesis posits that positive affect signals the absence of threat and hence 
results in more heuristic or global processing, whereas negative affect promotes more 
careful, analytic processing (Clore & Huntsinger, 2007; Mitchell & Philipps, 2007). 
 
phenomena, such as feelings, mood, and affect dispositions (Rothermund & Eder, 2011; 
Scherer, 2005). Central to these efforts are so-called ‘component-process’ definitions that 
conceptualize emotions as multi-dimensional constructs (e.g., Scherer, 2005). Specifically, it 
has been suggested that emotion episodes include (1) a cognitive component (appraisal), (2) 
a neurophysiological component (body states), (3) a motivational component (behavioural 
tendencies), (4) a motor expression component, and (5) a subjective feeling component 
(emotional experience) (Scherer, 2005). According to this view, feelings constitute only a 
specific subcomponent of emotions, whereas moods refer to rather diffuse and enduring 
affective states that cannot be directly associated with specific appraisals and usually affect 
cognition rather than action (e.g. Davidson, 1994). Affect disposition denotes an individual’s 
tendency to react with certain emotions to an eliciting event or to preferentially experience 
particular kinds of moods, as will be discussed in more detail below. 
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Importantly, the component-process definition implies striking similarities of emotion 
and motivation at a functional level. Adopting a phylogenetic perspective, Lang and Bradley 
(2008) described emotions as “survival-based dispositions to actions”. According to this, 
emotions are elicited by the activation of appetitive motivational circuits, promoting positive 
affect, and defensive motivational circuits, promoting negative affect. These motivational 
systems have been hypothesized to directly enhance attention and perceptual processing as 
well as influence motor output systems. This becomes particularly evident in the automatic 
engagement and/or modulation of somatic and autonomic reflexes, such as orienting and 
startle reflexes, upon the presentation of rewarding or threatening stimuli in both animals and 
humans (e.g., Bradley et al., 2001; Lang et al., 1997). In complex organisms, the adaptive 
value of emotion-mediated automatic evaluation is complemented by more deliberate, 
rational processing (Frank, Cohen, & Sanfey, 2009; Miller & Cohen, 2001). 
Specifically, it has been suggested that emotion and motivation are integrated with 
cognitive control processes so as to bias information processing and behaviour selection 
according to specific situational demands (Gray, 2004; Pessoa, 2009). Affective and 
motivational significance are thought to influence competition between limited processing 
resources and to arbitrate between multiple conflicting modes of information processing and 
response tendencies, i.e., to resolve control dilemmas. This may be reflected in prioritized 
processing of emotional stimuli (see also Vuilleumier, 2005) and enhanced engagement of 
effortful control mechanisms, e.g., leading to improved error or conflict detection and 
resolution. However, task-irrelevant emotional distractors typically have a negative effect on 
task performance (e.g., Blair et al., 2007; Verbruggen & De Houwer, 2007). Task-irrelevant 
affect-related processing is thought to consume limited resources, resulting in a reduction in 
available cognitive capacity (e.g., Seibert & Ellis, 1991). Moreover, intense emotional 
reactions prompt down-regulatory mechanisms that are thought to strongly rely on brain 
areas associated with cognitive control functions (Gross & Thompson, 2007; Ochsner & 
Gross, 2005), which may result in further depletion of shared resources (Inzlicht & Gutsell, 
2007). Motivational and affective significance can hence either improve or impair behavioural 
                                                                                                                                                        
6 The term ‘affect’ is used to denote several states involving relatively rapid valence appraisals and thus share 
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performance, depending on several factors, such as task-relevance and intensity of affective-
motivational content (Pessoa, 2009; Pessoa & Engelmann, 2010). 
Personality Traits Related to Motivation and Emotion 
 Dispositional concepts of motivation and emotion have been considered useful in 
explaining interindividual variability in behaviour in the face of identical external stimuli 
(Berridge, 2004; Heckhausen & Heckhausen, 2006). Motivation and affect dispositions (or 
traits) refer to the relatively stable tendency of an individual to show particular motivations 
and emotions in particular situations (Asendorpf, 2007; Heckhausen & Heckhausen, 2006). 
In the following sections I will discuss the neurophysiological underpinnings of approach and 
avoidance (or withdrawal) that do not only regulate appetitive and aversive motivation, but 
also form the substrate of human personality (for review, see Carver, Sutton, & Scheier, 
2000). 
The Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory of J.A. Gray: A Framework for Individual Differences in 
Reinforcement Processes 
In an influential account, Gray (1972) suggested that traits reflect interindividual 
differences in two complementary motivational systems: sensitivity to rewards and 
punishments (for similar proposals, see Cloninger, 1987; Davidson, 1998; Depue & Colllins, 
1999; Fowles, 1980). Gray’s Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory (RST; Gray, 1982) originally 
proposed that the so-called behavioural approach system (BAS) is activated by conditioned 
appetitive stimuli, i.e., signals of reward or omission/termination of punishment, and 
promotes reward-directed approach behaviour. By comparison, sensitivity to punishment is 
mediated by two behavioural systems. First, the behavioural inhibition system (BIS) is 
activated by conditioned aversive stimuli, i.e., signals of punishment or non-reward, as well 
as extreme novelty, and high-intensity stimuli. It thus supports the inhibition of on-going 
behaviour in the service of avoidance or extinction. Second, the fight-flight system (FFS) is 
activated by unconditioned aversive stimuli and facilitates defensive behaviours. According to 
                                                                                                                                                        
certain (e.g. attentional) processes (cf. Scherer, 1984). 
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Gray (1982), there are several behavioural systems underlying reactivity to different classes 
of unconditioned appetitive stimuli. Crucially, the RST states that the BAS is related to trait 
impulsivity and gives rise to state positive affect, whereas the BIS is associated with trait 
anxiety and elicits fear (Gray, 1990). Moreover, activation of the BIS is thought to result in 
increased arousal and enhanced attention and information processing. Activity in the FFS is 
thought to underlie the trait dimension of psychoticism (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1976), and to 
trigger state negative affect as well as panic and rage7. 
 Gray conceptualized BAS, FFS, and BIS as fundamental emotion systems to be 
specified at the behavioural, neural, and computational (or “cognitive”) level (e.g., Gray, 
1990). Although Gray did not fully detail the neural substrate of the BAS, he strongly linked it 
to activity in the nigrostriatal and mesolimbic DA system as well as the cortico-striatal loops 
(Gray, 1987). Specifically, he suggested that the ventral (limbic) striatum – with major inputs 
from amygdala and the hippocampal formation – mediates incentive motivation, whereas the 
dorsal (sensorimotor) striatum is concerned with more specific sensorimotor aspects of 
behaviour. The BIS has been hypothesized to include the septo-hippocampal system, 
including its projections to the frontal lobe and its afferents from the brainstem. Importantly, 
the ACC is thought to be a core component of the BIS as well. According to RST, the PFC 
maintains overarching plans and goals and exerts top-down control on both BAS and BIS. 
The neural basis of the FFS remains mostly unknown. Candidate regions include the medial 
hypothalamus and the periaqueductal grey, a midbrain region that has been implicated in the 
modulation of defensive behaviour (Watt, 2000). 
 Empirical tests of the RST provided only partial support for some of its basic claims. 
For instance, Gallagher & Hall (1992) compared the performance of participants who were 
particularly sensitive to reward or punishment cues in a proof-reading task under either 
reward (potential gain) or punishment (potential loss) conditions. Consistent with the 
predictions of the RST, punishment-sensitive individuals identified significantly more errors 
                                                 
7 In a revised version of the RST, Gray & McNaughton (2000) hypothesized that the BAS is sensitive to all classes 
of appetitive stimuli (conditioned and unconditioned). Moreover, the revised RST postulated a fight-flight-freeze 
system (FFFS), mediating responses to all classes of aversive stimuli, whereas the BIS is thought to solve 
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than did reward-sensitive individuals in the punishment condition. Contrary to the predictions 
of the RST, however, both groups showed comparable performance in the reward condition. 
Moreover, the authors found no evidence that reward- and punishment sensitive participants 
experienced different emotional reactions in the two incentive conditions. 
Other studies confirmed a higher emotional reactivity of punishment-sensitive individuals to 
aversive stimuli (e.g., Corr et al., 1995). Available evidence on reward-mediated emotional 
reactivity is similarly inconclusive (for a review, see Corr, 2004). 
In particular, Gray’s model implies that high sensitivity to aversive stimuli should lead 
to enhanced learning from punishments. In line with this notion, it has been shown that high 
punishment sensitivity improved implicit learning in a punishment compared to a control 
condition. In contrast, low punishment sensitivity was associated with impaired learning 
under punishment and improved learning in the control condition (Corr, Pickering, & Gray, 
1997). Still, less consistent findings have been reported in studies using explicit learning 
tasks (e.g., Zinbarg & Revelle, 1989). Interestingly, a recent study found that individuals who 
were highly sensitive to punishment showed improved probabilistic learning from negative 
feedback (punishment learning) and impaired probabilistic learning from positive feedback 
(reward learning) when under social evaluative stress compared to a neutral condition 
(Cavanagh, Frank, & Allen, 2011a). By contrast, in less punishment sensitive individuals, 
stress was associated with impaired punishment learning and improved reward learning. 
Moreover, stress-induced negative affect reliably predicted superior punishment learning 
performance in participants characterized by high punishment sensitivity, but poor 
punishment learning performance in less sensitive participants.  
 Thus, the theoretical conceptualization of the BIS has received comparatively more 
empirical support, whereas findings concerning the BAS remain controversial. Nonetheless, 
the RST has proven a useful framework for exploring the neurophysiological basis of 
personality. 
  
                                                                                                                                                        
conflicts between BAS and FFFS. Accordingly, the FFFS is associated with fear, whereas the BIS is associated 
with anxiety as well as worry and rumination. 
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Trait-Level Positive and Negative Affect 
 The RST defines BIS and BAS as emotion systems underlying both aversive vs. 
appetitive behaviour and negative vs. positive affective states. Indeed, many theoretical 
models of personality structure involve the basic trait dimensions of positive and negative 
emotionality. Most notably, Watson and Tellegen (1985) identified two orthogonal dimensions 
in factor analytic studies of self-rated mood: Positive Affect (PA) refers to the cross-
situationally consistent tendency to experience pleasant affective states, such as pride, 
delight, and enjoyment. Whereas high PA is associated with activity and optimistic 
engagement, low PA is characterized by sadness and lack of energy. By comparison, 
negative affect (NA) denotes the extent to which individuals are prone to experience various 
unpleasant affective states, such as anger, disgust, guilt and fear. Accordingly, high NA 
related to distress and aversively motivated engagement, while low NA was associated with 
calmness (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). 
Consistent with the proposed link to reward and punishment sensitivity, measures of 
PA and NA correlated moderately with measures of BAS and BIS, respectively (Heubeck, 
Wilkinson, & Cologon, 1998). On the basis of those findings, it has been proposed that the 
neural substrate of BAS and BIS might also underlie PA and NA (e.g., Carver, Sutton, & 
Scheier, 2000). Furthermore, NA predicted measures of state anxiety, depression, and 
general psychological distress. In contrast, PA was inversely related to these variables 
(Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). Similarly, intra-individual variations in perceived stress 
were related to fluctuations in NA but not PA, whereas intra-individual variations in social 
activity were primarily associated with fluctuations in PA (Watson, 1988). 
Importantly, individuals differed not only in the propensity to experience positive and 
negative affect, but also in the ability to regulate these affective responses (Gross & 
Thompson, 2007). As I have outlined above, affective reactions can interfere with task-
relevant processing. A prominent example is the detrimental effect of uncontrollable failure 
experiences on subsequent instrumental learning (Mikulincer, 1994; Seligman, 1975; 
Wortman & Brehm, 1975). Notably, the ability to cope with failure-induced negative affect 
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(Kuhl, 1981) has been shown to moderate the consequences of failure on learning 
performance. This finding will be discussed in more detail below. 
Uncontrollable Failure Experiences and Learning – A Special Case of a Deficit in Motivation 
or Affect Regulation? 
 How failure experiences affect subsequent performance has been a subject of 
intense debate in psychological research for several decades (Brunstein & Gollwitzer, 1996). 
Much of this work has been inspired by the learned helplessness theory (Seligman, 1975), 
which focuses on deficits in learning performance after the exposure to uncontrollable failure. 
According to helplessness researchers (e.g., Mikulincer, 1994; Seligman, 1975), the 
repetitive experience of uncontrollable aversive stimuli, such as inescapable painful stimuli or 
repeated failure feedback, results in a motivational deficit that is associated with impaired 
task performance, and generalizes to new tasks and environments (Hiroto & Seligman, 1975; 
Maier & Watkins, 2005; Roth & Kubal, 1975). Moreover, uncontrollable failure is typically 
followed by a heightened state of negative affect that is typically associated with reduced 
reward responsivity or ‘anhedonia’ (Bogdan & Pizzagalli, 2006; Henn & Vollmayer, 2005). 
The learned-helplessness effect is thus assumed to involve a cognitive, motivational and 
affective component (Pryce et al., 2011). 
The notion that a motivational deficit underlies the cognitive effects of uncontrollable 
failure has received considerable support from animal research. These studies showed that 
the exposure to inescapable electric shocks appeared to specifically reduce the amount of 
effort rats were willing to exert in an instrumental learning task with high response demands, 
while memory acquisition and retrieval in a spatial learning task were not affected (e.g. 
Vollmayer et al., 2004). Moreover, this view is consistent with expectancy-value theories (see 
above) that predict a failure-related decrease in motivation as a consequence of reduced 
outcome expectancies. A purely ‘motivational helplessness’ hypothesis of failure 
experiences, however, has been challenged:  (1) Trait and state variations in action- vs. state 
orientation (i.e., the capacity to regulate the affective reaction to failure, see below) 
moderated the effects of failure on subsequent task performance (e.g., Kuhl, 1981) and (2) 
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failure may also result in increased motivation, particularly in initial attempts to cope with the 
aversive event (e.g., Wortmann & Brehm, 1975). Furthermore, several findings point to the 
importance of self-relevance in determining the effects of failure on subsequent task 
performance (Brunstein, 2000). Brunstein and Gollwitzer (1996) demonstrated that 
participants exposed to failure feedback on a task critical for their self-definition subsequently 
showed improved performance on another identity-relevant task but impaired performance 
on an unrelated task. 
The concepts of action- vs. state orientation refer to individual differences in the ability 
to control affect and thought in the service of goal-directed behaviour, especially under high 
cognitive demands (Kuhl, 1994). State-orientation is characterized by unintended rumination, 
prolonged preoccupation with the aversive event, and hesitation. In a state-oriented mode, 
individuals hence are unlikely to change their current mental state and to implement action 
plans. Action orientation, in contrast, refers to efficient affect-regulation, resulting in an 
improved detachment from thoughts about the aversive event and a focus on task execution 
and goal implementation. Thus, highly action-oriented individuals are expected to show 
superior task performance following failure experiences or changes in task settings. 
Accordingly, Kuhl (1981) showed that failure-related performance decrements can primarily 
be attributed to state-oriented cognitions. Participants exposed to an unsolvable cognitive 
task reported reduced outcome expectations regarding the unsolvable training task - but not 
an unrelated test task. Nonetheless, the experimental induction of state orientation after the 
failure-experience resulted in performance deficits on a subsequent concentration test (d-2; 
Brickenkamp, 1962). Likewise, participants characterized by a disposition for state 
orientation performed worse after failure than action-oriented participants. Based on these 
findings, Kuhl (1981) concluded that valence and outcome expectancy – as proposed by 
expectancy-value theories of motivation – cannot fully predict the consequences of failure 
experiences. Instead, he argued that the dimensions of action- vs. state orientation have to 
be considered as well. 
Furthermore, recent findings from studies examining the effects of social-evaluative 
stress on instrumental learning indicated that stress had an impact on learning strategies 
rather than on overall accuracy (Petzold, Plessow, Goschke, & Kirschbaum, 2010; Schwabe 
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et al., 2007; Schwabe & Wolf, 2009). Interestingly, stress appeared to promote habitual (S-R) 
learning in detriment of (a) more explicit hippocampus-dependent spatial learning strategies 
(Schwabe et al., 2007) and (b) goal-directed instrumental learning (Schwabe & Wolf, 2009). 
Interestingly, in the latter study, the stress-related strategy effect was also reflected in 
reduced explicit knowledge about the S-R mappings (Schwabe & Wolf, 2009). Indeed, it has 
been suggested that stress selectively impairs explicit learning and memory systems, while 
implicit, habitual learning is not affected (Schwabe & Wolf, 2011). It should be noted, 
however, that mild stress has also been shown to improve explicit learning, presumably 
mediated by moderately increased arousal (Roozendaal et al., 2009; Wolf, 2009). Moreover, 
Petzold and colleagues (2010) reported that stress exposure selectively lessened the ability 
to efficiently use negative feedback during subsequent feedback-based learning. The authors 
suggested that stress might induce an attentional bias towards positive and away from 
negative, threatening information. Yet, findings by Cavanagh and colleagues (2011a) 
strongly suggested that individual differences in punishment sensitivity determine whether 
acute stress results in impaired vs. improved learning from negative feedback. In this study, 
only the participants reporting low punishment sensitivity showed stress-induced impairments 
in punishment learning, while the opposite pattern was observed for highly sensitive 
participants. Given that both failure experiences and social-evaluative stress are thought to 
elicit strong negative affect, their effects on learning may bear some similarities. 
In sum, the induction of failure is associated with complex changes in cognitive, 
affective and motivational processes. Although the specific mechanisms underlying the 
impact of failure experiences on subsequent task performance are not entirely clear, most 
researchers agree that failure outcomes are experienced aversively and trigger negative 
affective states that individuals have to cope with. Moreover, acute failure feedback has been 
shown to promote reactive engagement in a subsequent task, possibly reflecting 
compensatory efforts. 
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Brain Mechanisms Underlying the Interaction of Motivation, Emotion, and Cognition 
Traditionally, motivational and emotional processes have been distinguished from 
cognitive processes both on a functional and a neuroanatomical level. The amygdala and the 
PFC are two prominent examples for structures that have been associated with emotional 
and cognitive processing, respectively (LeDoux, 2000; Miller & Cohen, 2001; Ochsner & 
Gross, 2005). Considerable evidence, however, indicated that this modular view is no longer 
tenable. Previous research demonstrated a close interaction between brain regions 
supposedly involved in emotional and cognitive functions (for reviews, see Davidson, 
Pizzagalli, Nitschke, & Kalin, 2003; Pessoa, 2008; Phelps, 2006; Salzman & Fusi, 2010). 
Moreover, it has been suggested that emotional and cognitive parameters are integrated 
within dynamic brain networks, involving limbic and prefrontal structures (Pessoa, 2008; 
Salzman & Fusi, 2010). The next paragraph summarizes several critical findings this 
suggestion is based on. 
The amygdala is structurally heterogeneous group of nuclei within the anterior medial 
temporal lobe. It has been described as a core affective region that is critically involved in 
fear conditioning (Antoniadis, Winslow, Davis, & Amaral, 2009; Pessoa, 2010), the 
representation of a reinforcer’s value (Murray & Izquierdo, 2007), and the processing of 
emotional valence and intensity (LeDoux, 2007; Machado, Kazama, & Bachevalier, 2009). In 
particular, amygdala activation is related to vigilance and arousal, which lead some 
researchers to suggest that this region acts as a “detector” for the biological relevance of on-
going events (Sander, Grafman, & Zalla, 2003). In line with this notion, the amygdala has 
been shown to support the prioritized processing of affectively significant stimuli (Phelps & 
LeDoux, 2005). Moreover, Salzman and Fusi (2010) posited that the amygdala might encode 
the value of the current state that is used to regulate the engagement of appetitive and 
aversive behavioural systems. In support of this view, Prevost and colleagues (2011) showed 
that the basolateral and centromedial complexes of the amygdala played important roles in 
instrumental reward and avoidance learning, respectively. Importantly, these findings 
demonstrated that the amygdala contributed not only to affective but also to cognitive 
functions, such as associative learning, attention, and decision making (Pessoa, 2010). 
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The representation of state value has also been associated with the OFC that is 
strongly interconnected with the amygdala. Indeed, there is ample evidence for a functional 
overlap between the two structures (Murray & Izquierdo, 2007). However, the OFC is not the 
only prefrontal subregion engaged in affective processing. Further regions include the ACC, 
the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and parts of the inferior frontal gyrus, i.e., 
structures that are on the top of the hierarchy of the limbic cortico-basal ganglia network. 
Notably, emotion and cognition also appear to be integrated in regions that have been 
characterized as purely cognitive, such as the dlPFC (Pessoa, 2010). For instance, Savine 
and Braver (2010) showed that performance-contingent reward incentives increased 
behavioural efficiency during task-switching. Importantly, the reward-related performance 
modulations were associated with interactive incentive effects on switch-related activity in the 
dlPFC. The incentive manipulation also affected cue-related preparatory activity, which in 
turn predicted performance. These findings suggest that motivational influences on task 
performance are unlikely to reflect an unspecific “energizing“ of behaviour, as would be 
indicated by “simple” additive effects of reward manipulations. Instead, motivation appears to 
sharpen and/or enhance task-specific processing in the service of behavioural optimization 
(cf. Pessoa & Engelmann, 2010). 
Central to the integration of affective and motivational information are key nodes 
occupying a “hub-position” within the neural networks, i.e., regions on which inputs from 
multiple brain areas converge. The ACC has already been characterized as a suitable 
candidate for the implementation of this function. This was further corroborated by the 
observation that the recruitment of the ACC directly relates to task-engagement and effortful 
control (Boksem, Meijman, & Lorist, 2006a; Paus, Koski, Caramanos, & Westbury, 1998). 
Another potential mechanism for mediating affective and motivational influences on task 
performance is the neuromodulatory influence of DA. Drawing on the crucial role of DA in 
reward processing and approach motivation (Schultz, 2007), dopaminergic dynamics have 
also been hypothesized to underlie the impact of affective state on goal-directed behaviour 
and adaptive control (Aarts, Custers, & Veltkamp, 2008; Ashby, Isen, & Turken, 1998). 
However, there are several findings indicating that reward and positive affect exert 
dissociable effects on cognitive functioning (Chiew & Braver, 2011). The precise nature of 
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the relationships between affect, motivation, and dopaminergic activity thus remains to be 
determined. 
The Neurophysiological Effects of Failure 
 In human neuroimaging studies, the exposure to uncontrollable, aversive stimuli has 
consistently been shown to engage the ACC (Pryce et al., 2011). In line with this, the ACC 
was typically found to be activated in response to acute stress (Dedovic, D’Aguiar, & 
Pruessner, 2009). Moreover, evidence from human and animal research suggested that 
multiple neurochemical systems are involved in the response to uncontrollable failure and 
other stressors (Joels & Baram, 2009; Maier & Watkins, 2005). First of all, stress exposure is 
associated with activation of the hypothalamus-pituitary adrenal (HPA) axis (de Kloet, Joëls, 
& Holsboer, 2005), resulting in an increased release of cortisol. Acute stress-induced 
enhancement of cortisol levels is accompanied by improved associative learning (e.g., fear 
conditioning) and declarative memory consolidation, particularly for emotionally arousing 
material (Roozendaal et al., 2009; Wolf, 2009). 
These effects are most likely mediated by the regulatory influence of the amygdala on 
other brain regions implicated in associative learning and memory formation, such as the 
hippocampus. Specifically, cortisol has been suggested to facilitate the effects of 
noradrenaline that is released into the amygdala during aversive and stressful events 
(Roozendaal et al., 2009). Interestingly, there is also evidence indicating that stress 
hormones like cortisol might directly and indirectly affect dopaminergic activity and hence RL 
(e.g., Minton et al., 2009). In addition, the exposition to aversive events typically results in a 
short-lived increase of DA release in the ventral striatum (e.g., Cabib & Puglisi-Allgra, 1994). 
 Notably, the PFC, including the ACC, showed the highest density of stress hormone 
receptors (e.g., Pathel et al., 2000). Accumulating evidence indicated that the ACC might 
control the stress-induced activation of the HPA-axis (Herman et al., 2003) as well as the DA 
response in the ventral striatum (Pascucci et al., 2007). Specifically, Pascucci and 
colleagues showed that acute stress triggered a short-lived increase of DA and 
noradrenaline in the medial PFC of rats. Whereas prefrontal noradrenaline enhancement 
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determined the increase of DA release in the ventral striatum, continued mesocortical DA 
transmission due to sustained stressor exposition inhibited DA release in the ventral striatum. 
The opposing effects of prefrontal DA and noradrenaline on striatal DA are likely to reflect 
adaptive mechanisms supporting active coping or withdrawal as a function of perceived 
controllability of an event, which in turn is crucially dependent on the ACC (Amat et al., 
2005). 
Summary and Implications for the Present Study 
Adaptive behavioural control is mediated by the interaction of cognitive mechanisms 
with motivational and emotional processes. The concepts of emotion and motivation are 
closely interrelated and both appear to govern RL by affecting information processing as well 
as instrumental behaviours. Interactions between motivation, emotion, and cognition can be 
integrated within dynamic brain networks involving limbic and prefrontal structures, 
particularly the ACC, the amygdala as well as multiple neurochemical systems. In line with 
this notion, the ACC is activated by aversive stimuli and appears to evaluate the 
controllability of stressors, thereby determining stress-related neurochemical responses, e.g. 
DA responses in the striatum. By comparison, the amygdala has been hypothesized to 
mediate prioritized processing of affectively significant stimuli and to regulate the 
engagement of appetitive and aversive behavioural systems. The amygdala is also believed 
to exert regulatory influence on other brain regions implicated in associative learning and 
memory formation, e.g. in response to stressors such as failure experiences and exposure to 
social-evaluative stress that have been shown to significantly impact RL mechanisms. 
Crucially, recent evidence suggests that stress-related variations in negative affect influence 
neural learning mechanisms (e.g. reflected in an enhanced sensitivity to errors) rather than 
overall performance (Cavanagh et al., 2011a; Petzold et al., 2010; Schwabe & Wolf, 2009). 
Importantly, the effects of stress- and failure-induced negative affective states on behavioural 
indices of learning appear to be modulated by interindividual differences in sensitivity to 
reward (BAS) and punishments (BIS) (Gray, 1972) as well as the disposition towards action 
vs. state orientation (Kuhl, 1981). 
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Electrophysiological Correlates of Reinforcement Learning 
 Studies measuring scalp recorded event-related potentials (ERPs) to examine neural 
processes underlying performance monitoring have greatly advanced our knowledge on how 
the brain implements RL. In particular, two components associated with the processing of 
response errors and performance feedback, respectively, have been hypothesized to track 
learning-related changes in the evaluation and utilization of information about action 
outcomes (e.g., Holroyd & Coles, 2002). First, the error negativity (Ne; Falkenstein et al., 
1991) or error-related negativity (ERN; Gehring et al., 1993) has been linked to the activity of 
an internal error monitoring system. Second, a morphologically and functionally similar 
component can be observed in response to error-feedback stimuli and is commonly referred 
to as the feedback-related negativity (FRN; Miltner et al., 1997). Furthermore, the Ne is 
usually followed by a positive-going deflection, termed the error positivity, which is assumed 
to reflect error-related processes that are functionally dissociable from the Ne (Falkenstein, 
Hohnsbein, & Hoorman, 1990). In the subsequent sections, I will review a number of key 
experimental findings concerning the three ERP-components (Ne, FRN, Pe), with a specific 
focus on the neural underpinnings of learning. 
The Error Negativity (Ne) 
 The Ne is a negative deflection in the ERP that starts shortly before an individual’s 
erroneous response and peaks within 100 ms thereafter. The Ne has been observed in 
broad range of speeded-response tasks involving several stimulus and response modalities 
(for reviews, see Falkenstein, 2004; Falkenstein et al., 2000; Nieuwenhuis, Holroyd, Mol, & 
Coles, 2004). As can be seen in Figure 5, the scalp distribution of the Ne is maximal at 
fronto-central recording sites. Converging evidence from EEG source localizing, 
magnetoencephalographic, and fMRI studies in humans (for reviews, see Hester, 
Fassbender, & Garavan, 2004; Olvet & Hajcak; 2008; Ridderinkhof, Ullsperger, & Crone, 
2004; Taylor, Stern, & Gehring, 2007) as well as from intracranial recordings in primates 
(Emeric et al., 2008; Ito, Stuphorn, Brown, & Schall, 2003) indicates that the Ne originates in 
the ACC. Although the source of the Ne is most consistently localized within the dorsal ACC, 
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considerable variation between different studies indicates that alternative and/or additional 
regions might contribute to Ne generation, most notably, the pre-supplementary motor area 
(pre-SMA) and the rostral ACC (Brazdil, Roman, Daniel, & Rektor, 2005; Luu, Tucker, 
Derryberry, Reed, & Poulson, 2003; Ridderinkhof et al., 2004). Given that the Ne has also 
been characterized as part of on-going theta and delta rhythms (Luu & Tucker, 2001; Trujillo 
& Allen, 2007; Yordanova, Falkenstein, Hohnsbein, & Kolev, 2004), it is interesting to note 
that error-related theta-band activity over the MFC predicted white matter connectivity with 
the ventral striatum, ventrolateral PFC, and motor cortex (Cohen, 2011). Available evidence 
thus suggests that a widespread network underlies action monitoring. 
  
Figure 5: Left: The Ne peaks roughly within 100 ms after an individula’s erroneous response and is typically 
followed by a positive-going deflection, termed the error positivity (Pe). Right: The topographical map 
demonstrates a fronto-central maximum of the Ne (red focus). The red diamant corresponds to the estimated 
source of the Ne in the dACC (dipole model). (Figures adapted from Falkenstein et al., 2000 and Taylor et al., 
2007) 
 One of the earliest findings with respect to the Ne is its sensitivity to speed vs. 
accuracy instructions (Falkenstein et al., 1990; Gehring et al. 1993). Gehring and colleagues 
(1993) instructed participants to respond as quickly as possible (speed emphasis) or to make 
as few errors as possible (accuracy emphasis). The accuracy emphasis resulted in larger Ne 
amplitudes and more efficient post-error compensatory behaviour, including post-error 
slowing, and error correction rate. Although the comparison relied on error trials matched for 
response latency, the finding remains somewhat ambiguous because the speed-accuracy 
manipulation triggered a different weighting of what exactly is considered an error: slow 
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responses or wrong button presses. Moreover, the accuracy instruction by definition implies 
lower error rates. Studies examining the relation between accuracy and Ne amplitude have 
typically found larger Ne amplitudes when participants show better performance (e.g., 
Amodio, Jost, Master, & Yee, 2007; Hajcak, McDonald, & Simons, 2003; but see Falkenstein 
et al., 2000; Mathewson, Dywan, & Segalowitz, 2005). Interestingly, previous studies using 
probabilistic learning paradigms suggested that individual differences in accuracy related to 
ERPs on correct trials rather than the Ne (Eppinger et al., 2008; Eppinger, Mock, & Kray, 
2009). Either way, one should consider performance differences when interpreting variations 
in Ne amplitude across experimental conditions (cf. Yeung, 2004). 
 An association between Ne magnitude and overall task performance would be 
consistent with the idea that the Ne reflects the activity of an internal performance monitoring 
system. More specifically, one might expect a direct link between Ne magnitude and error-
related behavioural adjustments (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001; Gehring 
et al., 1993; Holroyd & Coles, 2002). Although this issue has been addressed by several 
studies, no consistent picture has emerged so far. Most reports focused on post-error 
slowing, i.e., strategic adjustments in reaction time (RT) on trials following an error, thought 
to reflect the increased recruitment of cognitive control processes (Botvinick et al., 2001). 
Using a single-trial measure of the Ne, Debener and colleagues (2005) demonstrated a 
significant relation between the Ne amplitude and the amount of post-error slowing (see also 
Gehring et al., 1993). However, a number of further studies – mostly using cross-trial 
averaging to quantify the Ne – failed to observe this kind of association (e.g., Dudschig & 
Jentzsch; 2009; Gehring & Fencsik, 2001), suggesting that more fine-grained analyses at a 
single-trial level might be critical. Supporting this notion, Cavanagh and colleagues (2009) 
showed that single-trial dynamics in error-related theta-power over the posterior MFC reliably 
predicted post-error slowing. Alternatively, it has been suggested that post-error RT changes 
might reflect processes other than control, such as sustained error processing interfering with 
stimulus-related processing on the next trial (cf. Gehring et al., in press). Research that 
aimed to establish a relation between Ne and immediate error correction has yielded similarly 
inconclusive findings (e.g., Burle et al., 2008; Falkenstein et al., 1996; Fiehler et al., 2005; 
Gehring et al., 1993). 
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Surprisingly few studies have examined whether the Ne relates to error-related 
behavioural adaptation in RL. Findings by Frank and colleagues (2005) point to a link 
between inter-individual differences in the Ne amplitude and a bias to avoid responses that 
have been learned to result in unfavourable outcomes (see also Cavanagh et al., 2011a; 
Frank et al., 2007b). Intriguingly, a recent study showed that state-level negative affect and 
inter-individual differences in punishment sensitivity modulated the tendency to learn more 
from errors or to correct choices as well as error-related neural processing (Cavanagh et al., 
2011a). This is in line with ample evidence for affective and motivational influences on action 
monitoring reflected in the Ne, as detailed in one of the following sections. 
The Feedback-Related Negativity (FRN) 
While the Ne occurs around the time of an erroneous response, the FRN is a 
negative deflection elicited ~250-300 ms following the presentation of a feedback stimulus in 
a wide variety of experimental paradigms (Gehring & Willoughby, 2002; Miltner et al., 1997; 
for a review, see Nieuwenhuis, Holroyd, Mol, & Coles, 2004) (see Figure 6). As noted by 
Miltner and coworkers (1997), the FRN shares several characteristics with the response-
locked Ne, which led some researchers to conclude that they might reflect the same 
cognitive and neural process (Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Nieuwenhuis, Yeung, Holroyd, 
Schurger, & Cohen, 2004). 
 
Figure 6: Left: The FRN can be oberserved as a relatively more negative-going deflection ~250-300 ms following 
the presentation of a feedback stimulus Right: Topographical map and estimated source in the dACC (dipole 
model). (Figure adapted from Gehring & Willoughby, 2002) 
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Similar to the Ne, the FRN has a fronto-central scalp distribution, suggesting that 
neural sources of the two components overlap. Indeed, the ACC and adjacent MFC have 
been identified as most likely generators of the FRN (Doñamayor et al., 2011; Holroyd et al., 
2004; Ruchsow, Grothe, Spitzer, & Kiefer, 2002), along with the posterior cingulate cortex 
(Müller et al., 2005; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005) and the right frontal cortex (Christie & Tata, 
2009). 
Several studies showed that the FRN is more pronounced after negative compared to 
positive feedback, indicating the component is sensitive to the valence of an outcome (e.g., 
Gehring & Willoughby, 2002; Nieuwenhuis, Yeung, et al., 2004; Sato et al., 2005; Yeung & 
Sanfey, 2004). Moreover, it has been suggested that the FRN may reflect a coarse 
evaluative mechanism that classifies on-going events in a binary manner as “good” or “bad” 
(e.g., Hajcak, Moser, Holroyd, & Simons, 2006; Sato et al., 2005; Toyomaki & Murohashi, 
2005). For instance, Yeung and Sanfey (2004) applied a gambling task to examine whether 
the magnitude (small vs. large) of gains and losses affects the FRN amplitude. While the 
FRN differentiated only between gains and losses, independently of their magnitude, a later-
occurring positive slow wave known as the P300 showed sensitivity to the magnitude but not 
the valence of outcomes. Although this finding has been confirmed by a number of other 
reports (e.g., Hajcak et al., 2006; Holroyd, Hajcak, & Larsen, 2006), there are also 
demonstrations that the FRN is sensitive to the magnitude of the outcome (e.g., Goyer, 
Woldorff, & Huettel, 2008; Kreussel et al., 2011). 
In addition, there is evidence supporting of the notion that the evaluative process 
reflected in the FRN might operate in a context-dependent fashion (Holroyd, Larsen, & 
Cohen, 2004). When the task included a range of possible outcomes, the FRN appeared to 
track their relative rather than absolute value. Accordingly, in the Holroyd et al.’s study 
(2004), a zero outcome elicited a larger FRN if it was the worst possible outcome (i.e., in the 
context of potential gains), but a smaller FRN if it was the best possible outcome (i.e., in the 
context of potential losses). Furthermore, a study by Nieuwenhuis and colleagues (2004) 
revealed that monitoring processes associated with the FRN rely on the most salient 
information the feedback stimulus conveys. In this study, participants’ choices on each trial in 
a gambling task either resulted in winning or losing 5 vs. 25 Cent. The authors showed that 
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the modulation of the FRN depended on whether colour coding emphasized the utilitarian 
(gain vs. loss) or performance aspect (correct vs. incorrect) of feedback information. 
Interestingly, a recent study indicated that feedback salience can facilitate learning, 
particularly if the feedback was partially ambiguous (Herbert, Eppinger, & Kray, 2011). 
Although the relation between FRN and learning has rarely been directly tested, various 
findings point to a functional link between the FRN and the utilization of feedback information 
for behavioural adaptation (e.g., Cavanagh, Klein, Frank, & Allen, 2010a; Holroyd & Coles, 
2008; Santesso et al., 2008). Most notably, van der Helden and colleagues (2010) 
demonstrated that the FRN amplitude predicted whether a mistake was repeated or learned 
from, implying that this component might reflect a PE. Further support for this notion comes 
from a study by Cohen and Ranganath (2007) showing that the FRN was larger on trials 
preceding behavioural switches, which is consistent with the magnitude of the negative PE 
derived from a computational RL model. A subsequent study that aimed to disentangle the 
PE-related mechanism and explicit rule-based decision-making only found an association 
between FRN and PE, whereas rule-based behavioural switches were related to P300 
amplitude (Chase et al., 2011). On the basis of their findings, the authors conclude that the 
FRN reflects the activity of an incremental habitual (model-free) RL system, while the P300 
relates to fast model-based RL mediating rule-based behavioural adjustments. 
It is a matter of current debate whether the FRN represents PEs monotonically, 
combining magnitude and valence into a single scalar. Some reports suggested that the FRN 
varies as a function of expectancy deviation rather than feedback valence and hence 
represents the magnitude but not the direction of the PE (Chase et al., 2011; Oliveira, 
McDonald, & Goodman, 2007). Alternatively, variations in FRN amplitude have been 
characterized as positive deflections that scale with the magnitude of positive PEs (Foti, 
Weinberg, Dien, & Hajcak, 2011; Holroyd, Pakzad-Vaezi, Krigolson, & Krigolson, 2008). 
Furthermore, some researchers have argued against a monotonic representation of the PE 
in the FRN and instead proposed a sequential and spatially distributed processing of 
feedback information (Philastides, Biele, Vavatzanides, Kazzer, & Heekeren, 2010). 
According to this notion, an early ‘good-bad’ categorization is followed by a more fine-grained 
outcome evaluation that incorporates both PE valence and magnitude. 
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In summary, Ne and FRN are two morphologically and topographically similar ERP 
components thought to reflect the activity of a generic performance monitoring system. In 
particular, these components have been hypothesized to evaluate on-going events in the 
service of behavioural adaptation. Although a number of studies provided empirical support 
for a specific link between Ne and FRN and RL, this relation has rarely been addressed 
explicitly and so far remains under-explored. Importantly, the evaluative process underlying 
Ne and FRN appears to be sensitive to the specific context of behaviour. Indeed, several 
findings suggest that the two components reflect the motivational significance of response 
outcomes rather than their objective value, as detailed below. 
The Error Positivity (Pe) 
 The Pe is a positive slow wave in the response-locked ERP that reaches its maximum 
between 200 and 400 ms after response-onset (Falkenstein et al., 1990; for a review, see 
Overbeek, Nieuwenhuis, & Ridderinkhof, 2005; see Figure 6). The Pe is more pronounced 
after erroneous compared to correct responses and exhibits a centroparietal scalp 
distribution. Accumulating evidence, however, indicated that two dissociable subcomponents 
occur in the time-range of the Pe: (1) an early frontocentrally distributed subcomponent (early 
Pe) and (2) a later centroparietally distributed subcomponent (late or ‘classic’ Pe) (Arbel & 
Donchin, 2009; van Boxtel, van der Molen, & Jennings, 2005; van Veen & Carter, 2002). The 
early Pe may originate from brain regions in the MFC that are also thought to underlie the Ne 
generation, suggesting that this component is actually part of the oscillatory process 
underlying the Ne (Arbel & Donchin, 2009; Falkenstein et al., 1991; O’Connell et al., 2007). 
However, the early Pe shows a somewhat more central scalp distribution, possibly indicating 
that different albeit neighbouring regions of the ACC contribute to Ne and early Pe. By 
contrast, the late Pe8 has been associated with two distinct neural sources in the rACC and 
in the vicinity of the posterior cingulate and the precuneus (O’Connell et al., 2007). The latter 
region has been implicated in consciousness, self-related processing, and the experience of 
agency (Cavanna & Trimble, 2006). This nicely fits the finding that the Pe – as opposed to 
                                                 
8 The present thesis focuses exclusively on the late Pe. 
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the Ne – varies as a function of error awareness (Endrass, Reuter, & Kathmann, 2007; 
Nieuwenhuis, Ridderinkhof, Blom, Band, & Kok, 2001; O’Connell et al., 2007). Likewise, the 
Pe is increased for cognitively or affectively more salient errors (Leutholt & Sommer, 1999; 
Stemmer, Witzke, & Schönle, 2001). Importantly, O’Connell and colleagues (2007) observed 
the early Pe for both aware and unaware errors, but the late Pe for aware errors only. These 
findings strongly indicate that the late Pe is associated with the conscious recognition of an 
error. This view is further corroborated by a recent study that demonstrated a strong link 
between the Pe and error detection (Steinhauser & Yeung, 2010). 
 Studies relating the Pe amplitude to task performance yielded inconsistent findings. 
Some investigators reported a smaller Pe for low-performing compared to high-performing 
participants (Dywan, Mathewson, & Segalowitz, 2004; Falkenstein, Hoormann, Christ, & 
Hohnsbein, 2000) which has been considered evidence that this component reflects the 
affective appraisal of an error or its consequences. Other studies, however, did not find a 
relation between accuracy and Pe magnitude (Hajcak, McDonald, & Simons, 2003; 
Herrmann, Römmler, Ehlis, Heidrich, & Fallgatter, 2004). Mixed evidence has also been 
obtained regarding the association between Pe and post-error behavioural adjustments. For 
instance, Hajcak and coworkers (2003) found that larger Pe amplitudes predicted the degree 
of post-error slowing (see also Nieuwenhuis et al, 2001). Nevertheless, most studies failed to 
show an association between the Pe and immediate error-corrective behaviour (Falkenstein 
et al., 2000; Fiehler et al., 2005; Ullsperger & von Cramon, 2006). Hence, there is no clear-
cut support for a ‘behavioural-adaptation hypothesis’ of the Pe. Nonetheless, the observed 
functional dissociations between Ne and (late) Pe suggest that a more slowly operating, 
deliberative performance monitoring system that is triggered by salient errors might underlie 
the Pe (cf. Overbeek et al., 2005). 
 In addition, several researchers have noted that the Pe bears strong resemblance to 
the stimulus-locked P300, which is thought to reflect the stimulus-inherent motivational or 
emotional significance (e.g., Keil et al., 2007; Nieuwenhuis, Aston-Jones, & Cohen, 2005; 
Yeung & Sanfey, 2004). According to this view, the Pe may indicate the updating of the 
representation of task-context in response to errors (Leutholt & Sommer, 1999) or the 
mobilization of resources for task-relevant processing in the service of immediate, i.e., within-
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trial, remedial actions (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005). The latter hypothesis is consistent with the 
observation that both the Pe and the P300 correlate with arousal (O’Connell et al. 2007). 
Moreover, the Pe has been shown to increase with learning and feedback validity in a 
probabilistic RL task (Eppinger et al., 2009). In contrast, the Ne did not change over the 
course of learning, supporting the notion that Pe and Ne reflect dissociable processes. The 
finding that the Pe grows larger as participants are better able to represent the correctness of 
their responses is compatible with accounts linking this component to conscious aspects of 
error processing as well as context updating. 
The Susceptibility of Error Negativity, Feedback-Related Negativity, and Error Positivity to 
Affective and Motivational Influences 
 Given that the consequences of an action can remarkably depend on the specific 
situation, one should expect the evaluative functions underlying Ne, FRN, and Pe to be 
sensitive to the motivational and affective significance of an on-going event. Much evidence 
in support of this notion comes from (1) studies with patients suffering from affective and 
other neuropsychiatric disorders that are characterized by negative emotionality and (2) 
studies investigating state and trait variations in affect and motivation. 
Deviant Performance Monitoring and Learning in Neuropsychiatric Populations 
 Patients with Major Depressive Disorder (MDD) typically show increased sensitivity to 
performance errors and negative feedback (Eshel & Roiser, 2010; Steffens, Wagner, Levy, 
Horn, & Krishnan, 2001). Accordingly, increased Ne and FRN amplitudes have been 
observed for moderately depressed compared to healthy individuals, particularly when errors 
are penalized (Chiu & Deldin, 2007; Hajcak & Foti, 2009; Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2008; 
Santesso et al., 2008; Tucker et al., 2003; but see Ruchsow et al., 2004, 2006). Although 
such an increase on the level of neurophysiological correlates of error processing should be 
associated with more efficient error-related behavioural adaptation (Holroyd & Coles, 2002; 
Frank et al., 2005; van der Helden et al., 2010), depressed subjects typically show poor 
performance following mistakes in response competition task (Compton et al., 2008; Holmes 
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& Pizzagalli, 2007). However, two recent studies using probabilistic RL paradigms failed to 
obtain any performance impairments in depressed participants (Cavanagh, Bismark, Frank, 
& Allen, 2011b; Chase et al., 2010). Instead, in the Cavanagh et al.’s study, the association 
between error-related ACC activity (reflected in FRN amplitude and error-related theta 
power) and avoidance learning was stronger for MDD patients, suggesting that the ACC 
might mediate specific behavioural effects of increased affective reactivity to negatively 
valenced events in depression. Moreover, Holmes and Pizgalli (2008b) found increased 
error-related rACC and medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) responses in patients with MDD 
compared to controls, but failure to subsequently recruit regions implementing control 
(dlPFC). In contrast, rACC, mPFC, and dlPFC activation was positively correlated in healthy 
participants, suggesting a dynamic interplay between these regions in adaptive behaviour 
regulation. 
 Studies examining the Pe in depressed patients yielded mixed results. While some 
researchers observed diminished Pe amplitudes in depressed individuals compared to 
healthy controls (Schrijvers et al., 2008, 2009), others failed to obtain significant differences 
(Chiu & Deldin, 2007; Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2008). As Schrijvers and colleagues (2009) point 
out, the divergent findings might be partly due to differences in symptom severity. Whereas 
increased levels of negative affect might account for enhanced Ne amplitudes in mild 
depression, this effect might be attenuated by extreme levels of anhedonia and apathy in 
more severely depressed patients, which in turn are characterized by decreased Pe 
amplitudes. 
 Hyperresponsivity to response errors and increased Ne amplitudes has also been 
found in patients suffering from obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD) (Endrass, Klawohn, 
Schuster, & Kathmann, 2008; Gehring, Himle, & Nisenson, 2000; Johannes et al., 2001). 
This finding is consistent with the notion that excessive concerns and repetitive behaviour of 
these individuals are associated with deviant action monitoring. However, recent evidence 
indicated that the OCD-related Ne modulation was task-specific, with non-patients suffering 
from high OC-symptomatology showing enhanced amplitudes in response competition tasks 
but not in RL tasks (Gründler, Cavanagh, Figueroa, Frank, & Allen, 2009). On the basis of 
this task-specific dissociation, the authors concluded that dissociable neural systems 
 56 
underlie adaptive decision making in learning and speeded response competition tasks. 
Moreover, OC symptomatology selectively affected the Ne amplitude, whereas the FRN did 
not vary as a function of symptom score (Gründler et al., 2009). Likewise, no differences in 
Pe amplitude have been reported for OCD patients compared to controls (Endrass et al., 
2008; Ruchsow et. al, 2005). 
 Despite some inconsistencies, the overall pattern of findings supports the notion that 
psychopathological changes in affective processing are accompanied by deviant action 
monitoring as reflected in Ne, FRN, and Pe. In particular, the observed dissociation between 
Ne and Pe suggests that the two components reflect different aspects of error processing. 
Influence of Affective and Motivational States and Traits on Performance Monitoring 
 Consistent with the idea that healthy individuals who are particularly concerned with 
the correctness or social appropriateness of their actions should be characterized by a 
hyperactive performance monitoring system, the Ne amplitude has been shown to relate to 
trait differences in negative emotionality and anxiety (Dennis & Chen, 2009; Hajcak, 
McDonald, & Simons, 2003; 2004; Tops, Boksem, Wester, Lorist, & Meijman, 2006; Vocat, 
Pourtois, & Vuilleumier, 2008). Likewise, individuals with high levels of negative affectivity 
exhibited larger FRN amplitudes to negative – but not positive – feedback than those with 
low levels of negative affectivity (Santesso et al., 2011; Sato, Yasuda, & Ohiro, 2005). 
Studies focusing on the relation between negative affect and Pe are scarce. However, there 
is evidence indicating that higher negative affectivity was associated with decreased Pe 
amplitudes (Hajcak et al., 2004). 
Interestingly, the Ne has been found to correlate with punishment sensitivity, whereas 
reward sensitivity correlates with the Pe (e.g., Boksem, Tops, Kostermans, & De Cremer, 
2008; Boksem, Tops, Wester, Meijman, & Lorist, 2006a). In addition, the relation between 
punishment vs. reward sensitivity and Ne amplitude was modulated by the motivational 
context. Individuals that were highly sensitive to punishment showed larger Ne amplitudes on 
errors associated with losses compared to those associated with omissions of gain. In 
contrast, individuals that were highly sensitive to reward showed the opposite pattern. 
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Moreover, high reward sensitivity was related to greater Pe amplitudes in gain omission 
compared to loss conditions (Boksem et al., 2008). Similarly, highly punishment sensitive 
individuals showed larger FRN amplitudes in response to external performance feedback 
(Balconi & Crivelli, 2010; De Pascalis, Varriale, & D’Antuono, 2010) and monetary losses 
(Santesso, Dzyundzyak, & Segalowitz, 2011). It should be noted, however, that other studies 
have failed to obtain a difference in the Ne, FRN or Pe as a function of punishment or reward 
sensitivity (Cavanagh & Allen, 2008; Van den Berg, Franken, & Muris, 2011). 
Drawing on previous research showing that the Ne was affected by mental fatigue 
(Boksem, Meijman, & Lorist, 2006b; Tops et al., 2006), Tops and Boksem (2010) recently 
proposed that the relation between Ne and personality measures, such as punishment 
sensitivity or negative affectivity, might be mediated by the motivational trait persistence. The 
authors demonstrated that high levels of constraint predicted less pronounced decreases in 
both behavioural measures and Ne amplitude during prolonged task performance, 
suggesting that trait-related differences in task engagement may underlie variations of the Ne 
amplitude.  
 An important drawback of studies using an individual differences approach is that 
they cannot exclude that non-affect related, a priori group differences account for the 
observed differences in error- and feedback-related ERP components. Therefore, it is 
important to test the degree to which experimental manipulations of affective and 
motivational states are accompanied by modulations of ERP-correlates of action monitoring 
and learning. Several studies indicated that the Ne was related to the salience or significance 
of an error. For instance, larger Ne amplitudes have been observed when accuracy is 
emphasized over speed (Falkenstein et al., 2000; Gehring et al., 1993). Furthermore, Hajcak 
and colleagues (2005) showed in two independent experiments that the Ne was increased 
on incorrect trials associated with high monetary value and under conditions of social 
evaluation. In the first experiment, the motivational significance of errors in a Flankers task 
was manipulated on a trial-to-trial basis by means of high vs. low monetary incentive cues. 
While high-value errors were associated with a greater Ne than low-value errors, participants 
showed comparable overall performance in both conditions. In the second experiment, 
participants were told that an experimenter would monitor and evaluate their performance. 
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Similar to the first study, the Ne amplitude was increased in the evaluation condition 
compared to a control condition, without any differences in overall performance. However, 
the design of the Hajcak et al.’s study did not differentiate between the consequences of 
error-related loss and error-related failure to gain. This distinction might be of special 
importance given that according to a commonly held view losses loom larger than gains 
(“loss aversion”; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Indeed, a recent report found larger Ne 
amplitudes for errors associated with monetary losses compared to errors associated with 
failure to obtain monetary rewards (Potts, 2011). Furthermore, Pailing and Segalowitz (2004) 
demonstrated that personality variables moderated the relation between motivational 
manipulations and Ne amplitude. In their study, high neuroticism scores predicted larger 
incentive-related modulations in Ne amplitude, whereas high conscientiousness predicted 
smaller incentive effects. 
Studies that induced short-term positive and negative affect yielded mixed findings. In 
one report, pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral pictures were presented prior (700 ms) to each 
imperative stimulus in a flankers task (Wiswede, Münte, Goschke, & Rüsseler, 2009a). While 
the Ne amplitude was larger in the unpleasant than in the neutral condition, no difference 
was found between the pleasant and the neutral condition. In contrast, Larson and 
colleagues (2006) reported increased Ne amplitudes to flanker stimuli that were 
superimposed on pleasant pictures but no difference between neutral and unpleasant 
backgrounds. In a further study, Wiswede and coworkers (2009b) investigated how 
encouraging or derogatory feedback that was based on participants’ reaction time influenced 
performance monitoring during a flanker task. The authors found larger Ne amplitudes in 
subjects that were provided derogatory feedback compared to encouraging feedback, 
whereas the Pe was unaffected by the feedback manipulation. However, a subsequent study 
using the same paradigm failed to obtain differences in Ne amplitude between the two 
feedback groups (Clayson, Clawson, & Larson, 2011), leading the authors to suggest that 
alterations in affective state do not influence action monitoring as reflected in the Ne. Yet, the 
results of the latter study raised some doubts regarding the effectiveness of the feedback 
manipulation in eliciting negative affect. First, the two groups reported equal levels of 
negative affect after the experiment, suggesting that the affect-induction was not effective. 
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Second, in contrast to the Wiswede et al.’s study, reaction times did not differ between the 
two feedback conditions, that is, participants in the derogatory-feedback group did not 
increased their response speed over the course of the task. Instead, they made more errors 
over time and hence performed worse than the encouraging-feedback group, making the 
interpretation of the null findings for the Ne (which has been shown to decrease with reduced 
accuracy) difficult. Clearly, further research is needed to clarify the relation between affective 
states and action monitoring indices. Importantly, the Pe was unaffected by the feedback 
manipulation in both studies. 
Summary and Implications for the Present Study 
ERP studies investigating the electrophysiological correlates of reinforcement 
learning have yielded important insights into the neural processes underlying error and 
feedback processing. In the context of the present study, three ERP components are of 
particular interest: The Ne and the FRN, assumed to reflect activity of a generic error-
processing system (Falkenstein et al., 1990; Gehring et al., 1993; Holroyd & Coles, 2002; 
Miltner et al., 1997), and the Pe (error positivity), which has been associated with the 
conscious recognition and affective/motivational appraisal of errors. Of major importance for 
this study are demonstrations that the Ne (and potentially also the FRN and the Pe) is 
susceptible to affective and motivational influences, indicating that the significance of on-
going events has a substantial impact on action monitoring. Yet, most of the studies cited 
above used response competition or gambling tasks to examine the influence of affective 
and motivational variables on error- and feedback-related ERP components. Reports of task-
specific dissociations in Ne amplitude (e.g. Gründler et al., 2009) suggest that the described 
findings cannot readily be generalized to studies of RL. 
Integrative Theoretical Accounts on Performance Monitoring 
A number of theories have been put forward to account for the ERP-correlates of 
error- and feedback processing. Most theories primarily addressed the functional significance 
of the Ne. An intense debate has emerged as to whether the Ne reflects the detection of a 
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mismatch between the actual and the required response (Falkenstein et al., 1990; Gehring et 
al. 1993), conflict arising from simultaneous activation of multiple response tendencies 
(Yeung, et al., 2004), differences between expected and obtained action outcomes (Holroyd 
& Coles, 2002), or the affective and motivational evaluation of an error (Hajcak & Foti, 2008; 
Luu et al., 2003). Importantly, these accounts are neither mutually exclusive nor can one of 
them fully explain the majority of empirical data. However, two computational models have 
largely dominated action monitoring research during the last decade: the Reinforcement-
Learning (R-L) theory (Holroyd & Coles, 2002) and the conflict monitoring theory (Botvinick et 
al., 2001). 
The Reinforcement Learning Theory of Holroyd and Coles – An Integrative Theoretical 
Account on Error Processing and Learning 
 The reinforcement learning (R-L) theory (Holroyd & Coles, 2002) provides a 
computational model that accounts for both the Ne and the FRN by integrating the DA-RPE 
hypothesis with the action selection functions attributed to the ACC. The R-L theory 
conceptualizes the Ne and FRN in terms of negative RPE signals indicating that the outcome 
of an action is “worse than expected”. Accordingly, the model posits that the Ne is elicited on 
the basis of internal response representations, whereas the FRN is elicited by external 
feedback stimuli. The ACC was proposed to use these learning signals to update 
associations between states, actions, and outcomes. Hence, the model directly links the two 
ERP components to the acquisition and optimization of goal-directed behaviour. 
Drawing on the work of Schultz and colleagues as well as on computational models of 
RL, Holroyd & Coles (2002) suggested an actor-critic architecture in which the TD PE is 
coded by the phasic activity of the mesencephalic DA system (see Figure 7). More 
specifically, the authors assumed that transient pauses in DA firing (i.e., negative PEs) 
disinhibit motor neurons in the ACC, leading to the generation of Ne and FRN. In accordance 
with previous research on the neural basis of RL (cf. Dayan & Niv, 2008; Maia, 2009; Niv & 
Montague, 2008), the R-L theory assigns the role of the adaptive critic to the basal ganglia. 
Additionally, the model suggests that multiple actors operate in parallel, including dlPFC, 
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OFC, and amygdala, each of which might use the PE to improve action selection. 
Importantly, the ACC is thought to act as a “supervisor” at the top of the hierarchy that uses 
the dopaminergic PE signal to arbitrate between the different motor controllers. In a way, the 
ACC thus learns a “controller-policy”, mapping states to actors, which in turn learn their own 
policies. 
 
Figure 7: Schematic illustration of the R-L theory. (Figure adapted from Holroyd & Coles, 2002) 
Given that feedback-based learning is accompanied by a transition from an external 
to an internal reference for action evaluation, a core prediction of the R-L theory concerns 
modulations of Ne and FRN over the course of learning. Specifically, the theory postulates 
that the Ne should increase with learning, reflecting the development of an internal 
representation of the correct response. In contrast, the FRN should decrease with learning, 
indicating reduced reliance on external feedback to determine the correctness of a response. 
Note that negative feedback after an erroneous response is fully expected once an individual 
has learned the response-outcome contingencies and hence does not result in a PE. 
Instead, the PE is computed around the time of the response, reflected in the Ne. Another 
important prediction following from the R-L theory is that larger PEs, i.e., larger Ne/FRN 
amplitudes, should be associated with a stronger tendency to subsequently avoid the same 
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maladaptive response. In the following section, I will review evidence on the central claim 
that both the Ne and the FRN are neural manifestations of a dopaminergic PE signal and 
hence indicators of a RL mechanism. 
Evaluation of the Reinforcement-Learning Theory. Consistent with the proposed 
involvement of the DA system, the Ne is sensitive to changes in dopaminergic transmission. 
For instance, altered Ne amplitudes have been reported in neuropsychiatric disorders that 
are characterized by altered DA levels, including Parkinson’s disease (Falkenstein, et al., 
2001; Stemmer, Segalowitz, Dywan, Panisset, & Melmed, 2007; Willemsen, Müller, Schwarz, 
Hohnsbein, & Falkenstein, 2008) and Huntington’s disease (Beste et al., 2007, 2008). 
Furthermore, the Ne amplitude is increased following the administration of a DA agonist 
compared to a placebo (de Bruijn et al., 2004), whereas DA antagonists lead to an 
attenuation of the Ne (de Bruijn et al., 2004; Zirnheld et al., 2004). Notably, a recent study 
reported impaired reward learning and more negative FRN amplitudes to reward feedback 
for participants receiving a DA agonist compared to a control group (Santesso et al., 2009). 
In contrast, the Pe is typically unaffected by modulations of the dopaminergic activity 
(Overbeek et al., 2005). Examining genetic polymorphisms of the COMT gene, which 
determines DA levels in the PFC, Frank and coworkers (2007b) found no difference in Ne 
amplitude between met/met and val/val carriers. Another study, however, reported larger Ne 
amplitudes for individuals homozygous for a certain allele of the DA D4 receptor gene that 
determines prefrontal receptor responsiveness to DA (Krämer et al., 2007). 
 Although these findings are mostly consistent with the R-L theory, substantial 
evidence indicates that other neurotransmitters, such as serotonin, noradrenaline, and 
GABA, are additionally involved in the generation of the Ne and the FRN (cf. Jocham & 
Ullsperger, 2009). Moreover, it has been argued that DA plays a different role in RL than 
originally proposed by Holroyd and Coles (2002). As was discussed in the context of the DA-
RPE hypothesis, several researchers have pointed out that the effects of phasic DA activity 
in the PFC take seconds or even minutes to resolve and are therefore unlikely to fulfil the 
requirements of a PE signal and to underlie rapid electrophysiological responses such as Ne 
and FRN (Durstewitz & Seamans, 2002; Jocham & Ullsperger, 2009). Instead, it has been 
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suggested that the performance monitoring functions of the ACC might exert a top-down 
modulatory influence on the DA system (Frank et al., 2005; Jocham & Ullsperger, 2009). 
 If Ne and FRN are neural manifestations of PEs, they should reflect response-
outcome contingency (reward probability) and valence. Convergent evidence indicates that 
both the Ne and the FRN are sensitive to feedback validity. Consistent with PEs derived from 
TD learning rules, learning conditions involving deterministic response-outcome 
contingencies (valid feedback) were associated with larger Ne and smaller FRN amplitudes 
than those involving probabilistic contingencies (partly invalid feedback) (Eppinger et al., 
2008, 2009; Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2002). Although the R-L theory does 
not explicitly specify to which degree expectancy and value are jointly represented by the 
FRN, the original proposal suggests a scalar value, i.e., the more unexpected and 
unfavourable the outcome, the more negative the amplitude. Unfortunately, the empirical 
evidence is still inconclusive. While some findings suggested that the FRN is sensitive to 
expectancy deviation rather than feedback valence (Chase et al., 2011; Oliveira, McDonald, 
& Goodman, 2007), others indicated that the FRN is unaffected by expectancy violations 
(Hajcak et al., 2007). Similarly, it remains unclear whether the feedback value is coded in a 
binary (Holroyd et al., 2004; 2006) or more graded fashion (Bellebaum et al., 2010; Goyer et 
al., 2008; Kreussel et al., 2011). 
Furthermore, the R-L theory has been challenged by reports of dissociations between 
Ne and FRN. For instance, the Ne appears to be modulated by affective and motivational 
variables, whereas very few studies reported corresponding effects for the FRN. Crucially, 
studies that measured both the Ne and the FRN found distinctive influences of factors such 
as OC symptomatology (Gründler et al., 2009) and age (Eppinger et al., 2008). A related 
problem concerns learning-related changes of the two components. In line with the 
predictions of the R-L theory, a number of studies showed that the Ne increases with 
learning (Eppinger et al., 2008, 2009; Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Morris et al., 2008; 
Nieuwenhuis et al., 2002; Pietschmann et al., 2008). The pattern of findings for the FRN, 
however, is less consistent. Several studies failed to obtain the predicted decrease of the 
FRN over the course of learning (e.g., Cohen & Ranganath, 2007; Holroyd & Coles, 2002; 
Pietschmann et al., 2008). Importantly, Eppinger and colleagues (2008, 2009) showed 
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pronounced learning-related changes in the ERPs to correct feedback and responses rather 
than in the ERPs to incorrect feedback and errors. A similar result was reported by Cohen 
and Ranaganath (2007). On the basis of their findings, Eppinger and coworkers (2008) 
concluded that the so-called ‘response/feedback-locked positivity’ might reflect dopaminergic 
modulations of ACC activity, possibly associated with a positive PE. The idea of a reward-
related positivity has also been put forward by Holroyd and coworkers (2008, 2011). Notably, 
a recent attempt to isolate to reward-related positivity by means of principal component 
analysis yielded promising results (Foti et al., 2011). 
 Surprisingly few studies have tested whether Ne and FRN magnitude predict 
behavioural adjustments during learning – as should be expected if the two components 
reflect a PE. Consistent with a RL framework, previous studies demonstrated that the 
magnitude of the FRN predicted strategic action selection (Cohen & Ranganath, 2007). Yet, 
in this study participants played a strategic game in which feedback was based on an 
algorithm that ensured equal distribution of wins and losses. Hence, there was no learnable 
response-outcome contingency. A subsequent study provided more compelling evidence for 
a link between FRN amplitude and learning-related behavioural changes (van der Helden, 
Boksem, & Blom, 2010). In a feedback-based sequence learning task, the FRN amplitude 
was more negative on incorrect trials that were corrected on the next encounter of the same 
item compared to those that were not corrected. Moreover, findings by Frank and coworkers 
point to a link between individual differences in Ne amplitude and a bias to avoid responses 
that have been learned to result in unfavourable outcomes (Cavanagh et al., 2011a; Frank et 
al., 2005, 2007b). 
Alternative Accounts on the Error Negativity and Related ERP-Components 
The Error/Mismatch Detection Theory. Early accounts have discussed the Ne in 
terms of an error detection mechanism (Coles et al., 2001; Falkenstein et al., 1991; Gehring 
et al., 1993). According to this view, the processing of the imperative stimulus activates a 
representation of the correct (or intended) response, which is compared with an efference 
copy of the outgoing motor command, i.e., the executed response. The Ne reflects an error 
signal that indicates a mismatch between the two representations. Most variants of the error 
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detection account agree on the assumption that the mechanism underlying the Ne gives rise 
to remedial actions such as immediate error correction. The error detection account directly 
implies that greater deviations of the actual response from the intended one should result in 
larger Ne amplitudes. Studies testing the effects of response and stimulus similarity on the 
Ne, however, yielded inconclusive results (e.g., Bernstein et al, 1995; Falkenstein et al., 
1996; Gehring & Fencsik, 2001; Yeung et al., 2007). For instance, Falkenstein and 
coworkers (1996) reported larger Ne amplitudes for dissimilar response representations, 
whereas Gehring and Fencsik (2001) found larger Ne amplitudes for similar response 
representations. However, these studies defined response similarity only based on effector 
side, which might be an inappropriate or insufficient characterization on a conceptual level. 
Moreover, the effects of stimulus and response similarity were often confounded with 
performance differences, rendering definitive conclusions difficult. 
The Conflict-Monitoring Theory. Another prominent computational approach to the Ne 
holds that this component reflects a monitoring process in the ACC that tracks the degree to 
which mutually incompatible responses are co-activated9 (Botvinick et al., 2001; Yeung, 
Botvinick, & Cohen, 2004). According to the conflict monitoring theory, the Ne reflects post-
error conflict due to the simultaneous activation of incorrect and correct responses, the latter 
arising from continued processing of the target stimulus after the erroneous response. The 
conflict signal is thought to be conveyed to the dlPFC which implements top-down control by 
recruiting task-set related attentional mechanisms in order to bias information processing. A 
central claim of the conflict monitoring account is that higher degrees of response conflict are 
associated with larger Ne amplitudes. However, empirical tests provided only limited (or no) 
support for this assertion (e.g., Burle et al., 2008; Carbonnell & Falkenstein, 2006; Yeung et 
al., 2004), possibly reflecting an inappropriate modelling of motor representations in these 
studies and/or the conflict monitoring theory itself (cf. Gehring et al., in press). In addition, the 
conflict monitoring theory refers to another medial frontal negativity: The N200, a stimulus-
locked ERP-component that is typically larger on incompatible compared to compatible trials 
                                                 
9 Response conflict is quantified as the Hopfield (1982) energy of simultaneously activated response units, i.e., 
the product of the activation of each unit, weighted by the strength of the inhibitory connections between the units. 
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in conflict tasks. Given that high response conflict does not necessarily result in errors, the 
N200 reflects pre-response conflict on correct trials. Indeed, there is evidence indicating that 
Ne and N200 bear strong resemblance both morphologically and functionally (Ferdinand, 
Mecklinger, & Kray, 2008; Folstein & Van Petten, 2008). However, dissociations of Ne and 
N200 have been reported as well (e.g., Davies et al., 2001; Ridderinkhof et al., 2002; but see 
Yeung & Cohen, 2006). 
Of note, recent modelling work suggests that both conflict monitoring in the ACC and 
reinforcement learning in the BG can be integrated within a single model that accounts not 
only for the Ne but also for the FRN (Cockburn & Frank, 2011). This is of particular 
importance as the conflict monitoring theory presumes instructed task rules and does not 
explain how task-specific response mappings are acquired. 
Affective/Motivational Theories. An important omission of the above-discussed 
models on ACC functioning is that they do not explicitly account for the susceptibility of the 
Ne (and potentially the FRN and Pe) to affective and motivational variables. Although those 
influences are not denied, a commonly held – but usually implicit notion – is that higher 
affective and motivational significance leads to an increased recruitment of cognitive control 
mechanisms (cf. Yeung, 2004). Considerable evidence suggested that the affective and 
motivational significance of on-going events has a substantial impact on action monitoring. 
However, the existing computational models do not specify how these effects are 
implemented in the brain. 
Luu and colleagues (2003) addressed this issue by assuming that the Ne might 
reflect the joint activity of several structures in a broader corticolimbic circuit. In line with the 
segregationist view on ACC functioning (Bush et al., 2000), the authors stated that distinct 
subregions of the ACC differentially contribute to action regulation with the dorsal part 
(dACC) being more strongly implicated in cognitive aspects of action monitoring and the 
rostral part (rACC) primarily processing the affective significance of a response outcome (see 
also van Veen & Carter, 2002). Interestingly, Luu et al. (2003) found that both the dACC and 
the rACC contributed to the Ne, whereas only the dACC contributed to the FRN. Although 
the functional segregation of the ACC into a cognitive and an affective subdivision has been 
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seriously challenged (Shackman et al., 2011), a large number of studies pointed to a 
functional dissociation between rACC and dACC in error processing and learning (e.g., 
Cavanagh, Gründler, Frank, & Allen, 2010b; Simões-Franklin, Hester, Shpaner, Foxe, & 
Garavan, 2010; Taylor et al., 2006). 
Furthermore, Boksem and coworkers (2006b) posited that there is a strong 
correspondence between the BIS (Gray, 1987) and the sensitivity of the Ne to mistakes, 
punishment, and negative affect. They further reasoned that the Ne might reflect aversively 
motivated, reactive engagement aimed at avoiding punishment. In line with this view, the Ne 
has been directly linked to defensive behaviours. Hajcak and Foti (2008) showed that the Ne 
amplitude predicted the potentiation of the startle reflex following error trials. On the basis of 
this finding, the authors reasoned that the Ne is associated with an error detection 
mechanism. The outcome of this mechanism serves to trigger defensive reactions in order to 
protect the organism against potential dangers. Moreover, Boksem and colleagues (2006a) 
found a correlation between the Pe and reward sensitivity BAS. From their findings, the 
authors concluded that high BIS scores and enhanced Ne amplitudes reflect a bias towards 
reactive control, denoting the tendency to recruit control processes after a (negative) event 
has occurred (Braver, Gray, & Burgess, 2007; Tops, Boksem, Luu, & Tucker, 2010). By 
contrast, high BAS scores and large Pe amplitudes are thought to indicate a bias towards 
proactive control, i.e., the tendency to engage in preparatory attention to maintain context 
and goal representations and to allocate resources in order to obtain rewards and to prevent 
negative events. 
Integrative Accounts. Recently, several attempts have been made to integrate the 
empirical findings on the Ne and related components into a more comprehensive view on 
performance monitoring and adaptive control (Alexander & Brown, 2010; Taylor, Stern, & 
Gehring, 2007; Tops et al., 2010). The prediction of response-outcome (PRO) theory 
(Alexander & Brown, 2010) synthesizes core ideas and mechanisms of existing models. 
Similar to the R-L theory, action monitoring is conceptualized within a RL framework. 
However, the PRO model is thought to learn R-O associations rather than S-R or S-O 
associations. Specifically, the PRO-model involves two functional components, implemented 
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by the mPFC: the first component is trained by a RL mechanism to predict the potential 
outcomes of an action, whereas the second component compares predicted and actually 
obtained outcomes. The first component subsequently uses detected discrepancies to 
improve its own predictions. In contrast to the R-L theory, the PRO model states that the 
mPFC signals discrepancies, i.e., PEs, for both positive and negative outcomes and allows 
for encoding of multiple PEs. Moreover, the PRO model does not presume that the mPFC is 
trained by a dopaminergic PE signal. 
Tops and coworkers (Tops et al., 2010; Tops & Boksem, 2011) provided an even 
more comprehensive and general scheme of behavioural systems underlying psychological 
processes. Drawing on the basic distinction between proactive and reactive behavioural 
programs (e.g., Braver, Gray, & Burgess, 2007; Koolhaas et al., 2007) the model proposes 
four distinct behavioural control systems: proactive approach, proactive avoidance, reactive 
approach, and reactive avoidance. Crucially, these systems are hypothesized to be under 
dopaminergic (reactive approach), cholinergic (reactive avoidance), noradrenergic (proactive 
approach), and serotonergic (proactive avoidance) neuromodulatory control. Moreover, the 
proactive and reactive systems are linked to a dorsomedial and ventrolateral cortical system, 
respectively. The authors reviewed evidence in support of the notion that proactive control is 
more adaptive in stable environments, in which behaviour is guided by context models 
whereas reactive control is more adaptive in unstable, rapidly changing environments that 
require fast, feedback-driven behavioural adjustments. 
 
Summary and Implications for the Present Study 
The R-L theory (Holroyd & Coles, 2002) provides a neurocomputational model of 
error processing that accounts both for the Ne and the FRN. It integrates the DA-RPE 
hypothesis with the action selection functions attributed to the ACC and implies a direct link 
between both ERP-components and learning-related behavioural adaptation. Specifically, it 
is assumed that negative PE signals are used by the ACC to update associations between 
states, actions, and outcomes. Other theories have also linked the Ne to remedial actions, 
but discussed the Ne in terms of a “mere” error/mismatch detection mechanism and a conflict 
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signal indicating the need for enhanced cognitive control. In addition, a few recent 
frameworks have aimed at accounting for the susceptibility of action monitoring to affective 
and motivational variables. However, these affective/motivational “theories” clearly lack the 
computational specificity of the R-L and conflict monitoring models, which in turn are more or 
less ignorant to the role of motivational and affective variables in performance monitoring. In 
particular, surprisingly little is known on how affect- and motivation-related modulations of 
ERP-correlates of performance monitoring relate to adaptive behavioural changes during RL. 
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3. Statement of Problem and Overview of Studies 
Despite considerable differences in their conceptualization of the ERP-correlates of 
error and feedback processing, most theories on performance monitoring assert a functional 
link between the neural mechanisms underlying these components and flexible behavioural 
adjustments. Most notably, the R-L theory (Holroyd & Coles, 2002) states that Ne and FRN 
are neural manifestations of PEs, which train the ACC to select appropriate motor controllers, 
i.e., to learn adaptive response rules for the task at hand. Although this claim has not 
thoroughly been supported by the literature, previous studies showed that the FRN amplitude 
predicts subsequent strategic choices and (Cohen & Ranganath, 2005) and learning-related 
behavioural adjustments (van der Helden et al., 2010). In addition, the Ne amplitude relates 
to interindividual variations in a bias to avoid responses that have been learned to result in 
unfavourable outcomes (Frank et al., 2005).  
At the same time, the evidence reviewed above strongly suggests that performance 
monitoring – as reflected in the Ne – is sensitive to the affective and motivational context of 
an action. The susceptibility of the FRN and the Pe to those influences is much less 
substantiated. Yet, recent findings indicate that highly punishment sensitive individuals are 
characterized by larger FRN amplitudes (Balconi & Crivelli, 2010; De Pascalis, Varriale, & 
D’Antuono, 2010; Santesso et al., 2011). So far, research focused almost exclusively on 
conflict and gambling paradigms to examine affective-motivational modulations of Ne and 
FRN, respectively. To my knowledge, only one prior study has explicitly tested how affective-
manipulations influence the activity of medial prefrontal performance monitoring system 
during reinforcement learning. Cavanagh and colleagues (2011a) found that social-
evaluative stress leads increased response-related mediofrontal EEG theta power but 
decreased theta power to negative feedback. Interestingly, the changes in mPFC activity 
were associated with relatively better punishment and worse reward learning in highly 
punishment sensitive individuals, but worse punishment learning and improved reward 
learning in less punishment sensitive individuals. These findings suggest that trait 
vulnerability to punishment significantly moderates the impact of stress-induced negative 
affect on action monitoring and learning. 
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Given that Ne, FRN, and Pe have been proposed to reflect neural signals that are 
used to guide subsequent behavioural adjustments, the main goals of this thesis were to 
determine (1) the degree to which manipulations of motivational-affective state result in 
modulations of the Ne, FRN, and Pe during reinforcement learning, (2) how these 
modulations are reflected in the ability to use error signals for learning-related behavioural 
adaptation, and whether the impact of the affective-motivational manipulations on the 
electrophysiological and behavioural indices of action monitoring changes (3) over the 
course of learning and (4) as a function of affect-related traits. 
A further aim of this thesis was to address the on-going debate as to whether the Ne 
is an index of deviant error processing associated with trait – but not state – variations in 
negative affect (e.g., Clayson et al., 2011). Indeed, it has been suggested that variations in 
Ne amplitude might reflect an ‘endophenotype’ for internalizing and externalizing disorders, 
respectively (Olvet & Hajcak, 2008). Such a conclusion appears premature for two important 
reasons: First, thus far, only a very small number of studies used experimental manipulations 
to examine the impact of motivational and affective factors on performance-monitoring 
processes. Second, employing an individual difference approach, one cannot exclude that 
non-affect-related variables account for the observed differences in Ne amplitude. Moreover, 
it remains to be determined whether experimentally induced state variations in negative 
affect and trait level negative affect are accompanied by similar changes in the functioning of 
the action monitoring system. 
These issues were addressed in three experiments. The first experiment was 
designed to investigate how an episode of self-relevant failure affects adaptive behavioural 
adjustments and ERP-correlates of performance monitoring during a subsequent feedback-
based learning task. To this end, two phases (pre- and posttest) of a probabilistic learning 
task were applied. Between pre- and posttest, participants performed a visual search task 
that was described as diagnostic of intellectual abilities. In this task, participants were 
assigned to one of two conditions in which they received either failure feedback (failure-
feedback-group) or no feedback (no-feedback-group). 
Failure experiences are associated with prominent affective and motivational 
consequences. First of all, failure is an acute stressor that triggers negative affective states 
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(Westermann, Spies, Stahl, & Hesse, 1996). Crucially, recent evidence suggests that stress-
related variations in negative affect influence learning strategy rather than overall 
performance (Cavanagh et al., 2011a; Petzold et al., 2010; Schwabe & Wolf, 2009). In 
particular, it has been shown that stress-manipulations affect the processing of response 
errors and negative feedback information. Moreover, personality traits such as punishment 
sensitivity might be important factors in mediating the specific behavioural consequences of 
these manipulations. The first experiment thus specifically aimed to determine (1) whether 
failure affects the reliance on internal vs. external cues for action evaluation during the time-
course of learning, reflected in learning-related dynamics of Ne vs. FRN, (2) the degree to 
which failure promotes a bias towards enhanced processing of errors/negative feedback or 
correct responses/positive feedback, and (3) whether affect-related traits moderate the 
effects of failure. 
Uncontrollable failure experiences also induce significant motivational changes 
(Brunstein, 2000; Kuhl, 1987; Seligmann, 1975). Previous research has demonstrated that 
self-relevance of the task and individual differences in action vs. state orientation are critical 
in determining whether failure leads to motivational deficits or reactive engagement. 
Importantly, the Ne has been shown to be sensitive to task engagement in that high 
persistence is associated with smaller reductions in Ne amplitude across the course of the 
task (Boksem et al., 2006a; Tops & Boksem, 2010). However, individual differences in 
negative affectivity appear to modulate the time course of motivational engagement during 
prolonged task performance. Luu and colleagues (2000) demonstrated that individuals 
characterized by high negative affectivity showed increased motivational engagement at the 
beginning of the task but impaired engagement during later stages of the task, reflected in 
initially enhanced but subsequently attenuated Ne amplitudes compared to individuals low in 
trait negative affect. Hence, motivational disengagement might disguise more specific 
consequences of failure on performance monitoring and learning (e.g., alterations in learning 
strategy).  
In an attempt to disentangle the effects of failure induction and motivational 
disengagement due to prolonged task performance, two experimental conditions were 
realized in the first and the second experiment. In the first experiment, the posttest was 
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described as indicative of intellectual abilities to ensure high self-relevance. By contrast, in 
the second experiment, the posttest was described in neutral terms. In both experiments, 
pre-task questionnaires assessed individual differences in punishment sensitivity, trait 
negative and positive affect, and action vs. state orientation. 
While Experiments 1 and 2 induced self-relevant failure to examine the 
consequences of short-term changes in affective and motivational state on performance 
monitoring and learning, the third experiment had a slightly different focus. Building up on 
previous demonstrations that the Ne tracks trial-by-trial variations in motivational significance 
(Hajcak et al., 2005; Potts, 2011), Experiment 3 aimed to determine whether manipulations 
of appetitive vs. aversive motivation by means of monetary incentives modulate error and 
feedback processing – as reflected in the Ne, FRN, and Pe – and how these modulations 
relate to behavioural adaptations during reinforcement learning. Given that a number of 
studies point to a functional dissociation between rACC and dACC in error processing (e.g., 
Cavanagh et al., 2010b; Simões-Franklin, et al., 2010, Taylor et al., 2006), a further goal was 
to explore whether the two cingulate subregions differentially contribute to error processing 
and error-related behavioural adjustments, depending on the motivational significance of an 
error. 
  
 74 
II Empirical Part 
4. Research Goals: Experiment 1 and 2 
In Experiment 1 and 2, participants were exposed to self-relevant failure during a 
visual search task that was linked to participants’ intellectual capability. The main goal of the 
two experiments was to examine the extent to which failure-induction influences the 
participants’ ability to use error signals for behavioural adaptation in a subsequent feedback-
based learning task and whether these differences in performance monitoring are reflected in 
modulations of the Ne, FRN, and Pe. In order to avoid that motivational disengagement due 
to prolonged task performance disguises the effect of failure-induction, different posttest 
instructions were given to manipulate participants’ motivation. In Experiment 1, the posttest 
was linked to intelligence, whereas a neutral instruction was given in Experiment 2. 
Previous research showed that the induction of negative affect due to derogatory 
feedback (Wiswede et al., 2009) or social-evaluative stress (Cavanagh et al., 2011a) leads to 
increased responsivity to internal indicators of performance errors, reflected in enhanced Ne 
amplitudes and mediofrontal theta power, respectively. Given the implication of the R-L 
theory (Holroyd & Coles, 2002) that larger prediction errors, i.e., larger Ne and FRN 
amplitudes, are associated with a stronger tendency to avoid the same maladaptive 
response subsequently, it would be predicted that failure-induced negative affective states 
are accompanied by improved learning from errors and negative feedback.  
However, available evidence indicates that personality may be an important factor in 
mediating behavioural manifestations of failure-induction. In particular, the findings by 
Cavanagh et al. (2011a) suggest that high and low punishment sensitivity mediates different 
biases towards punishment vs. reward learning. Moreover, individual differences in action vs. 
state orientation that have been linked to the ability to cope with failure-induced negative 
affect (Kuhl, 1987), might explain why stress has sometimes been found to compromise the 
use of negative feedback for learning-related behavioural adjustments (e.g. Petzold et al., 
2010). Thus, a specific aim of Experiment 1 and 2 was to test for moderating influences of 
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individual differences in punishment sensitivity, trait level negative and positive affect as well 
as action vs. state orientation on failure-induced changes in RL. 
Given that social-evaluative stress has been shown to differentially affect habitual 
learning and goal-directed learning as well as explicit knowledge of response rules, it is 
furthermore conceivable that the effects of failure-induction differ for deterministic and 
probabilistic A-O-contingencies, promoting explicit and implicit learning strategies, 
respectively. Therefore, the employed learning task included a deterministic and a 
probabilistic condition. 
A last issue concerned the on-going debate as to whether the response- and 
feedback-locked positivity are primary determinants of experimental variations in Ne and 
FRN, respectively (Eppinger et al., 2008; Foti et al., 2011; Holroyd et al., 2008). In particular, 
Eppinger and coworkers (2008; 2009) found more pronounced learning-related dynamics in 
the ERPs on correct trials, possibly reflecting neural activity associated with positive PEs. If 
this was the case, one might reason that failure affects the ERPs to correct responses and 
feedback rather than the ERPs to errors and negative feedback. 
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5. Experiment 1 
Study Design 
The experiment involved two consecutive phases (pre- and posttest) of a feedback-
based probabilistic learning task. In order to investigate whether the effects of failure 
induction are sensitive to response-outcome contingency, the learning task included three 
different conditions of feedback validity: in the deterministic learning condition feedback was 
always valid, in the probabilistic learning condition feedback was valid in 80% of trials but 
invalid in 20% of trials, and in the chance condition, which served as control condition, 
feedback was delivered randomly. After the pretest, subjects performed a visual search task 
that they were informed was diagnostic of their intellectual abilities. This was incorporated in 
order to enhance self-relevance, which is assumed to be an essential feature of efficient 
failure induction techniques (cf. Brunstein, 2000). One half of the subjects were exposed to 
failure feedback (failure-feedback group) while the other half received no feedback during 
this task (no-failure-feedback group). Subsequently, both groups performed the posttest, 
which tested for the effects of prior failure manipulation. While the learning task was 
described in neutral terms at pretest, it was linked to intellectual abilities at posttest. In 
addition, to assess individual differences in cognitive as well as motivational and affective 
variables, a number of psychometric tests and questionnaires were administered at the start 
of the experiment that included measures of fluid and crystallized intelligence, working 
memory capacity, punishment and reward sensitivity, positive and negative affect as well as 
action and state orientation. 
Research Predictions 
 The outline of research predictions is structured into three parts. The first part 
addresses learning-related effects in Ne, FRN, and Pe. Although the present study did not 
focus on the impact of learning per se, the analysis of these modulations is important for the 
interpretation of failure-related effects. Moreover, the present research aimed to replicate 
findings by Eppinger and colleagues (2008, 2009) indicating that learning does not only 
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affect the processing of errors and negative feedback, but also the processing of correct 
responses and positive feedback. The second part contains hypotheses concerning the 
impact of failure on error and feedback processing, including the implications for learning-
related behavioural adaptation. The third part subsumes predictions regarding the role of 
personality in determining the failure-related effects. 
Learning-related Modulations in Ne, FRN, and Pe 
The R-L theory (Holroyd & Coles, 2002) asserts that the Ne increases as learning 
progresses, whereas the FRN should decrease with learning, reflecting the transition from 
reliance on internal vs. external feedback to evaluate the outcome of an action. Several 
studies have reported a learning-related increase in Ne amplitude (Eppinger et al., 2008, 
2009; Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Morris et al., 2008; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2002; Pietschmann et 
al., 2008), whereas the evidence for learning-related modulations of the FRN is mixed 
(Cohen & Ranganath, 2007; Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Pietschmann et al., 2008; Walsh & 
Anderson, 2011a). Importantly, recent findings by Eppinger and colleagues (2008, 2009) 
suggest that learning-related changes occur in the ERPs to correct responses and positive 
feedback, rather than in the ERPs to incorrect feedback and errors. 
Moreover, the R-L theory predicts that both the Ne and the FRN should be sensitive 
to action-outcome-contingency as the PE tracks deviations from “cached” estimates of 
expected value stored by the actor-critic (Maia, 2009; Niv & Montague, 2008). The expected 
value of an action, hence, is smaller if this action does not consistently lead to favourable 
outcomes. Consistent with this prediction, the Ne and the FRN have been shown to be 
smaller and larger, respectively, when partly invalid feedback interferes with learning 
(Eppinger et al., 2008; 2009; Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2002). According to 
the R-L theory, Ne and FRN reflect teaching signals that train the ACC to learn adaptive 
response rules. In support of this notion, previous studies demonstrated a link between the 
magnitude of the FRN and subsequent behavioural adjustments (Cohen & Ranganath, 2007; 
van der Helden et al., 2010). In addition, the Ne amplitude has been shown to predict 
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individual differences in learning from errors and negative feedback (Frank et al., 2005). On 
the basis of these findings, the following predictions were made: 
Prediction 1: (a) The Ne increases over the course of learning in the deterministic and 
probabilistic learning condition, but not in the chance condition. However, when correct and 
erroneous responses are analysed separately, more pronounced learning-related 
modulations are evident in the ‘correct response-related positivity’. (b) The Ne amplitude is 
sensitive to feedback validity and should increase from the chance condition over the 
probabilistic to the deterministic learning condition. As for the learning-related changes, this 
effect should be present both in the ERPs to correct and incorrect responses. (c) The Ne 
amplitude predicts error-related behavioural adjustments, i.e., higher Ne amplitudes are 
associated with higher post-error accuracy. 
Prediction 2: (a) The FRN decreases over the course of learning, mainly reflected in 
modulations in the ERPs to positive feedback. (b) The FRN is sensitive to feedback validity 
and decreases from the chance condition over the probabilistic to the deterministic learning 
condition10. 
The Pe is not assumed to reflect a PE and has not consistently been implicated in 
learning-related behavioural adaptation. Nonetheless, most theories on the functional 
significance of this component such as the ‘error awareness-hypothesis’ and the ‘context-
updating hypothesis’ imply that the Pe should grow larger with learning (cf. Overbeek et al., 
2005). To my knowledge, only one study examined learning-related modulations in Pe 
amplitude thus far. In line with accounts that conceptualize the Pe in terms of conscious 
aspects of error processing as well as context updating, Eppinger and cowokers (2009) 
demonstrated that the Pe increased as participants became better able to represent the 
correctness of their responses. Thus, the prediction was: 
                                                 
10 In contrast to the Ne, the FRN amplitude was not expected to correlate with post-error accuracy. According to 
the R-L theory, larger FRN amplitudes should predict more efficient learning from negative feedback only in the 
very beginning of learning. With the development of an internal representation of the correct responses, the FRN 
is assumed to decrease and the Ne should predict behavioural adjustments. During later stages of the task, larger 
FRN amplitudes hence are thought to reflect poor learning. 
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Prediction 3: The Pe increases (a) over the course of learning and (b) with feedback 
validity. 
Effects of Failure on Behavioural and Electrophysiological Indices of Learning 
The impact of uncontrollable failure experiences on subsequent performance has 
been shown to depend on motivational characteristics both of the failure-induction and the 
subsequent training task (Brunstein & Gollwitzer, 1996). Helplessness research suggested 
that a motivational deficit underlies the negative effects of failure on instrumental learning 
(Mikulincer, 1994; Seligmann, 1975; Vollmayer et al., 2004). Brunstein and Gollwitzer (1996), 
however, demonstrated that participants exposed to self-relevant failure showed improved 
performance on a subsequent self-relevant task but impaired performance on an unrelated 
task. At the same time, it has been suggested that the need to cope with failure-induced 
negative emotions depletes limited control resources and hence leads to performance 
impairments on tasks relying on the same resources (Inzlicht & Gutsell, 2007). 
Moreover, social-evaluative stress has been found to affect learning strategies rather 
than overall learning performance (Cavanagh et al., 2011a; Petzold et al., 2010, Schwabe & 
Wolf, 2009). Findings by Schwabe and colleagues (2011) suggested that stress specifically 
promotes implicit, habitual learning at the expense of explicit learning and memory 
strategies. Given the contradictory pattern of findings regarding behavioural effects of 
uncontrollable failures, the following hypotheses are more tentative: 
Prediction 4: (a) Participants in the failure-feedback group should be more motivated 
to perform well at posttest than those in the no-failure-feedback group. The increased 
motivation should counteract the potentially detrimental effects of resource-consuming 
emotion regulation demands. Hence, both groups were expected to show similar overall 
posttest performance. (b) Given that stress has been shown to promote slow, habitual 
learning, failure-induction may differentially affect learning of deterministic and probabilistic 
contingencies. Thus, if anything, failure should affect performance in the deterministic 
learning condition in which explicit strategies are more helpful. In addition, a failure-induced 
bias towards habitual control should be reflected in a slower time course of learning. 
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Critically, available evidence on whether stress alters the ability to learn from past 
mistakes is inconclusive. While Petzold and colleagues (2010) reported stress-related 
impairments in the ability to use negative feedback for behavioural adaptation, others found 
stress-related improvements in punishment learning in highly punishment sensitive 
individuals (Cavanagh et al., 2011a). However, both studies assessed the stress-related 
effects in a test phase, which followed the actual learning phase. This test phase required 
participants to select the ‘best option’ among different pairs of stimuli that were associated 
with different reward probabilities in the previous learning phase. In choosing this indirect 
approach, the studies did not directly track error- and feedback-related behavioural 
adjustments during learning. 
Previous findings indicated that the Ne is sensitive to the motivational and affective 
significance of an error (Falkenstein et al., 2000; Gehring et al., 1993; Hajcak et al., 2005; 
Potts, 2011). Moreover, the induction of short-term negative affect has been shown to be 
associated with an increase in Ne amplitude (Wiswede et al., 2009a,b). Similarly, Cavanagh 
and colleagues (2011a) showed that the exposure to social evaluative stress lead to 
heightened response-related mediofrontal theta-power. However, others failed to obtain 
negative affect-related enhancements in Ne amplitude (Clayson et al., 2011; Larson et al., 
2006). So far, the effects of affective/motivational manipulations on performance monitoring 
have been examined using response competition or gambling tasks with known response 
contingencies. There is evidence indicating that the processing of ‘errors of commission’ 
during these tasks and suboptimal choices during probabilistic learning might be differentially 
influenced by affective variables (Gründler et al., 2009; Cavanagh et al., 2010b). Since most 
researchers agree that uncontrollable failure gives rise to strong negative feelings, the 
following predictions concerning the Ne and post-error behavioural adjustments were made: 
Prediction 511: (a) Failure-induction leads to an increase of the Ne at posttest. (b) This 
affect-related enhancement was expected to be more pronounced if participants were better 
able to represent the correctness of their responses, i.e., the pre-post Ne differences should 
                                                 
11 As was already stated above, this study specifically focused on differential modulations of ERPs to 
error/negative feedback vs. correct responses/positive feedback. 
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be larger towards the end compared to the beginning of the learning process. (c) In addition, 
dissociations in Ne amplitude between tasks with fixed response rules and probabilistic 
learning tasks suggest that the effects of failure may be sensitive to feedback validity. This 
could be reflected in a more pronounced failure-related Ne modulation in the deterministic 
compared to the probabilistic learning condition. 
Prediction 6: Although previous research indicated that social-evaluative stress alters 
the processing of errors and feedback, no study has explicitly examined the impact 
affective/motivational manipulations on behavioural adjustments during learning. Yet, the R-L 
theory implies that affect-related modulations in the Ne (see Prediction 5) should be reflected 
in adaptive action selection. Therefore, the failure-related enhancement in Ne amplitude was 
expected to be associated with higher post-error accuracy. 
The susceptibility of FRN and Pe to motivational and affective influences is less 
substantiated. In neuropsychiatric disorders such as major depression and OCD, the Pe is 
often unaffected (Overbeek et al., 2005). Reduced Pe amplitudes in severely depressed 
patients have been linked to apathy rather than negative affect (Schrijvers et al., 2009). 
However, Hajcak and colleagues (2004) reported that high trait level negative affect was 
associated with a reduced Pe. Larger FRN amplitudes have been found in moderately 
depressed patients (Cavanagh et al., 2011b; Santesso et al., 2008; Tucker et al., 2003). 
Furthermore, recent findings point to a positive relationship between punishment sensitivity 
and FRN magnitude (Balconi & Crivelli, 2010; De Pascalis, Varriale, & D’Antuono, 2010; 
Santesso et al., 2011). Yet, reduced mediofrontal theta-power in response to negative 
feedback has been found when participants were exposed to stress (Cavanagh et al., 
2011a). The described pattern of findings made a clear prediction regarding failure-related 
effects on the FRN and the Pe difficult: 
Prediction 7: (a) Given the findings that the FRN is enhanced in depressed and highly 
punishment sensitive individuals, failure-induction may result in larger FRN amplitudes. This 
prediction also seems consistent with the R-L theory, which states that Ne and FRN reflect 
basically the same process. However, no prior study has examined the impact of 
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experimental manipulations of affective/motivational variables on the FRN. Moreover, stress 
has been found to reduce sensitivity to negative feedback, making a straightforward 
prediction difficult. (b) According to the R-L theory, Ne and FRN track the reliance on internal 
and external feedback, respectively, over the course of learning. It was reasoned that the 
experience of uncontrollable self-relevant failure might affect the dynamics of learning-related 
changes in Ne and FRN. Specifically, participants in the failure-feedback group were 
expected to rely more strongly on external feedback. This should be reflected in a less 
pronounced reduction in FRN amplitude as learning progressed. 
Prediction 8: Given the limited number of studies that experimental manipulations of 
affective and motivational variables to examine later stages of error processing as reflected 
in the Pe, the susceptibility of this component to failure-induction remains an open question. 
The Modulatory Role of Personality 
Individual differences in the disposition towards state vs. action orientation have been 
shown to moderate the effect of uncontrollable failure on subsequent performance (Kuhl, 
1981). Thus, it follows that: 
Prediction 9: State-orientated participants perform worse after failure-induction than 
action-oriented participants. 
Moreover, high punishment sensitivity predicted better implicit learning in a 
punishment compared to a control condition (Corr, Pickering, & Gray, 1997) as well as 
improved probabilistic learning from negative feedback and impaired learning from positive 
feedback under stress (Cavanagh et al., 2011a). The opposite pattern has been observed in 
low punishment sensitive individuals. Yet, less consistent findings have been reported in 
studies using explicit learning tasks with deterministic contingencies (e.g., Zinbarg & Revelle, 
1989) and the effects in Cavanagh et al.’s study were observed after but not during learning. 
Nonetheless the findings suggest: 
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Prediction 10: (a) Punishment sensitivity moderates the effects of failure on 
subsequent learning performance. (b) The influence of individual differences in punishment 
sensitivity may differ for the deterministic and probabilistic learning condition. 
Pailing and Segalowitz (2004) demonstrated that high neuroticism scores predicted 
larger incentive-related modulations in Ne amplitude, whereas high conscientiousness 
predicted smaller incentive effects. In the study by Cavanagh and colleagues (2011a), 
however, stress-induced negative affect predicted higher response-related but reduced 
negative feedback-related mediofrontal theta power both in highly and less punishment 
sensitive individuals12. To my knowledge, no further study has investigated to what extent 
personality factors moderate the effect of affective/motivational manipulations on 
electrophysiological correlates of error and feedback processing. Nonetheless, the sensitivity 
of the Ne and - albeit to a lesser extent - of Pe and FRN to motivation- and affect-related 
traits suggests that: 
Prediction 11: Individuals differences in state vs. action orientation and punishment 
sensitivity moderate the impact of failure on the Ne. It is an open issue to what extent trait 
variables determine failure-related modulations in FRN and Pe. 
Methods 
Participants 
Forty-two undergraduate students with normal or corrected to normal vision, free of 
neurological or psychological disorder and free from psychoactive medication use, completed 
pre- and posttest. A further 22 participants had to be excluded after the pretest because they 
did not commit enough errors to obtain reliable ERP-measures (>14 error trials in both halves 
of pre- and posttest). Data from seven participants were discarded due to poor learning 
performance13 (3), excessive artifacts (2), and technical problems during EEG recording (2). 
                                                 
12 Yet, the neural responses differentially predicted behavioural indices of punishment learning in the low vs. high 
BIS group. 
13 Less than 55% correct trials in the deterministic learning condition 
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The effective sample thus consisted of 17 participants (12 women; mean age = 22.6 years; 
age range = 19 to 33 years) in the failure feedback group and 18 participants (13 women, 
mean age = 21.7 years; age range = 19 to 27 years) in the no-failure-feedback group. They 
were paid 8 Euros per hour or received course credit. Informed written consent was required 
in accordance with the protocols approved by the local ethics committee of Saarland 
University, and participants were thoroughly debriefed after the experiment. 
Overview of the Experimental Procedure 
 
Figure 8: Schematic illustration of the experimental procedure. 
A schematic overview of the experimental procedure is outlined in Figure 8. After a 
brief description of the experiment, participants filled out a consent form and a short 
demographic questionnaire. Then they completed the psychometric tests and personality 
scales.  The following experiment involved three consecutive phases: the first probabilistic 
learning phase (pretest), failure manipulation (visual search task), and the second 
probabilistic learning phase (posttest). After completion of the pretest, one half of the 
participants were assigned to the no-failure-feedback group, and the other half were 
assigned to the failure-feedback group. Both groups were matched for performance in the 
pretest. In order to test the effect of failure manipulation, participants’ mood state was 
assessed with a short questionnaire immediately after the visual search task. At posttest, 
participants were informed that they were going to perform the probabilistic learning task 
again. In contrast to the pretest, it was now stressed that the task was indicative of 
intellectual abilities. At the end of the experiment, participants were given a brief final 
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questionnaire that focused on the motivational involvement and the emotional experience 
associated with performing the two learning phases and the visual search task (see 
Appendix). Afterwards, participants were informed of the actual purpose of the study and the 
nature of the experimental manipulations. Particularly, participants in the failure feedback 
group were told that the negative feedback in the visual search task was totally independent 
of their actual performance. 
Stimuli and Tasks 
Probabilistic learning task (Pre- and posttest). The stimulus material consisted of 24 
colored images of objects (Snodgrass & Vanderwart, 1980). On a given trial participants 
were presented with a target stimulus and had to press one of two response keys. Following 
the response either the word “RICHTIG” (“correct”), “FALSCH” (“incorrect”) or “ZU 
LANGSAM” (“too slow”) was presented. Participants were instructed to infer the correct 
stimulus-response mappings on the basis of the feedback. In order to maintain motivation 
throughout the experiment, participants were also told that they would gain a point for each 
correct answer and lose a point for each incorrect or too slow response. At the end of the 
experiment a monetary bonus of up to 10 Euros was awarded based upon the total amount 
of points. Stimuli were associated with three different conditions of feedback validity (100%, 
80 %, and 50%). Four stimuli were assigned to each condition, yielding a total of 12 different 
target stimuli. In the deterministic learning condition, feedback was always valid (100% 
validity). Two stimuli were mapped to the left and the right response key, respectively. In the 
probabilistic learning condition, feedback was valid in 80% of the trials. For the two stimuli 
that were mapped to the left response key, participants thus received ‘Correct’ feedback in 
80% and ‘Incorrect’ feedback in 20% of left button presses (and vice versa for right button 
presses and the other two stimuli mapped to the right response key). In the chance condition, 
‘Correct’ and ‘Incorrect’ feedback was delivered at random (50% validity). Each of the 12 
target stimuli were presented 50 times in pseudo-randomized order throughout the task, 
resulting in a total of 600 trials. The same individual stimulus appeared at most three times in 
a row and within a block of 60 trials the number of stimuli associated with the three learning 
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conditions was equal. The assignment of stimuli to learning condition and response key was 
counterbalanced across participants. 
Each trial started with a central fixation cross presented on a light gray background 
for a variable interval of 250 to 500 ms, followed by the centrally presented target stimulus 
that was displayed for 500 ms. In order to obtain a sufficient number of error trials, we 
applied an adaptive response deadline ranging from a minimum value of 400 ms to a 
maximum value of 1000 ms (for a similar procedure, see Eppinger et al., 2008). At the 
beginning of the task, the response time window was set to an initial value of 800 ms. After 
the completion of the first 100 trials, the response window was individually adjusted on a trial-
to-trial basis, depending on the proportion of time out trials, i.e., the total number of time-out 
trials divided by the total number of trials performed up to that point. If the proportion of time-
outs was less than two (or more than eight) percent, the response time window was 
decremented (incremented) by 200 ms. If the proportion of time-outs varied between two and 
four (six and eight) percent, the response deadline was decremented (incremented) by 100 
ms. In the interval from four to six percent of time-outs, the response deadline remained 
unchanged. After the response, a blank screen was presented for 500 ms, followed by the 
feedback displayed for 500 ms. A randomly jittered 1250- to 2000-ms interval separated 
each trial. Participants first worked through 60 practice trials. Pre- and posttest consisted of 
20 blocks of 30 trials. During the breaks, they received feedback about the total amount of 
points they had collected up to that point. 
Visual search task (Failure manipulation). Ten pairs of natural-scene pictures served 
as stimuli for the failure manipulation task. Each picture pair comprised the “original” and a 
modified “copy” of a colored photograph that were presented on the left (original) and right 
(copy) side of the screen. The “copies” were created by changing six to ten subtle details in 
each picture (see Figure 9 for an example stimulus pair). All photographs were scaled to 9 × 
12 cm. The task was described as a mental speed test predictive of intelligence. This was 
incorporated to enhance self-relevance, which is assumed to be an essential feature of 
efficient failure induction techniques (cf. Brunstein, 2000). Each picture pair was presented 
for 60 s, and participants were asked to indicate by mouse-click all differences in the 
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modified picture as quickly as possible. Participants in the failure feedback group received 
predominantly negative feedback indicating the number of differences that have not been 
detected. Feedback was delivered according to a fixed schedule that has been shown to 
induce a strong failure experience (Brunstein & Olbrich, 1985). An initial sequence of 
success and failure (0 − 2 − 0 − 3) was followed by continuous failure (4 − 4 − 3 − 5 − 4 − 6). 
Thereafter, a brief protocol was presented which provided participants in the failure feedback 
group with a spurious evaluation of their performance: The total number of differences 
missed by the individual (31) and the average number of differences missed by other 
participants (19). In the no-failure feedback group no feedback was provided. 
 
Figure 9: Example stimulus pair presented in the visual search task. Differences are marked in the rightmost 
picture. 
Questionnaires. The participants performed two psychometric tests assessing fluid 
intelligence (Digit-Symbol Substitution test, DSS; adapted from Wechsler, 1981), and 
crystallized intelligence (Spot-a-Word test; adapted from Lehrl, 1977). A modified version of 
the Digit Ordering Test (Cooper, Sagar, Jordan, Harvey, & Sullivan, 1991) was used to 
measure working memory capacity. Participants also completed German versions of the 
following questionnaires: The Positive Affect Negative Affect Scale (PANAS; Watson, Clark, 
& Tellegen, 1988; Krohne, Egloff, Kohlmann, & Tausch, 1996), the Carver and White (1994) 
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Behavioral Inhibition Scale/Behavioral Activation Scale (BIS/BAS), and the Action Control 
Scales (ACS-90, Kuhl, 1994). The PANAS assesses the predisposition to experience 
positive or negative affective state. The BIS/BAS scales were used as measures of 
punishment and reward sensitivity. The ACS-90 was used to assess the general tendency 
toward action- vs. state-oriented behaviour after failure experiences (HOM). The final 
questionnaire focused on the motivational involvement and the emotional experience 
associated with performing the learning tasks and the visual search task (see Appendix). To 
check the effect of failure manipulation we administered the German questionnaire 
“Befindlichkeitsskala” (BfS). The BfS (von Zerssen, 1976) comprises 28 pairs of opposite 
adjectives (e.g., “self-confident/insecure”). For each pair, subjects are required to indicate the 
adjective that better represents their current feelings. 
EEG Recording 
The electroencephalogram (EEG) was recorded with Ag/AgCl electrodes from 59 
sites according to the extended 10-20 system, referenced to the left mastoid, at a sampling 
rate of 500 Hz (filtered online from DC to 70 Hz). The horizontal and vertical 
electrooculograms were recorded from electrodes placed on the left and right canthi of both 
eyes and at the infra- and supra-orbital ridges of the left eye. Electrode impedances were 
kept below 5 kΩ. 
Data Analyses 
Behavioural data analyses. Response latencies of less than 244 ms (> 2SD) or 
exceeding the response deadline were excluded from further analyses14. Mean accuracy 
rates were computed separately for each learning condition in pre- and posttest by averaging 
the data into six bins of 100 trials each, i.e., Bin 1 contained Trials 1-100, Bin 2 contained 
                                                 
14 The deadline was exceeded by 2.2% (no-failure-feedback group) and 2.1% (failure-feedback group) of the 
responses. At pretest, mean RTs on correct and incorrect trials were 421 ms (SD = 25 ms) and 417 ms (SD = 30 
ms) for the no-failure feedback group and 422 ms (SD = 26 ms) and 416 ms (SD = 29 ms) for the failure feedback 
group. At posttest, mean RTs on correct and incorrect trials were 405 ms (SD = 30 ms) and 398 ms (SD = 31 ms) 
for the no-failure feedback group and 396 ms (SD = 32 ms) and 388 ms (SD = 31 ms) for the failure feedback 
group. 
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Trials 101-200, and so on. Note that for the probabilistic learning condition only valid trials 
were included. To examine error-related behavioural changes, I additionally computed post-
error accuracy, i.e., the proportion of correct choices on the next presentation of a particular 
item, separately for each learning condition and test phase. 
ERP data analyses. Offline, the data were re-referenced to the linked mastoid and 
band-pass filtered from 0.05 to 30 Hz. Eye movement artefacts were removed using 
independent component analysis from the BrainVision Analyzer Software Package (Brain 
products); remaining artefacts were eliminated with a semiautomatic artefact rejection 
procedure (amplitudes over ± 100 µV, changing more than 50 µV between samples or more 
than 200 µV within single epochs, or containing baseline drifts). Artefact-free EEG data were 
segmented relative to response and feedback onset to extract response-related and 
feedback-related ERPs. The response-locked and feedback-locked epochs were baseline 
corrected with respect to the average voltage during a -200 to -50-ms-pre-response interval 
and a 100-ms-pre-stimulus interval, respectively. 
Following previous studies using probabilistic learning tasks (e.g., Eppinger et al., 
2008; Frank, et al., 2005), the Ne was quantified after 15 Hz low-pass filtering at electrode 
FCz as the peak-to-peak difference in voltage between the most negative peak between -50 
and 100 ms and the largest positive peak in the prior 100 ms. Peak-to-peak voltage was 
measured to determine baseline-independent amplitudes and to minimize distortions due to 
the positivity on which the Ne is superimposed. Since a negative peak could not be reliably 
determined for correct trials, mean amplitudes in a 0-100 ms post-response time window at 
electrode FCz were computed to analyse the positivity following correct responses. I decided 
to analyse correct and incorrect responses separately rather than to compute difference 
waves (error-correct), because former studies revealed larger learning-related modulations in 
the positivity on correct trials than in the Ne (e.g., Eppinger et al., 2008), whereas affective-
motivational manipulations have been shown to specifically affect the Ne (e.g., Hajcak et al., 
2005). 
The FRN was quantified twofold. In a first step, I determined the FRN as peak-to-
peak voltage difference between the most negative peak in a 200 to 400 ms time window 
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after feedback onset and the preceding positive peak in a 150 to 300 ms post-feedback 
interval at electrode FCz (see Frank et al., 2005; Yeung & Sanfey, 2004). However, as 
participants learned quickly, the ERP-averages contained relatively few trials for negative 
feedback, particularly in the deterministic learning condition. Whereas just six trials are 
necessary to obtain stable averages for the Ne (Olvet & Hajcak, 2009b), 20 trials are needed 
to ensure a reliable FRN (Marco-Pallares et al., 2011). Of note, peak-amplitude measures 
are more sensitive to noise-induced fluctuations than average amplitude measures (Luck, 
2005). Therefore, in a second step, the FRN was defined as mean amplitude in a 50-ms-
time-window centered on the individual negative peaks of the FRN. As in previous studies 
(Hajcak et al., 2004; Wiswede et al., 2009), the Pe was measured as the mean amplitude 
between 200 and 400 ms after the response at electrode Pz. 
To examine learning-related changes in Ne, FRN, and Pe, ERP averages were 
computed for each learning condition, separately for the first and second half of pre- and 
posttest. Thus, Bin 1 (first half) of the ERP analysis comprised Bins 1-3 of the behavioral 
analysis, and Bin 2 (second half) of the ERP analysis comprised Bins 4-6 of the behavioral 
analysis. 
Statistical analyses. Accuracy and ERP data were analyzed using repeated measures 
analyses of variance (ANOVAs). In a further step, each personality measure (BIS, BAS, NA, 
and HOM) was included as a continuous moderator in the ANOVAs to examine the 
modulatory role of trait variables. Separate analyses of covariance (ANCOVAs) were 
conducted for each of the four variables. Whenever necessary, the Geisser−Greenhouse 
correction was applied (Geisser & Greenhouse, 1958) and corrected p values are reported 
together with the uncorrected degrees of freedom and the epsilon values (ε). Pearson’s 
correlations were calculated to examine the relation between Ne amplitude and post-error 
accuracy. In order to check for a-priori group differences in personality measures (control 
analyses) as well as group differences in post-manipulation mood rating and final 
questionnaire (manipulation check), the corresponding measures were analyzed using 
multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA). 
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Results 
Control Analyses/Manipulation Check 
Table 1 shows the results of the psychometric tests and the questionnaires for the no-
feedback and the failure feedback group.  
Tabelle 1. Results of the psychometric measures, the mood scale (BfS), self-evaluation for 
the visual search task and motivational involvement/rumination at posttest (means and 
standard deviations) for the no-failure feedback group and the failure feedback group 
(Experiment 1) 
Measure No-failure feedback group Failure feedback group 
Cognitive variables   
DSS 063.67 (10.62) 62.18 (9.70) 
Spot-a-word 18.56 (6.61) 18.76 (4.89) 
Digit ordering 09.33 (2.06) 08.94 (1.92) 
Affect & action control   
PA 34.28 (4.38) 34.47 (5.51) 
NA 23.17 (6.30) 20.06 (5.93) 
BIS 02.87 (0.45) 02.91 (0.49) 
BAS 02.99 (0.49) 03.11 (0.33) 
HOMa 04.50 (3.01) 03.82 (3.36) 
Mood (post-manipulation)   
BfSb 09.72 (3.56) 18.47 (3.34) 
Final questionnaire   
Self-evaluation 03.47 (0.74) 02.71 (0.44)  
Involvement 03.33 (0.78) 03.80 (0.61) 
Rumination 02.03 (1.01) 02.06 (0.92) 
a Note that higher scores indicate action orientation while lower scores indicate state-orientated behavior. 
b Higher scores indicate more negative feelings. 
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Importantly, the two groups did not differ significantly with respect to psychometric 
measures (all p-values > .14). There were, however, differences in current mood state after 
failure manipulation. The failure feedback group reported more negative feelings, as 
indicated by a higher BfS score, [F (1,33) = 56.07, p < .001]. Moreover, participants’ self-
reports on the final questionnaire showed that they were less satisfied with their performance 
on the visual search task as compared to the no-failure feedback group [F (1,33) = 15.78, p < 
.001], and also tended to indicate higher posttest involvement [F (1,33) = 3.90, p < .058]. 
Accuracy Data 
Accuracy data (see Figure 10) were analysed using an ANOVA with the between-
subjects factor feedback group (failure feedback vs. no feedback), and the within-subject 
factors test phase (pretest vs. posttest), learning condition (deterministic, probabilistic and 
chance condition), and bin (Bins 1-6). As expected, the analysis yielded a significant main 
effect of learning condition [F(2,66) = 231.26, p < .001, ε = .80]. Contrasts revealed accuracy 
to be higher for the deterministic and probabilistic learning condition compared to the chance 
condition, as well as for the deterministic compared to the probabilistic learning condition (p-
values < .01). 
Learning-related effects. The analysis yielded a reliable main effect of bin [F(5,165) = 
22.81, p < .001, ε = .66] that was qualified by significant interactions between learning 
condition and bin [F(10,330) = 4.83, p < .001, ε = .82], and test phase, learning condition, 
and bin [F(10,330) = 3.28, p < .01, ε = .85] suggesting that the course of learning differed 
between pre- and posttest as a function of feedback validity. To decompose the interaction, 
separate analyses were conducted for pre- and posttest. At pretest, polynomial contrasts 
showed that accuracy increased over the course of the task following a linear trend for the 
deterministic as well as the probabilistic learning condition (p-values < .001; see Figure 12). 
At posttest, a significant linear trend across bins was obtained only for the probabilistic 
learning condition (p < .01). In contrast, a predominantly cubic trend for the deterministic 
learning condition (p < .001) reflected that after an initial enhancement, accuracy dropped 
and finally increased again. 
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Effects of failure manipulation. Visual inspection of the posttest data suggested that 
the transient decrease in accuracy emerged for the failure feedback group only (see Figure 
10). However, the four-way interaction of feedback group, test phase, learning condition, and 
bin failed to reach significance (p = .10). 
 
 
Figure 10: Mean accuracy learning curves for the three learning conditions displayed separately for the no-failure 
feedback group and failure feedback group at pretest (left) and posttest (right). Error bars indicate standard error. 
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Post-error Accuracy Data 
In order to determine whether failure induction affects the ability to learn from past 
mistakes and thus modulates error-related behavioural changes, post-error accuracy rates 
were subjected to an ANOVA with the between-subjects factor feedback group, and the 
within-subject factors test phase, and learning condition. Consistent with the results for the 
total accuracy, a significant main effect of learning condition was obtained [F(2,66) = 78.80, p 
< .001], indicating that post-error accuracy was lowest in the chance condition and highest in 
the deterministic learning condition (all p-values < .001) (see Figure 11). 
 
Figure 11: Mean post-error accuracy rates for the three learning conditions at pretest and posttest displayed 
separately for the no-failure feedback group (left) and failure feedback group (right). Error bars indicate standard 
error. 
Effects of failure manipulation. The analysis revealed a reliable main effect of test 
phase [F(1,33) = 4.27, p < .05] that was qualified by a significant interaction between 
feedback group and test phase [F(1,33) = 5.53, p < .05], and a marginally significant 
interaction between feedback group, test phase, and learning condition [F(2,66) = 2.85, p = 
.065]. Separate analyses for the two groups showed that post-error accuracy increased from 
pre- to posttest for the failure feedback group (p < .01) but not for the no-failure feedback 
group (p = .85). To examine whether the post-error accuracy differences are due to the 
failure feedback group adopting a more conservative response strategy, i.e., more accurate 
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at the expense of slower post-error responding, post-error correct vs. incorrect reaction times 
(RT) were analyzed (see Appendix). This analysis did not reveal significant interactions 
involving the factor feedback group and test phase (p-values > .15). Thus, the failure-related 
change in post-error accuracy does not appear to reflect a speed-accuracy trade-off. 
Does Personality Moderate the Effects of Failure on Error Processing and Learning? 
To investigate whether personality differences modulates the effects of failure-
induction on learning, accuracy rates were averaged across the six bins of pre- and posttest, 
respectively. Mean accuracy rates were subjected to 2 (feedback group) × 2 (test phase) × 3 
(learning condition) ANCOVAs with the trait measures as continuous moderators. The 
analyses focused on interaction terms involving the continuous moderator variable and the 
factors feedback group and test phase. 
High punishment sensitivity predicts failure-induced learning impairments. The 
analysis of the moderating influence of punishment sensitivity yielded a marginally significant 
four-way-interaction of feedback group, test phase, learning condition, and BIS [F(2,62) = 
2.67, p = .089, ε = .82]. Follow-up ANCOVAs that were split by test phase revealed a 
significant interaction of feedback group, learning condition, and BIS for posttest [F(2,62) = 
3.14, p = .05] but not for pretest (p = .29). Of note, a marginally significant interaction of 
learning condition and bin was found in the failure-feedback-group only [F(2,30) = 3.14, p = 
.058]. In the failure-feedback-group, higher BIS-scores predicted worse learning performance 
in the deterministic learning condition at posttest [r(17) < −.54, p < .05]. Furthermore, a 
marginally significant negative correlation between BIS and overall posttest performance was 
obtained for the probabilistic learning condition [r(17) < −.44, p = .077]. There was, however, 
no evidence for influences of punishment sensitivity on failure-related differences in post-
error accuracy (F-values < 1.7, p-values > .20). No further trait variable reliably modulated 
the effects of failure-induction on learning performance (F-values < 2.1, p-values > .16). 
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Summary of Behavioural Findings 
Not surprisingly, accuracy was found to increase with feedback validity. Moreover, 
accuracy increased in a linear function over the course of pretest for both learning conditions, 
but this was only the case for the probabilistic learning condition at posttest. For the 
deterministic learning condition considerable learning occurred at the beginning of posttest, 
but accuracy decreased with time on task. As participants were likely to become quickly 
aware of the response contingencies in the deterministic learning condition, this finding 
suggests a higher amount of “slips” in cognitive control resulting in motor errors of 
commission – rather than weak reinforcement learning – during later stages of posttest. 
Consistent with this notion, RT decreased from pre- to posttest, and erroneous responses 
were faster in the deterministic compared to the probabilistic learning condition (p-values < 
.001) (see Appendix). There were no between-group differences in overall performance at 
either pretest or posttest. However, high punishment sensitivity predicted worse posttest 
performance in the failure-feedback group. By contrast, punishment sensitivity did not appear 
to affect learning in the no-failure-feedback group. Furthermore, I did not obtain pre-post 
changes in overall accuracy for either of the two feedback groups. Instead, participants in the 
failure feedback group were more likely to correct their errors on the next repetition of a given 
stimulus, as was shown by an increase in post-error accuracy from pre- to posttest. 
ERP data 
Error Negativity 
As illustrated in Figure 12, the Ne was evident as a fronto-centrally distributed 
negative deflection in the deterministic and probabilistic learning condition for both groups at 
pre- and posttest. Correct responses were followed by a pronounced positivity that, unlike 
the negativity on incorrect trials, clearly increased over the course of learning. To test for 
group differences in the peak-to-peak amplitude of the Ne and the mean amplitude of the 
correct response-related positivity, I used separate 2 (feedback group: failure feedback vs. 
no feedback) × 2 (test phase: pretest vs. posttest) × 3 (learning condition: deterministic, 
probabilistic and chance condition) × 2 (bin: Bin 1 vs. Bin 2) ANOVAs. Both the Ne and the 
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correct response-related positivity increased with feedback validity [F(2,66) = 49.14 and 
49.50, p < .001 and .01, respectively]. Below, I will first report the failure- and learning-related 
effects for the Ne, followed by the results for correct responses. 
 
Figure 12: Response-locked ERPs to correct (solid lines) and incorrect responses (dashed lines) displayed 
separately for the no-failure feedback group and failure feedback group and the two halves of pretest (left) and 
posttest (right). The upper panels show the ERPs in the deterministic learning condition at electrode sites Fz, 
FCz, and Cz. Small boxes highlight the Ne effect at electrode FCz. The lowest panel shows the ERPs in the 
probabilistic learning condition at FCz. Note that the Ne amplitude was quantified peak-to-peak. 
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General effects of failure on the Ne. The analysis yielded a reliable main effect of 
feedback group [F(1,33) = 8.30, p < .01] and significant interactions between feedback group 
and test phase [F(1,33) = 10.01, p < .01] and feedback group, learning condition and test 
phase [F(2,66) = 4.29, p < .05, ε = .75]. A follow-up ANOVA that was split by test phase 
confirmed that there were no group differences at pretest (p-values > .34), whereas the Ne 
amplitude was larger for the failure feedback group than for the no-failure feedback group at 
posttest [F(1,33) = 15.26, p < .001]. As illustrated in Figures 12 and 13, the failure-related Ne 
modulation was more pronounced in the deterministic and probabilistic learning condition 
than in the chance condition, reflected in an interaction between feedback group and learning 
condition [F(2,66) = 5.64, p < .01, ε = .80]. Nonetheless, separate analyses revealed 
significant differences for the deterministic (p < .01) and probabilistic learning condition (p < 
.001) as well as for the chance condition (p < .05). Figure 13 also shows that the Ne 
increased from pre- to posttest for the deterministic and probabilistic learning condition in the 
failure feedback group (p < .05 and .01, respectively), but not in the no-failure feedback 
group (p-values >.17). 
Learning-related effects of failure on the Ne. The analysis of learning-related changes 
in the Ne revealed significant interactions between learning condition and bin [F(2,66) = 7.18, 
p < .01] and feedback group, learning condition, and bin [F(2,66) = 5.29, p < .01], as well as 
a marginally significant interaction between test phase, feedback group, learning condition, 
and bin [F(2,66) = 2.88, p = .065]. Follow-up ANOVAs for the two test phases yielded a 
reliable interaction between feedback group, learning condition, and bin for posttest [F(2,66) 
= 9.66, p < .001], but not for pretest (F < 1), indicating group differences in the modulation of 
the Ne across posttest only. Decomposing the interaction within each group revealed a 
significant main effect of bin [F(1,17) = 11.57, p < .01] and a significant interaction between 
learning condition and bin [F(2,34) = 7.72, p < .01, ε = .70] for the no-failure feedback group 
as well as for the failure-feedback group [F(1,16) = 4.66, p < .05 and F(2,32) = 7.97, p < .01, 
respectively]. Figure 13 illustrates that the Ne decreased from the first to the second half of 
posttest for the deterministic learning condition in the no-failure feedback group (p < .01) but 
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increased for deterministic and probabilistic learning condition in the failure feedback group 
(p-values < .05). 
It should be noted that there was no evidence for learning-related changes in the Ne 
for either deterministic or probabilistic learning condition at pretest (p-values > .61). However, 
more negative Ne amplitudes reliably predicted higher post-error accuracy for the 
deterministic and probabilistic learning condition at both pretest [r(35) < −.46 and −.36, p < 
.01 and .05, respectively] and posttest [r(35) < −.52 and −.44, respectively, p-values < .01].15 
 
Figure 13: Bar graphs show the mean Ne amplitude at electrode FCz, separately for the three learning conditions 
within each group at pretest (left) and posttest (right). Error bars indicate standard error. Note that the amplitude 
difference in comparison to the waveforms shown in Figure 4 is due to the latency jitter across participants 
causing a reduction of the Ne in the grand average ERP. 
                                                 
15 At posttest, significant correlations between Ne amplitude and post-error accuracy were found for the failure-
feedback group (r-values > −.65, p-values < .01) but not for the no-failure-feedback group (r-values < −.16, p-
values > .52). In contrast, at pretest, (marginally) significant correlations were found for the no-failure-feedback 
group (r-values > −.44, p-values < .07) but not for the failure feedback group (r-values < −.39, p-values > .12). 
Importantly, the correlation coefficients did not significantly differ between the two feedback groups at pretest (z-
values < .80, p-values > .21), whereas the coefficients were significantly larger in the failure feedback group 
compared to the no-failure-feedback group at posttest (z-values > 1.8, p-values < .07). These findings further 
support the notion that failure induction promoted aversively motivated behavioural control. 
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Learning-related effects in the correct response-related positivity. The analysis of the 
positivity following correct responses yielded reliable main effects of bin [F(1,33) = 97.03, p < 
.001] and test phase [F(1,33) = 21.77, p < .001], indicating that the correct response-related 
positivity increased across the two bins and from pre- to posttest. As shown in Figure 13, the 
pre-post difference was greater in Bin 1 than in Bin 2, reflected in a significant interaction 
between test phase and bin [F(1,33) = 18.88, p < .001]. No main effect or interaction 
involving the factor feedback group approached significance (p-values > .20). 
Moderating Influences of Personality on the Failure-related Ne Increase  
To examine the role of personality, peak-to-peak amplitudes of the Ne were averaged 
across the two bins of pre- and posttest, respectively, and subjected to 2 (feedback group) × 
2 (test phase) × 3 (learning condition) ANCOVAs with the trait measures as continuous 
moderators. 
State orientation attenuates the failure-related differences in Ne amplitude. A 
marginally significant interaction of feedback group, test phase, learning condition, and HOM 
was obtained [F(2,62) = 2.69, p = .076]. Follow-up ANCOVAs that were split by test phase 
revealed a significant interaction of feedback group, learning condition, and HOM only for the 
posttest [F(2,62) = 3.28, p < .05] but not for the pretest (p = .20). Separate analyses for the 
three learning conditions found a marginally reliable interaction of feedback group and HOM 
for the probabilistic learning condition only (p = .085). State orientation16 was associated with 
relatively larger Ne amplitudes in the no-failure-feedback group (action orientation: -2.13 µV, 
state orientation: -4.71 µV) but not in the failure-feedback-group (action orientation: -5.39 µV, 
state orientation: -5.01 µV). No significant correlation between HOM and Ne amplitude was 
found (p-values > .12). Similar ANCOVAs for BIS, BAS, and NA did not yield reliable 
moderating effects of the personality measures (F-values < 2.8, p-values > .10). 
  
                                                 
16 Action and state orientation were defined by means of a median-split of HOM. 
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Summary of Ne Findings 
As predicted, failure induction was accompanied by an increase of the Ne for the 
deterministic and probabilistic learning condition. Moreover, the Ne increased across posttest 
both in the deterministic and probabilistic learning condition for the failure feedback group, 
but decreased in the deterministic learning condition for the no-failure feedback group. The 
failure-related Ne enhancement was not modulated by interindividual differences in 
punishment sensitivity or trait negative affect. State-orientation was associated with reduced 
between-group differences in Ne amplitude in the probabilistic learning condition at posttest. 
This effect primarily reflected larger Ne amplitudes for state- compared to action-oriented 
participants in the no-failure-feedback group. Importantly, the failure manipulation did not 
reliably affect the positivity following correct responses. 
Error Positivity 
 There was a pronounced amplitude difference between erroneous and correct 
responses in the Pe time window for the deterministic and probabilistic learning condition 
with a maximum at centro-parietal sites (see Figure 15). The Pe amplitudes were analyzed 
using an ANOVA with the factors feedback group (failure feedback vs. no feedback), test 
phase (pretest vs. posttest), learning condition (deterministic, probabilistic, and chance 
condition), bin (Bin 1 vs. Bin 2), and correctness (correct vs. incorrect responses). 
The ANOVA revealed significant main effects of feedback type [F(1,33) = 65.31, p < 
.001] and learning condition [F(2,66) = 28.92, p < .001] that were qualified by a significant 
interaction of feedback type and learning condition [F(2,66) = 38.13, p < .001]. As illustrated 
in Figure 16, these findings reflect that the Pe was evident as a more positive-going slow 
wave following erroneous compared to correct responses in the deterministic and 
probabilistic learning condition, but not in the chance condition. Contrasts confirmed that the 
Pe was greater in the deterministic compared to the probabilistic learning condition (p < .05) 
and in the two learning conditions compared to the chance condition (p < .001). Furthermore, 
the analysis yielded a reliable main effect of test phase [F(1,33) = 27.14, p < .001] and 
significant interactions of test phase and feedback type [F(1,33) = 8.43, p < .01] and test 
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phase, feedback type and learning condition [(2,66) = 3.51, p < .05]. Separate analyses for 
each learning condition revealed significant interactions of test phase and feedback type for 
the deterministic and probabilistic learning condition only (p-values < .05). Although the 
ERPs to both erroneous and correct responses were more positive-going at posttest (p-
values < .01), these interactions indicated that the increase was more pronounced for 
erroneous responses (see Figure 14). 
 
Probabilistic and Chance Condition 
 
Pe Amplitude in µV 
 
No-Failure-Feedback Group 
 
Failure-Feedback Group No-Failure-Feedback Group Failure-Feedback Group 
    
Figure 14: The upper panel shows the response-locked ERPs in the deterministic learning condition at electrode 
Pz. Grey bars highlight the time window used for Pe analysis. The lower panel shows the mean Pe amplitdes (in 
µV) in the probabilistic learning and chance condition, separarely for correct and incorrect trials. 
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Learning-related effects in the Pe. The analysis yielded a reliable main effect of bin 
[F(1,33) = 113.32, p < .001] and significant interactions of bin and feedback type [F(1,33) = 
40.47, p < .001] and bin, feedback type, and learning condition [F(2,66) = 10.45, p < .001]. 
Decomposing the interaction within each learning condition revealed that the Pe increased 
with learning in the deterministic (p < .001) and probabilistic learning condition (p < .001) but 
not in the chance condition (p = .66) (see Figure 14). However, there was no significant 
relationship between the Pe and post-error accuracy at either pre- or posttest (rs < .14, p-
values > .44). 
Summary of Pe findings 
The Pe increased both with feedback validity and learning. Furthermore, the Pe 
increased from pre-to posttest. Most critically, however, no effects of failure-induction on the 
Pe were obtained. Moreover, ANCOVAs for BIS, BAS, NA, and HOM indicated that failure-
related effects did not rely on influences of personality (F-values < 2.4, p-values > .13). 
 
Feedback-related Negativity 
 Figure 15 shows the feedback-locked ERPs in the three learning conditions at pre- 
and posttest, separately for the two experimental groups. At pretest, the FRN was clearly 
evident as a fronto-centrally distributed negative-going deflection that was larger following 
positive compared to negative feedback. This difference between correct and incorrect-
feedback trials was most pronounced in the chance condition. Both the peak-to-peak 
amplitude and the mean amplitude measures of the FRN were subjected to an ANOVA with 
the factors feedback group (failure feedback vs. no feedback), test phase (pretest vs. 
posttest), learning condition (deterministic, probabilistic, and chance condition), bin (Bin 1 vs. 
Bin 2), and feedback type (positive vs. negative feedback). Below, I will first report the results 
for the peak-to-peak measures, followed by the results for the mean amplitudes measures. 
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Peak-to-peak Analysis of the FRN 
The analysis revealed a significant main effect of feedback type [F(1,33) = 46.15, p < 
.001] that was qualified by an interaction of learning condition and feedback type [F(2,66) = 
4.53, p < .05], suggesting that the amplitude difference between positive and negative 
feedback was the larger the more invalid the feedback (see Figure 15). However, contrasts 
of deterministic vs. probabilistic learning condition as well as deterministic and probabilistic 
learning condition vs. chance condition failed to obtain significant differences (p-values > 
.17). No further effects approached significance. 
 
Figure 15: Feedback-locked ERPs to correct (solid lines) and incorrect responses (dashed lines) displayed 
separately for the no-failure feedback group and failure feedback group and the two halves of pretest (left) and 
posttest (right). 
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Mean Amplitude Analysis of the FRN 
Similar to the peak-to-peak amplitudes, the analysis of mean amplitudes revealed a 
reliable main effect of learning condition [F(2,66) = 20.97, p < .001], a reliable main effect of 
feedback type [F(1,33) = 46.15, p < .001], and a significant interaction between learning 
condition and feedback type [F(2,66) = 9.12, p < .01, ε = .64]. Contrasts showed that the 
amplitude difference between positive and negative feedback, i.e., the FRN, was larger for 
the probabilistic compared to the deterministic learning condition [F(1,33) = 5.02, p < .05] as 
well as for the chance condition compared to deterministic and probabilistic learning 
condition [F(1,33) = 14.27, p < .01]. Follow-up ANOVAs that were split by feedback type 
yielded a significant main effect of learning condition for positive (p < .001) but not for 
negative feedback (p = .12). 
General effects of failure on the FRN. A significant interaction between feedback 
group, feedback type, and test phase [F(1,33) = 5.60, p < .05] indicated that the FRN was 
affected by the failure-manipulation. As could be seen from Figure 15, at posttest, the 
difference between FRN and feedback-locked positivity was larger for the failure-feedback 
group than for the no-failure-feedback-group. Separate analyses for the two test phases, 
however, failed to obtain a significant interaction between feedback group and feedback type 
both at pretest (p = .89) and posttest (p = .12). In addition, decomposing the interaction 
within each group did not reveal significant interactions of test phase and group for either 
positive (p = .13) or negative feedback (p = .75). 
Learning-related effects of failure on the FRN. The analysis yielded a significant main 
effect of bin [F(1,33) = 4.68, p < .05] and a significant interaction between learning condition 
and bin [F(2,66) = 10.23, p < .001, ε = .80], reflecting a more pronounced amplitude 
reduction in the ERPs to positive and negative feedback across the two bins in the 
deterministic learning condition (see Figure 15). This was confirmed by contrasts that 
revealed a significant larger difference between Bin 1 and 2 in the deterministic compared to 
the probabilistic learning condition [F(1,33) = 14.88, p < .01] as well as in the two learning 
conditions compared to the chance condition [F(1,33) = 5.45, p < .05]. Moreover, marginally 
 106 
significant interactions between learning condition, bin, and test phase [F(2,66) = 2.48, p = 
.092] and feedback group, learning condition, bin, and test phase [F(2,66) = 3.04, p = .054] 
suggested that the amplitude modulation across bins was affected by failure-manipulation. A 
follow-up ANOVA that was split by test phase yielded a significant interaction between 
feedback group, learning condition, and bin for the posttest [F(2,66) = 3.71, p < .05] but not 
for the pretest (p = .87). Figure 15 illustrates that only the failure-feedback-group showed a 
marked amplitude decrease across bins in the deterministic learning condition at posttest, 
reflected in a significant interaction between learning condition and bin (p < .01). This 
interaction was not observed for the no-failure-feedback group (p = .37), which instead 
showed reduced amplitudes in both halves of posttest. It should be noted that the learning-
related effects did not differ for positive and negative feedback. Moreover, in contrast to the 
Ne, the FRN did not reliably predict post-error accuracy posttest (rs < .27, p-values > .12). 
Summary of FRN Findings 
The mean amplitude analysis of the FRN suggested that failure-induction resulted in 
enhanced sensitivity to feedback, reflected in relatively larger amplitude differences between 
the ERPs to positive and negative feedback in the failure-feedback group at posttest. 
Moreover, amplitude of the ERPs to both feedback types was larger in the failure-feedback-
group compared to the no-failure-feedback-group in the deterministic learning condition 
during the first half of posttest. The latter finding possibly indicates that participants in the 
failure-feedback-group paid relatively more attention to the feedback at the beginning of 
learning. ANCOVAs with BIS, BAS, NA, and HOM as continuous moderator did not reveal 
significant influences of personality on failure-related changes in feedback processing17 (F-
values < 2.7, p-values > .11). 
Summary Experiment 1 
The first experiment revealed two main findings concerning the failure feedback group 
and the no-failure feedback group. First, it was found that failure induction resulted in an 
                                                 
17 ANCOVAs were conducted both for peak-to-peak and mean amplitude measures of the FRN. 
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increase of the Ne for the deterministic and probabilistic learning condition at posttest. 
Importantly, the amplitude enhancement was not accompanied by higher overall accuracy 
and therefore cannot simply be explained by changes in error expectancy. Instead, the Ne 
increase was associated with higher post-error accuracy, that is, the participants were more 
likely to correct an erroneous response on the next presentation of a stimulus. Thus, failure 
induction appears to increase the impact of error signals on behavioral adaptation during 
subsequent feedback-based learning. Furthermore, punishment sensitivity moderated the 
effects of failure on subsequent learning performance. High punishment sensitivity predicted 
reduced posttest accuracy in the failure-feedback group. By contrast, no significant 
relationship between punishment sensitivity and posttest performance was found in the no-
failure-feedback group. There was also no evidence that punishment sensitivity modulated 
the impact of failure on neural mechanisms of error processing as reflected in the Ne. 
Second, a pronounced decrease in Ne amplitude was observed in the second half of 
posttest in the deterministic learning condition for the no-failure-feedback group. At the same 
time, there was no significant pre-post accuracy decrease for either learning condition in this 
group. The latter result suggests that linking posttest performance to intelligence successfully 
motivated participants to maintain task engagement. Moreover, the present data indicate that 
lower responsivity of the error monitoring system – as reflected in the decrease of the Ne 
from the first to the second half of posttest – is not necessarily associated with performance 
deficits. 
In addition, the analysis of mean-amplitude measures of the FRN indicated that 
failure-induction lead not only to an increase of the Ne but also to enhanced sensitivity to 
external performance feedback, reflected in a relative increase in the FRN, i.e., a more 
pronounced differentiation between positive and negative feedback. By contrast, no failure-
related modulations in Pe amplitude were observed. Moreover, the analyses did not reveal 
clear evidence in support of the notion that individual differences in trait level punishment 
sensitivity, negative affect, and action vs. state orientation moderate the effects of the failure 
manipulation on error- and feedback processing. 
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6. Experiment 2 
The results of Experiment 1 show that failure induction results in an enhanced 
responsivity to internal indicators of errors as well as external performance feedback during a 
subsequent learning task. However, it remains unknown to what extent the observed effects 
reflect the increased self-relevance of posttest that was linked to intelligence. To explore this 
issue, the second experiment used a different posttest instruction: participants were simply 
told that they were going to perform the same task as in pretest. 
Research Predictions 
Based on the findings by Boksem and colleagues on mental fatigue due to sustained 
task performance (Boksem et al., 2006a; Tops and Boksem, 2010), it was predicted that 
subjects in the no-failure-feedback group disengage from task over the course of posttest. 
Thus: 
Prediction 1: In contrast to Experiment 1, accuracy as well as Ne amplitude was 
expected to decrease from pre- to posttest in the no-failure-feedback group, since the 
cognitive system becomes less efficient in monitoring ongoing behavior.  
It seemed plausible to assume that motivational disengagement also results in less 
differentiated processing of positive and negative feedback, i.e., in a decrease in FRN 
amplitude. Yet, impaired learning should be associated with larger feedback-related PEs. 
According to the R-L theory this would lead to a larger FRN. 
Prediction 2: If disengagement affects the FRN, this should be particularly evident in 
the chance condition, which is not subject to learning-related changes. 
Boksem and colleagues (2006a) did not report whether the Pe is affected by mental 
fatigue, but they found an increase in latency of the stimulus-locked P300 with time on task. 
Given that the Pe has been proposed to reflect a response-related P300 (cf. Overbeek et al., 
2005), one might reason that the Pe is also sensitive to disengagement. This prediction is 
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consistent with other theoretical accounts that link the Pe to the motivational significance or 
conscious recognition of an error. 
Prediction 3: It is conceivable that the Pe decreases from pre-to posttest in the no-
failure-feedback group. 
  Although Luu et al. (2000) reported a relationship between negative affect and 
motivational disengagement, threatening participants’ self-worth by self-relevant failure 
appears to result in an “inherent” motivational boost at posttest (Brunstein, 2000). Hence, 
action monitoring should be less affected by motivational disengagement in the failure 
feedback group than in the no-failure feedback group: 
Prediction 4: (a) At posttest, the failure-feedback group shows better performance 
and larger Ne amplitudes than the no-failure-feedback group. (b) The hypotheses concerning 
the FRN and Pe were more tentative. Generally, effects of disengagement on the FRN and 
the Pe (see Predictions 2 and 3) should be less pronounced in the failure-feedback group 
compared to the no-failure-feedback group.  
Moreover, the findings from Experiment 1 suggest that failure feedback specifically 
promotes a reactive, error-driven motivational engagement. It remains an open question, 
however, whether there are also pre-post increases in Ne amplitude, FRN amplitude, and 
post-error accuracy when posttest is described in neutral terms. 
Personality did not appear to moderate the impact of failure on the ERP-measures in 
Experiment 1. However, personality measures, such as punishment sensitivity, have been 
shown to preserve task engagement (Tops & Boksem, 2010). Thus, the corresponding 
predictions are:  
Prediction 6: (a) High punishment sensitivity is associated with less pronounced pre-
post-decreases in performance and Ne amplitudes in the no-failure-feedback group. (b) As in 
Experiment 1, high punishment sensitivity should predict worse performance in the failure-
feedback group. 
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Methods 
Participants 
Sixty-five undergraduate students were recruited for participation in this study by 
applying the same criteria as in Experiment 1. None of them had participated in the first 
experiment. Twenty-three participants quit the experiment after the pretest because they did 
not commit enough errors to obtain reliable ERP-measures (>14 error trials in both halves of 
pre- and posttest). Data from a further 9 participants had to be excluded because of poor 
performance in the learning task (4), excessive artifacts (1), and technical problems during 
EEG recording (4). The final sample thus consisted of 16 participants (11 women, mean age 
= 21.0 years; age range = 19 to 28 years) in the failure feedback group and 17 participants 
(12 women, mean age = 22.4 years; age range = 18 to 29 years) in the no-failure feedback 
group. 
Stimuli, Tasks, and Procedure 
Stimuli and tasks were the same as in the first experiment. Procedural details were 
also identical to those in Experiment 1, except for one important difference: Before starting 
with the learning task at posttest participants received the same instruction as at pretest, i.e., 
the task was not linked to intelligence, but was described in neutral terms. 
Results 
Control Analyses/Manipulation Check 
Table 2 shows the results of the psychometric tests and the questionnaires for the no-
feedback and the failure feedback group. There were no group differences with respect to 
the psychometric measures (all p-values > .37). As in Experiment 1, participants in the failure 
feedback group reported more negative feelings [F (1,31) = 14.49, p < .002] and were less 
satisfied with their performance on the visual search task [F (1,31) = 13.28, p < .002].  
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Tabelle 2. Results of the psychometric measures, the mood scale (BfS), self-evaluation for 
the visual search task and motivational involvement/rumination at posttest (means and 
standard deviations) for the no-failure feedback group and the failure feedback group 
(Experiment 2) 
Measure No-failure feedback group Failure feedback group 
Cognitive variables   
DSS 61.59 (9.01) 61.88 (8.41) 
Spot-a-word 21.06 (4.49) 19.81 (3.31) 
Digit ordering 08.53 (2.43) 08.94 (2.05) 
Affect & action control   
PA 36.29 (4.78) 37.38 (4.76) 
NA 21.47 (4.61) 23.19 (7.83) 
BIS 02.88 (0.49) 02.84 (0.41) 
BAS 03.16 (0.29) 03.18 (0.31) 
HOMa 04.12 (2.00) 04.75 (2.65) 
Mood (post-manipulation)   
BfSb 010.71 (5.55) 18.06 (5.54) 
Final questionnaire   
Self-evaluation 03.53 (0.82) 02.59 (0.64)  
Involvement 03.43 (0.62) 03.32 (0.69) 
Rumination 02.09 (0.92) 01.59 (0.73) 
a Note that higher scores indicate action orientation while lower scores indicate state-orientated behaviour. 
b Higher scores indicate more negative feelings. 
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Accuracy Data 
Response latencies faster than 256 ms (> 2SD) or exceeding the response deadline 
were excluded from further analyses18. Accuracy data were analysed using the same 
ANOVA design as in Experiment 1. As can be seen from Figure 16, a significant main effect 
of learning condition [F(2,62) = 250.66, p < .001] indicated that accuracy was highest for the 
deterministic learning condition and lowest for the chance condition (p-values < .001). 
Learning-related effects. The analysis yielded a significant main effect of bin [F(5,155) 
= 26.30, p < .001, ε = .68] that was qualified by an interaction between learning condition and 
bin [F(10,310) = 4.38, p < .001]. Moreover, an interaction between test phase and bin 
[F(5,155) = 4.29, p < .01, ε = .82] and a marginally significant interaction between test phase, 
bin, and learning condition [F(10,310) = 1.83, p = .088, ε = .66] indicated that the course of 
learning differed between pre- and posttest. Polynomial contrasts revealed linear increases 
in accuracy for both learning conditions across pretest only (p-values < .01). At posttest, 
accuracy varied across the bins following a predominantly cubic (p < .001) and quadratic (p < 
.01) trend for the deterministic and probabilistic learning condition, respectively (see Figure 
16). 
Effects of failure manipulation. In contrast to Experiment 1, a significant interaction 
between feedback group and test phase was obtained [F(1,31) = 8.32, p < .01]. Separate 
analyses for the two groups revealed that accuracy significantly decreased from pre- to 
posttest in the no-failure feedback group [F(1,16) = 9.85, p < .01], whereas no pre-post 
difference in accuracy was found for the failure feedback group (p = .23). 
                                                 
18 The deadline was exceeded by 2.2% (no-failure feedback group) and 2.3% (failure feedback group) of the 
responses. At pretest, mean RTs on correct and incorrect trials were 446 ms (SD = 33 ms) and 440 ms (SD = 30 
ms) for the no-failure feedback group and 427 ms (SD = 23 ms) and 423 ms (SD = 22 ms) for the failure feedback 
group. At posttest, mean RTs on correct and incorrect trials were 404 ms (SD = 32 ms) and 393 ms (SD = 26 ms) 
for the no-failure feedback group and 411 ms (SD = 27 ms) and 403 ms (SD = 26 ms) for the failure feedback 
group. 
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Figure 16: Mean accuracy learning curves for the three learning conditions displayed separately for the no-failure 
feedback group and failure feedback group at pretest (left) and posttest (right). Error bars indicate standard error. 
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Post-error Accuracy Data 
As in Experiment 1, post-error accuracy rates were subjected to an ANOVA with the 
factors feedback group, test phase, and learning condition. Figure 17 shows that post-error 
accuracy increased with feedback validity [F(2,62) = 82.86, p < .001]. 
 
Figure 17: Mean post-error accuracy rates for the three learning conditions at pretest and posttest displayed 
separately for the no-failure feedback group (left) and failure feedback group (right). Error bars indicate standard 
error. 
Effects of failure manipulation. The analysis yielded a significant interaction between 
feedback group and test phase [F(1,31) = 11.14, p < .01]. Decomposing the interaction 
revealed that post-error accuracy reliably decreased from pre- to posttest for the no-failure 
feedback group [F(1,16) = 5.05, p < .05], but increased for the failure feedback group 
[F(1,15) = 6.25, p < .05] (see Figure 18). In contrast to Experiment 1, the analysis of post-
error RT revealed a significant interaction between feedback group and test phase [F(1,31) = 
9.46, p < .01], reflecting a smaller pre-post decrease in post-error RT for the failure feedback 
group than for the no-failure feedback group. Although there were no reliable between-group 
differences at pre- or posttest (p-values > .10), this finding suggests that the failure feedback 
group increased post-error accuracy at the cost of relatively longer post-error RT. 
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Summary of Behavioural Findings 
Whereas the no-failure feedback group showed worse performance at posttest, 
overall accuracy did not differ between pre- and posttest in the failure feedback group. 
Similar to Experiment 1, non learning-related dynamics of performance became prevalent for 
both groups at posttest. While these findings are likely to reflect reduced task engagement 
towards the end of posttest in the no-failure feedback group, the pattern of performance in 
the failure feedback group suggests that participants produced relatively more errors of 
commission during posttest, particularly in the deterministic learning condition. In support of 
this, RTs decreased from pre- to posttest and were faster in the deterministic than in the 
probabilistic learning condition on error trials (p-values < .001). Consistent with Experiment 1, 
failure induction was specifically associated with increased error-correction rates. Whereas 
failure-induction was associated with learning impairments in highly punishment sensitive 
individuals in Experiment 1, trait variables did not reliably moderate the effects of failure on 
overall or post-error accuracy in Experiment 2 (F-values < 2.6, p-values > .12). 
ERP data 
Error Negativity 
Figure 18 shows the ERPs to correct and incorrect responses, separately for both 
feedback groups in the first and second half of pre- and posttest (see also Figure 20). The 
peak-to-peak measures of the Ne and the mean amplitude of the correct response-related 
positivity were analyzed using the same ANOVA design as in Experiment 1. Consistent with 
Experiment 1, both the Ne and the correct response-related positivity increased with 
feedback validity [F(2,62) = 47.89 and 61.42, respectively, p-values < .001]. Below, the 
failure-related effects on the Ne are reported first, followed by the results for the correct-
response related positivity. 
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Figure 18: Response-locked ERPs to correct (solid lines) and incorrect responses (dashed lines) displayed 
separately for the no-failure feedback group and failure feedback group and the two halves of pretest (left) and 
posttest (right). The upper panels show the ERPs in the deterministic learning condition at electrode sites Fz, 
FCz, and Cz. Small boxes highlight the Ne effect at FCz. The lowest panel shows the ERPs in the probabilistic 
learning at electrode FCz. 
General effects of failure. The analysis revealed a reliable main effect of feedback 
group [F(1,31) = 4.74, p < .05] that was qualified by a significant interaction between 
feedback group and test phase [F(1,31) = 17.41, p < .001]. As illustrated in Figure 18 (see 
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also Figure 19), the Ne decreased from pre- to posttest for the no-failure feedback group 
[F(1,16) = 10.97, p < .01], but increased from pre- to posttest for the failure feedback group 
[F(1,15) = 6.14, p < .05]. 
Learning-related effects of failure. Similar to Experiment 1, I found significant 
interactions between learning condition and bin [F(2,62) = 11.88, p < .001] and test phase, 
feedback group, learning condition, and bin [F(2,62) = 3.34, p < .05]. Separate pre- and 
posttest analyses yielded a significant interaction between feedback group, learning 
condition, and bin for posttest [F(2,62) = 4.93, p < .05, ε = .84] but not for pretest (F < 1). At 
posttest, a significant interaction between learning condition and bin was obtained for the 
failure feedback group only [F(2,30) = 6.56, p < .01; no-failure feedback group: p = .30]. 
Figure 19 shows that the Ne increased over the course of posttest for the deterministic and 
probabilistic learning condition (p-values < .05) but tended to decrease for the chance 
condition (p = .056). 
Consistent with Experiment 1, greater Ne amplitudes predicted higher post-error 
accuracy for deterministic and probabilistic learning condition at both pretest [r(33) = −.38 
and −.40, respectively, p-values< .05] and posttest [r(33) = −.54 and −.67, respectively,  p-
values< .01]19. 
Effects of learning on the correct response-related positivity. The positivity on correct 
trials increased from Bin 1 to Bin 2 [F(1,31) = 70.61, p < .001] and from pre- to posttest 
[F(1,31) = 16.13, p < .001]. As was indicated by a significant interaction between bin and test 
                                                 
19 However, separate analyses for the two groups and the two test phases revealed a more inconsistent pattern 
than in Experiment 1. For the no-failure-feedback group, (marginally) significant correlations between Ne and 
post-error accuracy were found both at pre- and posttest in the deterministic learning condition, [r(17) = −.48 and 
−.67, p = .053 and <.01, respectively], but only at posttest in the probabilistic learning condition [r(17) = −.32 and 
−.53, p = .21 and <.05, respectively]. For the failure-feedback group, in contrast, no reliable correlation between 
Ne and post-error accuracy was found at either pre- or posttest in the deterministic learning condition [r(16) = −.07 
and −.36, p = .80 and .17, respectively], but there were (marginally) significant relations both at pre- and posttest 
in the probabilistic learning condition [r(16) = −.49 and −.77, p = .056 and <.001, respectively]. Notably, the 
correlation coefficients did not significantly differ between the two feedback groups at either pre- or posttest (z-
values < 1.19, p-values > .23). 
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phase [F(1,31) = 20.83, p < .001], the amplitude difference between the two bins was larger 
at pretest (see Figure 18). No effect of failure manipulation was found (p-values > .18). 
 
Figure 19: Bar graphs show the mean Ne amplitude at electrode FCz, separately for the three learning conditions 
within each group at pretest (left) and posttest (right). Error bars indicate standard error. Note that the amplitude 
difference in comparison to the waveforms shown in Figure 7 is due to the latency jitter across participants, 
resulting in a reduction of the Ne in the grand average ERP. 
Summary of Ne Findings 
In line with Experiment 1, these findings demonstrate that failure feedback resulted in 
an enhancement of the Ne. Moreover, there was an increase in Ne amplitude over the 
course of posttest for the deterministic and probabilistic learning condition in the failure 
feedback group. In contrast, the Ne decreased from pre- to posttest for the no-failure 
feedback group. This decrease was much more pronounced than in Experiment 1, where the 
no-failure group showed a reduced Ne for the deterministic learning condition in the second 
half of posttest only. In contrast to Experiment 1, no evidence for a moderating role of state 
orientation (or any other trait variable) was found (F-values < 2.4, p-values > .10). 
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Error Positivity 
 Figure 20 shows the ERPs to correct and incorrect responses at electrode Pz, 
separately for the three learning conditions and the two feedback groups at pre- and posttest. 
The Pe was clearly evident as a centro-parietally distributed slow-wave that was more 
positive-going after erroneous compared to correct responses in the deterministic and 
probabilistic learning condition. The Pe was analyzed using the same ANOVA design as in 
Experiment 1. The analysis yielded reliable main effects of feedback type [F(1,31) = 51.17, p 
< .001] and learning condition [F(2,62) = 47.90, p < .001, ε = .87]. Similar to Experiment 1, a 
significant interaction of feedback type and learning condition [F(2,62) = 42.50, p < .001, ε = 
.70] indicated that the Pe was sensitive to feedback validity. Contrasts showed that the Pe 
was larger in the deterministic compared to the probabilistic learning condition [F(1,31) = 
4.38, p < .05] and in the two learning conditions compared to the chance condition [F(1,31) = 
51.78, p < .001], in which no Pe was observed (see Figure 21). Moreover, a marginally 
significant interaction of feedback type, learning condition, test phase, and feedback group 
was obtained [F(2,62) = 2.88, p = .075, ε = .82]. Decomposing the interaction within each 
group revealed a marginally significant interaction of feedback type, learning condition, and 
test phase in the failure-feedback group only [F(2,30) = 2.61, p = .090]. As can be seen from 
Figure xx, this finding reflects that the Pe tended to increase from pre- to posttest in the 
failure-feedback group. 
Learning-related effects of failure. Figure 20 illustrates that the Pe increased over the 
course of pretest in the deterministic and probabilistic condition (but not in the chance 
condition) in both feedback groups. At posttest, however, a learning-related increase in Pe 
amplitude was only observed for the failure-feedback group. Accordingly, the analysis 
revealed a significant main effects of bin [F(1,31) = 66.53, p < .001] as well as significant 
interactions of bin and feedback type [F(1,31) = 25.63, p < .001], bin, feedback type, and 
learning condition [F(2,62) = 4.49, p < .05, ε = .85], bin, feedback type, learning condition, 
and feedback group [F(2,62) = 5.94, p < .01, ε = .85], bin, feedback type, learning condition, 
feedback group, and test phase [F(2,62) = 3.81, p < .05]. Follow-up ANOVAs that were split 
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by test phase revealed a significant interaction of bin, feedback type, learning condition, 
feedback group for the posttest [F(2,62) = 10.14, p < .01, ε = .78], but not for the pretest (p = 
.77). Decomposing the interaction within each group yielded a significant interaction of bin, 
feedback type, and learning condition for the failure-feedback group only [F(2,30) = 10.14, p 
< .01, ε = .71]. As shown in Figure 20, this interaction indicates that the Pe increases over 
the course of posttest in the two learning conditions for the failure-feedback group. As in 
Experiment 1, there were no significant correlations between Pe amplitude and post-error 
accuracy at pre- or posttest (rs < .18, p-values > .30). 
 
Probabilistic and Chance Condition 
 
Pe Amplitude in µV 
 
No-Failure-Feedback Group 
 
Failure-Feedback Group No-Failure-Feedback Group Failure-Feedback Group 
    
Figure 20: The upper panel shows the response-locked ERPs in the deterministic learning condition at electrode 
Pz. Grey bars highlight the time window used for Pe analysis. The lower panel shows the mean Pe amplitudes (in 
µV) in the probabilistic learning and chance condition, separately for correct and incorrect trials. 
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Summary of Pe Findings 
 In line with Experiment 1, the Pe increased with feedback validity. Moreover, the Pe 
increased with learning in both groups at pretest, but this was only the case for the failure-
feedback group at posttest. As in Experiment 1, trait variables did not moderate the effects 
on Pe-amplitude (F-values < 2.1, p-values > .14). 
Feedback-related Negativity 
 Feedback-locked ERPs are presented in Figure 21. The FRN was evident as a more 
negative-going deflection following negative compared to positive feedback at fronto-central 
sites and decreased with feedback validity. Similar to the first experiment, visual inspection 
suggested that there was an overall amplitude reduction in the feedback-locked ERPs over 
the course of learning as well as from pre- to posttest, particularly in the deterministic 
learning condition. However, Figure 21 also shows that the amplitude of the feedback-locked 
ERPs was generally reduced in the no-failure-feedback group both at pre- and posttest. As in 
Experiment 1, I will first report the analyses of peak-to-peak amplitudes, followed by the 
results for the mean amplitude measures of the FRN. 
Peak-to-peak Analysis of the FRN 
Failure-related effects. The analysis of peak-to-peak amplitudes yielded a reliable 
main effect of feedback type [F(1,31) = 66.32, p < .001], and marginally significant 
interactions of feedback type and test phase [F(1,31) = 3.68, p = .064] and feedback type, 
test phase and feedback group [F(1,31) = 3.86, p = .058]. Separate analyses for each group 
yielded a significant interaction of feedback type and test phase for the no-failure-feedback 
group [F(1,17) = 17.09, p < .01], whereas no effect was found for the failure-feedback group 
(p = .98). Figure 21 illustrates that the FRN – defined as the difference between positive and 
negative feedback20 – decreased from pre- to posttest in the no-failure-feedback group. 
Moreover, the analysis revealed a significant interaction of feedback group, test phase, 
                                                 
20 Separate analyses failed to obtain significant pre-post differences both for ERPs to positive (p = .25) and 
negative feedback (p = .10). 
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learning condition, feedback type, and bin [F(2,62) = 3.49, p < .05]. Follow-up ANOVAs 
within each group yielded a significant interaction of test phase, learning condition, feedback 
type, and bin for the no-failure-feedback group only [F(2,32) = 4.97, p < .05]. As can be seen 
from Figure 22, this interaction indicated that for the chance condition, the pre-post decrease 
in FRN amplitude was more pronounced in Bin 2. 
 
Figure 21: Feedback-locked ERPs to correct (solid lines) and incorrect responses (dashed lines) displayed 
separately for the no-failure feedback group and failure feedback group and the two halves of pretest (left) and 
posttest (right). 
Mean Amplitude Analysis of the FRN 
 The analysis yielded reliable main effects of feedback type [F(1,31) = 24.15, p < .001] 
and learning condition [F(2,62) = 20.36, p < .001] that were qualified by an interaction of 
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feedback type and learning condition [F(2,62) = 5.55, p < .01]. Contrasts showed that the 
FRN was smaller in the two learning conditions compared to the chance condition [F(1,31) = 
7.63, p < .05], whereas the difference between deterministic and probabilistic learning 
condition failed to reach significance (p = .22). Separate analyses for each feedback type 
yielded a significant main effect of learning condition both for positive feedback (p < .001) 
and negative feedback (p < .05). Positive feedback elicited more negative amplitudes in the 
deterministic compared to the probabilistic learning condition and in the two learning 
conditions compared to the chance condition (p-values < .001). By comparison, for negative 
feedback, a significant difference was found between deterministic and probabilistic learning 
condition (p < .05) but not between the two learning conditions and the chance condition (p = 
.23). In addition, the analysis yielded a reliable main effect of test phase [F(1,31) = 8.89, p < 
.01], reflecting a general attenuation of ERP amplitudes from pre- to posttest. Moreover, a 
marginally significant main effect of feedback group [F(1,31) = 3.16, p = .085], indicated an 
overall difference in ERP amplitude between the two groups. As can be seen from Figure 22, 
the ERPs were more positive-going both at pre- and posttest in the failure-feedback group. 
Learning-related effects. A significant main effect of bin [F(1,31) = 8.74, p < .01] and a 
significant interaction of bin and learning condition [F(2,62) = 10.90, p < .001] were obtained. 
As illustrated in Figure 22, these effects reflect a learning-related decrease in the amplitude 
of the feedback-locked ERPs that was more pronounced in the deterministic compared to the 
probabilistic learning condition [F(1,31) = F(1,31) = 12.20, p < .01] and in the two learning 
conditions compared to the chance condition [F(1,31) = 7.52, p < .05]. Of note, neither the 
mean amplitude measures nor the peak-to-peak measures of the FRN were significantly 
correlated with post-error accuracy at pre- or posttest (rs < .27, p-values > .14). 
Summary of FRN Findings 
For the peak-to-peak measures, the analysis showeda decrease of the FRN from pre- 
to posttest in the no-failure-feedback group. In contrast, the mean-amplitude analysis 
revealed an overall pre-post attenuation of ERP amplitude only. In line with Experiment, no 
 124 
evidence was obtained to indicate a modulatory role of trait variables for either mean 
amplitude measures or peak-to-peak amplitudes of the FRN (F-values < 2.0, p-values > .18). 
Summary Experiment 2 
The results of Experiment 2 confirmed the prediction that prolonged task performance 
results in motivational disengagement for the no-failure feedback group and provide further 
support for the notion that failure feedback amplifies sensitivity to internal indicators of errors. 
First, in contrast to Experiment 1, participants in the no-failure feedback group showed worse 
performance at posttest. Consistent with former studies (Boksem et al., 2006b; Tops & 
Boksem, 2010), the performance impairments were accompanied by a decrease of the Ne in 
the deterministic learning condition. However, in contrast to previous suggestions (Tops & 
Boksem, 2010), there was no evidence that traits such as punishment sensitivity and 
negative affectivity interact with the effects of task duration on behavioural and 
electrophysiological indices of engagement. In line with Experiment 1, the Pe increased with 
learning in both groups at pretest, but this was only the case for the failure-feedback group at 
posttest. This finding further supports the notion that participants in the no-failure-feedback 
group disengaged from task towards the end of posttest. Moreover, the analysis of peak-to-
peak amplitudes revealed a decrease in the FRN from pre- to posttest in the no-failure-
feedback group. Yet, the mean amplitude analysis of the FRN only yielded an overall pre-
post decrease in ERP amplitude that was evident in both groups. This finding may reflect that 
participants generally paid less attention to the feedback at posttest. 
Second, the results for the failure feedback group replicated the findings from 
Experiment 1. In both experiments, failure induction was associated with an increase in Ne 
amplitude as well as higher post-error accuracy in the deterministic and probabilistic learning 
condition. In contrast to Experiment 1, however, the failure manipulation did not affect the 
FRN nor were there influence of punishment sensitivity of posttest learning performance. 
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7. Discussion of Experiment 1 and 2 
The following section is divided into three parts. The first part summarizes the main 
findings of the two experiments. In the second part, learning-related changes of the 
response- and feedback-locked ERPs are discussed. The third part focuses on the most 
important findings of the present research – the effects of the failure manipulation. 
Summary of Main Results 
The aim of the present experiments was to examine how exposure to self-relevant 
failure influences performance monitoring – as reflected in the Ne, FRN, and Pe – and 
behavioural adaptation during subsequent feedback-based learning. Two phases (pre- and 
posttest) of a learning task were applied that included three different conditions of feedback 
validity (100%, 80%, and 50%). Between pre- and posttest, participants were assigned to 
one of two groups receiving either failure feedback or no feedback during a visual search 
task that was described as diagnostic of intellectual abilities. To disentangle the effects of 
failure and motivational disengagement due to prolonged task performance, the posttest was 
linked to intelligence (Experiment 1) or described in neutral terms (Experiment 2). 
Consistent with previous research that has established a link between the Ne and the 
evaluation of the affective and motivational significance of an error (e.g., Gehring et al., 1993; 
Hajcak et al., 2005; Luu et al., 2003), the results of both experiments revealed that exposure 
to uncontrollable failure led to an increase of the Ne in the subsequent learning task. These 
findings were extended by the observation that the failure-induced Ne amplitude 
enhancement was accompanied by more efficient error-related behavioural adjustments 
during learning. Crucially, the increase in Ne amplitude at posttest was not associated with 
better overall performance, but higher post-error accuracy, i.e., a higher proportion of correct 
choices on the next presentation of the target on which an erroneous response occurred. It is 
important to note that this error-related change in behaviour is unlikely to reflect an unspecific 
increase of attention or arousal since stimuli were presented in random order. Instead, the 
behavioural adjustment appears to specifically relate to a higher impact of negative 
reinforcement learning signals at posttest (Frank et al., 2005; Holroyd & Coles, 2002). In line 
 126 
with this view, the failure-induced Ne increase was more pronounced in the second half of 
posttest when the participants were better able to internally represent an incorrect response. 
Moreover, failure feedback affected the Ne amplitude in the two learning conditions but not in 
the chance condition. In Experiment 1, the analysis of mean-amplitude measures of the FRN 
revealed a relatively larger difference between positive and negative feedback in the failure-
feedback group compared to the no-failure-feedback group at posttest. This finding suggests 
that failure-induction did not only result in a heightened responsivity to internal indicators of 
errors but also increased the sensitivity to external performance feedback. However, the 
results of Experiment 2 failed to confirm a failure-related FRN modulation. Instead, the peak-
to-peak amplitude analysis revealed a reduced difference between positive and negative 
feedback in the no-failure-feedback group at posttest. Furthermore, the mean-amplitude 
analysis showed that the ERPs generally decreased from pre- to posttest. No failure-related 
modulations in Pe amplitude were observed in Experiments 1 and 2. Yet, there was a lack of 
learning-related changes in Pe amplitude across posttest in the no-failure-feedback group in 
Experiment 2. 
Corroborating prior findings concerning the effects of prolonged task performance on 
action monitoring (Boksem et al., 2006a; Tops & Boksem, 2010), Ne amplitude and accuracy 
decreased with time on task for the no-failure feedback group in Experiment 2. In contrast, 
both groups in Experiment 1 as well as the failure feedback group in Experiment 2 showed 
comparable overall performance at pre- and posttest. Thus, increasing the motivational 
significance of posttest by linking the learning task to intelligence (Experiment 1) or giving 
prior negative feedback as to participants’ intellectual abilities (Experiment 1 and 2) 
preserved task engagement. However, we observed different fluctuations of the Ne across 
posttest: the Ne amplitude decreased for the deterministic learning condition in the no-failure 
feedback group, but increased for deterministic and probabilistic learning condition in the 
failure feedback groups. 
Furthermore, the results of the two experiments did not reveal clear evidence in 
support of the notion that individual differences in trait level punishment sensitivity, negative 
affect, and action vs. state orientation modify the effects of the failure manipulation on error- 
and feedback processing. Only in Experiment 1, punishment sensitivity moderated the 
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effects of failure on subsequent learning performance. High punishment sensitivity predicted 
reduced posttest accuracy in the failure-feedback group but not in the no-failure-feedback 
group. There was no evidence that punishment sensitivity modulated the impact of failure on 
neural mechanisms of error processing as reflected in the Ne and FRN. 
Learning-related Changes in the Response- and Feedback-locked ERPs 
There were two main reasons for examining ERP modulations over the course of 
pretest. First, they provided a baseline that was potentially relevant for the interpretation of 
failure-related effects. Second, the present research aimed to replicate findings by Eppinger 
and colleagues (2008, 2009) indicating learning-related effects on the processing of correct 
responses and positive feedback. 
 Learning-related changes in the Ne. In line with previous studies (e.g., Eppinger et al., 
2008, 2009; Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2002), the analysis of the response-
locked ERPs showed that the Ne was the larger the more valid the feedback. Moreover, the 
present study confirmed prior findings (Eppinger et al., 2008; 2009), which demonstrated that 
not only the Ne but also the correct response-related positivity is sensitive to response-
outcome contingency. Yet contrary to the predictions of the R-L theory (Holroyd & Coles, 
2002), the Ne did not increase with learning in either group. Instead, consistent with the 
studies by Eppinger and coworkers, there was a pronounced learning-related enhancement 
in the ERPs to correct responses. 
On the first glance, the observed pattern of learning-related modulations in the 
response-locked ERPs contradicts the predictions of the R-L theory. Instead, the data appear 
to speak in favour of more recent proposal that focus on variations in the ERPs to correct 
responses (e.g., Eppinger et al., 2008, 2009; Foti et al., 2011; Holroyd et al., 2008). Yet, 
there are several reasons to suggest that caution is warranted in drawing this conclusion 
based on the current data. First, the bins in the present experiments contained a quite large 
number of trials. Given that accuracy reached asymptote within the first bin (see Figures 11 
and 17), averaging across the first vs. second half of the learning task might have obscured 
an early increase in Ne amplitude. In support of this notion, learning-related changes in the 
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Ne have been found if the learning task contained a fewer number of item repetitions (e.g. 
Eppinger & Kray, 2011) or involved more than two response options and hence was more 
difficult (Pietschmann et al., 2008). 
Second, it has been demonstrated the action monitoring as indexed by the Ne is 
susceptible to mental fatigue due to prolonged task performance (Boksem et al., 2006a; 
Tops & Boksem, 2010). Of note, in the Boksem et al.’s (2006a) study, the Ne amplitude 
showed the most pronounced reduction after the first 20 minutes of task performance. This 
approximately matches the duration of one bin of the learning task in the present 
experiments. Thus, it is conceivable that the effects of fatigue on Ne amplitude have 
attenuated those of learning. 
Third, the correct response-related positivity increased not only in the deterministic 
and probabilistic learning condition but also in the chance condition. Furthermore, the 
positivity increased from pre- to posttest. At the same time, accuracy did not change or even 
decreased from the first to the second learning phase. This finding seems hard to reconcile 
with the idea of a reward-related learning signal. It should be noted, however, that the 
variance in the response-locked positivity might partly reflect stimulus-evoked P300 activity 
(Hajcak, Vidal, & Simons, 2004; Vidal, Burle, Bonnet, Grapperon, & Hasbroucq, 2003). 
Indeed, Eppinger and coworkers (2008, 2009) reported that the stimulus-evoked P300 
increased across the bins in each of the three conditions, including the chance condition. In 
contrast to the present study, the authors did not find an increase in the response-locked 
positivity in the chance condition, suggesting that this component is dissociable from the 
stimulus-evoked P300. Nonetheless, component overlap is a serious problem in interpreting 
learning-related modulations in Ne and correct response-related positivity. 
It might be of particular interest, therefore, that a similar investigation failed to obtain 
differential learning-related modulations in the ERPs to correct and erroneous responses 
(Pietschmann et al., 2008). Importantly, the learning task used in this study involved four 
(instead of two) possible S-R mappings. Since no response deadline was applied, this 
manipulation resulted in comparatively long response latencies (about 900 ms) and probably 
in a less substantial overlap with the stimulus-evoked P300. Although the mean accuracy 
rates in the study were comparable to those obtained in the present experiments, the authors 
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observed moderate learning-related changes in the ERPs to correct as well as erroneous 
responses. In addition, Pietschmann and coworkers found a pronounced correct-response 
negativity (CRN) – rather a response-related positivity – that decreased as learning 
progressed. As the CRN has been linked to response uncertainty (Coles et al., 2001; 
Scheffers & Coles, 2001), the authors suggested that their findings reflect the learning-
related reduction in uncertainty about the correctness of a response. 
Thus both the null finding for the Ne and the pronounced learning-related modulations 
in the correct response-related positivity need to be interpreted with caution. 
Learning-related changes in the FRN. Similar to the Ne, the FRN varied as a function 
of response-outcome contingency in both experiments. As predicted, the FRN was the 
smaller the more valid the feedback. In addition, analyses showed that feedback validity 
affected the ERPs to positive feedback rather than those to negative feedback, which is in 
line with previous data (Cohen et al., 2007; Eppinger et al., 2008, 2009; Holroyd & Coles, 
2002; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2002). However, the present study did not find evidence for 
learning-related modulations in FRN amplitude. Instead, the ERPs to both positive and 
negative feedback became less positive as participants learned the mappings rules. In 
particular, this finding contrasts with the results of Eppinger and colleagues (2008, 2009), 
who reported a learning-contingent amplitude reduction in the ERPs to positive feedback 
only. This discrepancy was somewhat surprising, given that basically the same learning 
paradigm was applied. The most obvious difference to the Eppinger et al.’s studies was the 
longer temporal extension of the bins created to examine effects of learning21. Thus, it seems 
plausible to assume that differential learning-related modulations of positive vs. negative 
feedback trials occurred within the first bin only. By contrast, the overall amplitude reduction 
in the second bin was likely to reflect an attenuation of the feedback-evoked P300. In line 
with this view, visual inspection suggested that the effect was maximal at posterior sites. The 
feedback-evoked P300 shows sensitivity to the motivational salience of an outcome (Yeung 
                                                 
21 Pre- and posttest contained only 600 trials (as opposed to 1500 trials in the Eppinger et al.’s studies) and were 
divided in two bins only (instead of four). Moreover, the learning blocks contained a larger number of stimuli (12 
vs. 6) and a longer inter-trial-interval was applied. 
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& Sanfey, 2004) and is smaller if feedback does not provide response-related information 
(Walsh & Anderson, 2011; Yeung, Holroyd, & Cohen, 2005). A feasible explanation of the 
amplitude reduction in the second bin, then, is that participants paid less attention to the 
feedback stimulus after they have developed an internal representation of the correct 
response. 
Yet, the lack of learning-related variations in the ERPs to positive feedback contrasts 
with the findings for the response-locked positivity. If the two components are neural 
manifestations of a positive PE, as was suggested by Eppinger and coworkers (2008, 2009), 
they would be expected to show complementary changes over the course of learning. There 
is no obvious reason why reward prediction indicated by the response-related positivity 
should continue to increase, while the evaluation of the actual reward indicated by the 
feedback-locked positivity remains unaltered. 
Although the bins in the present study may have been too large to reveal learning-
related modulations in the FRN, the current findings further substantiate the notion that 
expectancy of rewards vs. non-rewards affects the neural responses to positive feedback, 
while leaving unaffected the processing of negative feedback (Cohen et al., 2007; Eppinger 
et al., 2008, 2009; Holroyd et al., 2008). Indeed, this idea has received considerable support 
from a recent study using temporospatial principal components analysis to identify a positive 
deflection underlying the ERP difference between positive and negative feedback in the FRN 
time window (Foti et al., 2011). Crucially, the study clearly distinguished the reward-related 
positivity from the feedback-evoked P300. This is particularly important as the P300 overlaps 
with the FRN in time and has also been shown to vary as a function of outcome expectancy 
(Hajcak, Holroyd, Moser, & Simons, 2005; Johnson & Donchin, 1980). 
Taken together, the FRN was sensitive to feedback validity but did not change with 
learning, possibly reflecting that the bins were too large to assess learning-related dynamics. 
Learning-related changes in the Pe. In line with the findings by Eppinger et al. (2009), 
the analysis revealed that the Pe increased with learning and feedback validity. Although the 
ERPs to erroneous as well as correct responses became more positive as learning 
progressed, the amplitude enhancement was more pronounced on error trials. The sensitivity 
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of the Pe to feedback validity and learning is consistent with most theoretical accounts on 
this component such as the ‘error-awareness hypothesis’ and the ‘error-salience hypothesis’ 
(cf. Overbeek et al., 2005; Steinhauser & Yeung, 2010). If the Pe reflects conscious error 
recognition, it should grow larger with the development of an internal representation of the 
correct response. Similarly, the cognitive or affective salience of errors should increase with 
advanced learning. 
The learning-related change in the Pe is also in line with proposals that stress the 
similarity to the P300 (Leutholt & Sommer, 1999). In particular, the P300 has been proposed 
to reflect the updating of an internal model of the current environmental context in response 
to events signalling a mismatch with this model (Donchin & Coles, 1988). This directly 
implies that the Pe should vary over the course of learning, reflecting the incorporation of the 
response rules into the context model (cf. Overbeek et al., 2005). Yet, the current findings 
are not thoroughly consistent with a ‘P300 account’ of the Pe. According to more recent 
views, the P300 signifies the motivational significance of the eliciting event and is linked to 
processes that support goal-directed behavioural adjustments (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005). In 
line with this notion, Chase and coworkers (2010) showed that the P300 to negative 
feedback predicted rule detection and explicit rule-based behavioural adjustments in a 
reversal learning task. The present experiments, however, did not provide evidence for a 
relationship between the Pe and error-related behavioural adaptation. In contrast to the Ne, 
the Pe did not significantly correlate with post-error accuracy. Of course, this finding does not 
exclude that the Pe may relate to other forms of remedial actions, such as for example 
immediate error correction (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005). 
Interestingly, the pattern of results for the Pe bears striking resemblance to that for 
the correct response-related positivity both morphologically and functionally. The two 
components were maximal at midline centro-parietal electrode sites and showed pronounced 
changes over the course of learning and from pre- to posttest. This finding further 
corroborates the view that highly similar neural processes underlie the Pe, the correct 
response-related positivity, and the stimulus-evoked P300. 
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In sum, most pronounced learning-related modulations were observed for the correct 
reponse-related positivity and the Pe. By contrast, Ne and FRN increased with feedback 
validity only. While the latter the latter finding presumably reflect that the bins were too large 
to track learning-related dynamics, the effects in the correct response-related positivity might 
have been partially caused by component overlap with the stimulus-evoked P300.  
Effects of Failure on Performance Monitoring and Learning 
Of central interest for the present thesis were the effects of failure on behavioural and 
electrophysiological indices of performance monitoring and learning. Consistent with the 
findings by Brunstein and Gollwitzer (1996), self-relevant failure did not result in learning 
impairments. Specifically, the results of Experiment 2 indicate that failure exposure 
prevented motivational disengagement at posttest. However, enhancing the motivational 
significance of posttest in Experiment 1 was not associated with an additional performance 
benefit in the failure-feedback group. By contrast, Brunstein and Gollwitzer (1996) reported 
better performance in a subsequent task relevant to the self-aspect threatened through prior 
failure. Yet in their study, the task was very simple and short in duration (< 10 minutes). In 
the present study, the learning task took about 45 min und was cognitively more demanding. 
Thus, one possible explanation for the lack of performance improvements is that the need to 
cope with failure-related negative affect depleted control resources the learning task relied on 
(Inzlicht & Gutsell, 2007). 
This view is in line with the suggestion that participants made more “errors of 
commission” in the deterministic learning condition during later stages of posttest, particularly 
in Experiment 1. As I have pointed out earlier, these errors were likely to reflect lapses in 
focused attention. From visual inspection (see Figure 11), it appears that the corresponding 
drop in accuracy was more prevalent in the failure-feedback-feedback group than in the no-
failure-feedback group. Although the effect failed to reach significance in the overall ANOVA, 
a separate posttest analysis revealed a significant interaction of feedback group, learning 
condition, and bin [F(10,330) = 2.13, p < .05]. The interaction indicated that the course of 
performance differed between the groups in the deterministic learning condition (p < .05) but 
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not in the probabilistic and chance condition (p-values > .77). This finding may suggest that 
participants in the failure-feedback group allocated less attentional resources to stimuli in the 
deterministic learning condition after they have learned the contingencies. 
Furthermore, selective failure-related performance impairments in the deterministic 
learning condition seem to fit previous findings that stress primarily affects explicit learning 
and memory strategies (Schwabe et al., 2011; Schwabe & Wolf, 2009). However, failure 
exposure did not appear to undermine the acquisition of the correct response mappings. If 
anything, subsequent retrieval and maintenance of the response rules was compromised. 
There was also no evidence that failure-induction promoted habitual, incremental learning. 
Although the overall ANOVA on mean accuracy rates might have been insensitive to subtle 
changes in learning rate, visual inspection of the learning curves did not suggest that 
learning progressed more slowly at posttest. Instead, participants in the failure feedback 
group showed numerically higher performance scores at the beginning of posttest. It should 
be noted, however, that habitual control was not directly tested in the current study. Thus, it 
is conceivable that failure-induction resulted in relative insensitivity to contingency degrading 
and reduced explicit knowledge of the mapping rules. Future studies may probe this 
possibility. 
The Ne is sensitive to prior failure. Most strikingly, the results of Experiment 1 and 2 
showed that failure-induction led to an increase in the Ne that was accompanied by more 
efficient error-related behavioural adjustments during subsequent learning. Importantly, the 
failure-related modulations in Ne amplitude are not attributable to pre-experimentally existent 
individual differences in trait-level negative affect or punishment sensitivity which have been 
related to increased reactivity of the error monitoring system (e.g., Boksem et al., 2006a; 
Hajcak et al., 2004; Luu et al., 2000). Instead, the results are based on direct manipulations 
of affective-motivational state. As was indicated by participants’ self-reports, the experimental 
manipulation was successful in inducing self-relevant failure, and by this, negative feelings. 
Importantly and as expected, there was no evidence for between-group differences in Ne 
amplitude at pretest in either experiment, whereas clear group differences were obtained at 
posttest. Furthermore, the observed Ne modulations cannot simply be explained by within- or 
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between-group differences in overall performance (cf. Yeung, 2004). The findings thus 
provide strong evidence that the functioning of the ACC, as reflected by the Ne, is sensitive 
to the affective and motivational context of an action (Luu et al., 2003; Olvet & Hajcak, 2008). 
In particular, the present study confirms and extends the finding by Wiswede and 
colleagues (2009a,b) that short-term manipulations of negative affect are reflected in 
modulations of the Ne. Whereas in the study by Wiswede et al. (2009b) the Ne was 
measured during the affective manipulation, the present data show that the effects of failure 
feedback generalized to a different task. This is an important new finding suggesting that 
failure-induced negative affective state can bias information processing at a broader task-
unspecific level. Moreover, the failure-related increase in Ne amplitude challenges the view 
that the Ne is a state-independent marker of an endophenotype for internalizing (increased 
amplitude) vs. externalizing (reduced amplitude) psychopathology (Clayson et al., 2011; 
Olvet & Hajcak, 2008). Instead, the present results suggest that state and trait variations in 
negative affect might be associated with similar changes in the functioning of the internal 
error monitoring system (Boksem et al., 2006a; Hajcak et al., 2003, 2004). However, this 
does not imply that state and trait variables operate in an independent fashion. Although the 
present study did not find evidence for a moderating role of personality, findings by 
Cavanagh and coworkers (Cavanagh & Allen, 2008; Cavanagh et al., 2011a) suggest that 
influences of negative affective state and trait vulnerability to stress jointly modulate stress-
related activity of the medial prefrontal performance monitoring system in an inverted-U type 
fashion. This might explain why affective-motivational manipulations have not consistently 
been found to affect error monitoring as reflected in the Ne. 
Recently, it has been argued that variations in Ne amplitude due to experimental 
manipulations of motivational and affective significance “merely” reflect changes in the 
allocation of attentional resources (Clayson et al, 2011). In particular, Clayson and 
colleagues proposed that the conflict monitoring theory could easily account for Ne 
modulations that have been observed in conjunction with motivational/affective manipulations 
(Botvinick et al., 2001; Yeung, Botvinick, & Cohen, 2004). The conflict monitoring theory 
posits that the Ne reflects post-error conflict due to the simultaneous activation of incorrect 
and correct response, with the latter arising from continued processing of the target stimulus 
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after the erroneous response is produced. Given that participants in the failure feedback 
group were likely to be highly motivated to perform well at posttest, larger Ne amplitudes 
might indicate an increased post-error activation of the correct response as a consequence 
of enhanced target processing (cf. Yeung, 2004). Similarly, it seems plausible to assume that 
more efficient continued processing of the imperative stimulus would facilitate the detection 
of mismatch between the actual and the intended response, as suggested by the error 
detection/mismatch theory (Bernstein, Scheffers, & Coles, 1995; Falkenstein, et al., 1990; 
Gehring et al., 1993).  
However, increased attention to task-relevant information should be associated with 
improved task performance. Contrary to this prediction, both groups showed comparable 
overall performance in Experiment 1. Similarly, RT data analyses did not reveal reliable 
between-group differences in response speed at pre- and posttest (see Appendix). This is 
important, since Yeung and Nieuwenhuis (2009) showed that fast responses are associated 
with low conflict and smaller Ne amplitudes, whereas slower responses are associated with 
high conflict and larger Ne amplitudes. In the present study, there was no evidence indicating 
that the failure-related Ne modulations reflected a speed-accuracy trade-off. Thus, although 
attentional mechanisms are likely to play a key role in mediating the effects of 
motivational/affective variables, the current findings do not support a ‘pure’ conflict-
monitoring account of the failure-related Ne modulation22. 
Rather, the present study suggests that failure induction results in a strategic shift 
towards reactive control, denoting the tendency to recruit control processes when an 
(negative) event has already occurred (Braver et al., 2007; Tops et al., 2010). Consistent 
with the notion that a reactive mode of behaviour control is highly adaptive in uncertain 
                                                 
22 Moreover, the conflict monitoring theory states that high conflict triggers increased recruitment of cognitive 
control mechanisms on the next trial. By contrast, the present results revealed that the Ne enhancement was 
accompanied by delayed, i.e., learning-related, rather than immediate behavioural adjustments. Supplementary 
analyses did not yield significant correlations between the Ne and accuracy on the immediately following trial (p-
values > .24). Yet, it should also be noted that the predictions of the conflict-monitoring theory primarily apply to 
response conflict tasks that usually involve one fixed mapping rule for all trials. It seems reasonable to assume, 
then, that information processing was biased according to target-specific response rules in the present learning 
task (for instance, the conflict signal may trigger an update of the correct S-R mapping in working memory). In 
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environments, failure feedback thus appears to induce a state in which participants are 
particularly vigilant to potential threats and negative response outcomes. This is in line with 
previous research that has established a relation between the activity of the medial prefrontal 
performance monitoring system and sensitivity to negative stimuli and events. In particular, 
larger Ne amplitudes have been linked to punishment sensitivity (e.g., Boksem et al., 2006a; 
2008), trait differences in negative emotionality and anxiety (e.g., Hajcak, McDonald, & 
Simons, 2003; 2004; Tops, Boksem, Wester, Lorist, & Meijman, 2006), learning from errors 
(Frank et al., 2005), and defensive motivation (Hajcak & Foti, 2008). Similarly, social stress 
reactivity has been found to increase the sensitivity to internal indicators of error and conflict 
(Cavanagh, et al., 2011a).  
In contrast to the Ne, the correct response-related positivity was not affected by the 
failure manipulation. This dissociation seems at odds with a recent proposal according to 
which the correct response-related positivity rather than the negativity on incorrect trials is 
subject to experimentally induced change (e.g., Holroyd et al., 2008), and instead suggests 
that both components reflect separable processes. Holroyd and colleagues (2008) largely 
draw on findings from animal research that phasic increases in dopaminergic activity in 
response to unpredicted rewards are typically larger than phasic decreases in response to 
unpredicted negative events (e.g., Schultz, 2002) and thus may have stronger effects on 
target structures23 (for a similar suggestion, see Eppinger et al., 2008). However, this leaves 
open the question why failure substantially changed the impact of negative events on neural 
processing while apparently leaving unaffected the response to positive events. 
Although the present findings highlight the need to explore the performance 
monitoring system in terms of both cognitive and affective/motivational mechanisms, the 
precise nature of the processes that mediate the observed effects of failure feedback 
remains to be determined. As was already pointed out by Yeung (2004), cognitive and 
affective accounts on the Ne are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Nevertheless, 
arguments similar to that made by Clayson and colleagues (2011) (see above) show that a 
                                                                                                                                                        
support of this notion, Egner and coworkers (2007) demonstrated that different types of conflict (Flanker vs. 
Simon conflict) recruited distinct conflict resolution mechanisms in an independent fashion. 
23 Note, however, that the magnitude of the negative PE has been shown to be coded by the duration of DA dips 
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sharp distinction is often drawn between influences of affective/motivational states and 
attention on performance monitoring. As I have outlined in the theoretical part of this thesis, 
emotional and motivational processes are thought to bias information processing and 
behaviour selection according to specific situational demands (Gray, 2004; Pessoa, 2008, 
2009). Specifically, emotion and motivation systems have been suggested to selectively 
enhance attentional and perceptual processing and to influence the recruitment of effortful 
control mechanisms (e.g. Clore & Hunziker, 2007; Pessoa & Engelman, 2010; Savine & 
Braver, 2010). Hence, it is conceivable that the impact of emotion, motivation, and attention 
on performance monitoring relies on similar mechanisms in a highly integrated neural 
architecture (Pessoa, 2008). The critical question, then, is not whether these findings reflect 
changes in affective/motivational state or attentional processing but how affective and 
motivational influences are integrated with task-specific processing. 
Minor influences of failure on the FRN. Importantly, the R-L theory (Holroyd & Coles, 
2002) asserts that Ne and FRN reflect activity of the same generic error processing system. 
The proposed functional similarity implies that if one component is affected by a certain 
experimental manipulation, so is the other as well. Indeed, the first experiment provided 
some evidence for a failure-related relative increase not only of the Ne but also of the FRN. 
However, the FRN did not differ significantly between the two groups at posttest, suggesting 
that the effect was rather weak. Critically, the findings of Experiment 2 did not confirm the 
failure-related FRN modulation. Instead, the analysis of peak-to-peak amplitudes revealed a 
decrease in the FRN from pre- to posttest in the no-failure-feedback group. Thus, failure-
induction appeared to increase the responsivity to performance feedback in Experiment 1, 
but to prevent diminished processing of feedback cues in Experiment 2. 
Previous studies found greater FRN amplitudes in individuals with depression, 
elevated negative affectivity, and higher punishment sensitivity, possibly reflecting increased 
concern about negative action outcomes (Balconi & Crivelli, 2010; Santesso et al., 2008, 
2011a,b; Sato et al., 2005). However, these groups showed heightened neural responses to 
negative feedback, while failure-induction was associated with enhanced differentiation 
between positive and negative feedback in the present study. Notably, the effect of failure 
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was independent of feedback validity and hence seemed insensitive to the information the 
feedback provided for appropriate responding. Although the accuracy data and Ne findings 
indicate that participants in the failure-feedback were not impaired in representing the 
correctness of their responses, the FRN modulation suggests that they were more reluctant 
to disengage from feedback over the course of the task. This might reflect that the prior 
failure experience reduced the participants’ reliance on internal cues for action evaluation 
and promoted the use of external feedback cues to validate the internal judgments. 
According to this view, heightened vigilance to internal and external feedback – as reflected 
in increases in Ne and FRN – would indicate an attempt to “recalibrate” the performance 
monitoring system that was challenged through uncontrollable failure. 
At first glance, the heightened neural response to external feedback seems to 
contrast with findings of the Cavanagh et al.’s (2011a) study, which demonstrated a stress-
related shift towards diminished processing of external punishment cues. Yet, in this study, 
participants were exposed to uncontrollable evaluative stress during concurrent learning. In 
addition, the study did not differentiate between valid and invalid negative feedback. This 
distinction might be critical as reduced vigilance to invalid negative feedback, would be an 
adaptive strategy to cope with uncontrollable stressors. By contrast, in the present study, 
heightened sensitivity to external feedback might reflect participants’ efforts to regain control 
after the stressful experience. 
It seems plausible to explain the decrease of the FRN in the no-failure-feedback 
group in Experiment 2 by reduced attention to feedback stimuli. However, the analysis also 
revealed an overall pre-post attenuation in ERP amplitude for both groups. As I already have 
outlined above, this effect is likely to reflect a decrease of the feedback-evoked P300, 
indicating that participants in both groups paid less attention to the feedback at posttest. 
Notably, the decrease in FRN amplitude in the no-failure-feedback group parallels the Ne 
findings and hence might indicate alterations in ACC functioning due to mental fatigue 
(Boksem et al., 2006a; Lorist et al., 2005). Indeed, the ACC has been shown to be critically 
involved in effort-related decision making (Schweiber, Saft, & Hauber, 2005; Walton, 
Bannerman, Alterescu, & Rushworth, 2003; Winterer, Adams, Jones, & Knutson, 2002). 
Specifically, Boksem and Tops (2008) proposed that a network involving ACC, amygdala, 
 139 
ventral striatum, and insula integrates information about the anticipated costs and benefits of 
behaviour with information on current physiological state and available resources to guide 
adaptive action selection. According to this view, mental fatigue is an adaptive mechanism to 
abandon behaviours that have an unfavourable cost-benefit ratio. Hence, the observed group 
differences in Ne and FRN could also be explained by failure-related shifts in cost-benefit 
analyses. One might argue that the failure experience was likely increase the subjective 
value participants place on high performance during posttest. As a consequence, participants 
should continue to invest mental effort to maintain high accuracy levels throughout the task, 
reflected in sustained engagement of the ACC in response to behaviourally relevant events. 
Although this account is compatible with the findings of Experiment 2, it cannot easily explain 
why enhanced recruitment of cognitive control resources in the failure-feedback group in 
Experiment 1 did result in improved performance. 
Given the lack of robustness of effects, the failure-related FRN modulations should be 
interpreted with caution. In either case, the present results indicate that failure has distinct 
effects on Ne and FRN. First, pronounced failure-related changes in Ne amplitude were 
evident in both experiments. Second, these effects were specific for erroneous responses 
and varied as a function of learning. The findings thus add to a growing number of studies 
that reported Ne/FRN dissociations, for example, in neuropsychiatric disorders (e.g., Borries 
et al., 2010; Gründler et al., 2009), trait level anxiety (Hajcak et al., 2003), and different age 
groups (Eppinger et al., 2008, 2009). 
Failure does not affect the Pe. Consistent with previous studies (Clayson et al., 2011; 
Wiswede et al., 2009b), the first experiment did not reveal failure-related changes in the Pe. 
Furthermore, the second experiment demonstrated only a lack of learning-related changes in 
Pe amplitude in the no-failure-feedback group towards the end of posttest. As comparatively 
little is known about the functional significance of the Pe, the interpretation of the latter 
finding is difficult. It is tempting to attribute the absence of learning-related modulations to 
motivational disengagement; yet, no prior study has explicitly examined the effects of 
prolonged task performance on the Pe. Critically, visual inspection of the ERP waveforms in 
the Lorist et al.’s (2005) study suggests that the Pe did not change with time on task, 
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although the Ne reduction may have disguised modulations in Pe amplitude. Nonetheless, a 
relative attenuation in the Pe due to mental fatigue seems consistent with the notion that this 
component reflects the allocation of resources for remedial actions (cf. Overbeek et al., 
2005). Further support for the susceptibility of the Pe to mental fatigue comes from source 
localization studies indicating that the ACC contributes to Pe generation (O’Connell et al., 
2007). 
Certainly, the present findings are hard to reconcile with conceptualizations of the Pe 
in terms of the affective appraisal of an error (Falkenstein et al., 2000). However, the present 
results also contrast with reports of attenuated Pe amplitudes for subjects with high trait level 
negative affect (Hajcak et al., 2004) and severe depression (Schrijvers et al., 2009). Hajcak 
and colleagues (2004) suggested that high-NA individuals were less aware of making 
mistakes or found their errors less salient. Yet, an important restriction of their finding is that 
the amplitude was reduced on error and correct trials. Moreover, the amplitude differences 
between high- and low-NA subjects were more pronounced at fronto-central compared to 
posterior sites, raising some doubts about the true nature of processes underlying the effect. 
Within the framework of the ‘error-awareness hypothesis’ (cf. Overbeek et al., 2005), 
the present findings suggest that although participants were more vigilant to internal 
indicators of maladaptive performance after failure exposure, conscious error recognition did 
not vary as a function of the affective and motivational context of an action. In line with the 
observation that that only the Pe but not the Ne correlates with error awareness (Endrass et 
al., 2007; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001), this result implies that the processes reflected in the Ne 
are functionally distinct from those leading to conscious error recognition. 
Failure enhances the impact of errors on learning-related behavioural adaptation. 
According to the R-L theory, the Ne constitutes a predictive error signal that is used by the 
ACC to select and reinforce appropriate actions (Holroyd & Coles, 2002). The finding that the 
failure-related Ne enhancement was accompanied by higher post-error accuracy supports 
this view. Similar conclusions have been drawn from previous studies demonstrating that 
activity in the medial prefrontal error processing system predicted the correctness of future 
responses (Hester, Barre, Murphy, Silk, & Mattingley, 2008; van der Helden, Boksem, & 
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Blom, 2010). Moreover, findings by Frank and colleagues (2005) suggest a specific relation 
between Ne amplitude and a bias to learn more from bad than from good choices. Applied to 
the present study, this idea implies that individuals exposed to self-relevant failure use error 
signals more efficiently to determine which response to avoid on subsequent presentations of 
a stimulus. In line with these findings, the current data challenge the view that positive events 
generally have a stronger impact on ACC functioning and learning-related behavioural 
adaptation than do negative events (Eppinger et al., 2008; Holroyd et al., 2008). 
Still, the failure-related increase in post-error accuracy seems inconsistent with the 
results of the study by Petzold and coworkers (2010), which revealed stress-related 
impairments in the ability to use negative feedback for behavioural adaptation. However, an 
apparent difference between their study and the present experiments might account for the 
divergent findings. Petzold and coworkers applied an indirect measure of feedback-based 
learning. In their study stress-related effects were assessed in a test phase designed to 
assess the outcomes of slow habitual, putatively BG-mediated learning (Frank et al., 2004). 
By contrast, rapid trial-to-trial adjustments during learning, as examined in the current study, 
have been shown to rely on the PFC and DA levels therein (Frank et al., 2007a,b). 
Specifically, Frank and colleagues (2007a,b) suggested that high prefrontal DA levels 
support rapid model-based learning by stabilizing working memory representations of 
negative response outcomes. 
Of note, acute stressors have been shown to trigger DA release in the ACC, which is 
thought to evaluate the controllability of the stressor and to regulate subsequent mesocortical 
and mesolimbic DA transmission accordingly (Amat et al., 2005; Pascucci et al., 2007). 
Increased DA levels have been linked to active behavioural coping with aversive events 
(Cabib & Puglisi-Allegra, 1996; Horvitz, 2000). Hence, failure-related modulations in ACC 
functioning, possibly reflecting the attempt to regain behavioural control after the stressful 
experience, might have contributed to the present findings. Contrary to the predictions of the 
R-L theory, however, the above reasoning suggests that the ACC is not only a passive 
recipient of dopaminergic learning signals from the BG, but also actively biases learning-
related striatal processing and mediates behavioural adjustments in a model-based fashion 
(Doll et al., 2009; Frank et al., 2005; Huys & Dayan, 2009). 
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The involvement of the ACC in regulating the response to stressors might also 
explain why no evidence for a failure-induced shift towards habitual control was found in the 
present study. Ample evidence indicates that stress-related effects on instrumental behaviour 
are mediated by effects of glucocorticoids and noradrenaline in the amygdala, which then 
biases processing in brain circuits involved goal-directed control such as the mPFC, the 
hippocampus, and the dorsomedial striatum (Schwabe & Wolf, 2011). Crucially, one of the 
control functions implemented by the ACC is to inhibit such stress-related activity (Amat et 
al., 2005). Thus, the putative failure-related change in ACC functioning might have prevented 
a strong bias towards habitual learning. 
 A related aim of this study was to examine whether failure differentially affects error 
processing in the deterministic and probabilistic learning condition. Building upon on findings 
of task-specific dissociations in Ne amplitude as a function of OCD symptomatology, 
Gründler and colleagues (2009) proposed that dissociable neural systems might underlie 
responsivity to errors on conflict task with fixed response rules and maladaptive choices in 
probabilistic learning tasks. The present results did not reveal distinct influences of failure 
manipulation for the two learning conditions. However, there was other evidence to suggest 
that participants’ ability to represent the correctness of their responses did play a role for 
failure-related effects on error processing. Whereas no learning-related changes in Ne 
amplitude were found at pretest, failure-induction was associated with an increase of the Ne 
across posttest in the deterministic and probabilistic learning condition. This finding confirms 
the prediction that the impact of failure on error processing grows larger as participants are 
better able to represent the correctness of their responses. Understood in the above context, 
this may reflect that participants in the failure-feedback group were more vigilant to 
(negative) performance cues throughout the posttest. Thus, failure feedback appeared to 
amplify learning-related changes of the Ne, possibly reflecting more efficient reactive 
monitoring during later stages of learning. 
 Taken together, the present findings further corroborate the view that the Ne is 
closely linked to behavioural adaptation. Importantly, the Ne magnitude predicted delayed 
but not immediate behavioural adjustments, suggesting that the neural mechanisms 
underlying the Ne are implicated in associative learning. This is in line with a large body of 
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research indicating that the ACC – which is thought to contribute to the generation of the Ne 
– integrates information about reinforcements to guide adaptive action selection (Rushworth 
& Behrens, 2008; Shackman et al., 2011). Although the R-L theory (Holroyd & Coles, 2002) 
most explicitly frames the Ne in terms of a teaching signal, alternative theories such as the 
conflict monitoring theory or the error detection/mismatch theory (Bernstein et al., 1995; 
Botvinick et al., 2001; Falkenstein et al., 1990; Gehring et al., 1993) are not incompatible with 
a relationship between the Ne and learning-related behavioural adjustments. The conflict-
monitoring theory asserts that error-related activity in the ACC serves an alerting function, 
signalling the need to engage additional control. Originally, the conflict-induced control 
enhancement was conceptualized as a uniform top-down biasing mechanism, strengthening 
task-specific processing according to the current task set (Botvinick et al., 2001). However, 
the current study indicates that the adaptive control mechanism operates in an item-specific 
fashion. Rather than triggering processes that are relevant to all reinforcement 
contingencies, such as an unspecific increase in attention, the error signal appears to 
strengthen a particular S-R mapping only. This in in line with evidence indicating that multiple 
independent control loops may operate in parallel to resolve different types of conflict (Egner, 
2008). 
Dissociable effects of failure and self-relevance on the Ne. In an attempt to 
disentangle the effects of failure and prolonged task performance on error and feedback 
processing, the present study manipulated the self-relevance of the learning task at posttest. 
Although behavioural and ERP data in the first half of posttest suggest that the initial effects 
of the experimental manipulations were comparable for the no-failure feedback group in 
Experiment 1 and the failure feedback group in Experiment 2, the two groups were 
characterized by distinct changes in Ne amplitude in the second half of posttest. Notably, a 
pattern of results similar to that observed for the no-failure feedback group, i.e., large initial 
Ne amplitudes followed by fast reductions, has been reported for individuals characterized by 
high habitual intrinsic engagement (Tops & Boksem, 2010). The susceptibility of intrinsic 
engagement to increasing boredom during prolonged performance of monotonous tasks fits 
the present finding that the Ne decreased in the deterministic but not in the more challenging 
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probabilistic learning condition. In contrast, the pattern of sustained monitoring in the failure 
feedback groups parallels findings for individuals scoring high on constraint (Tops & Boksem, 
2010). From this perspective, the Ne enhancement across posttest might reflect negatively 
motivated engagement resulting from worry and concerns about mistakes that become more 
salient with learning. 
Somewhat surprisingly, the decrease of the Ne in the no-failure-feedback group in 
Experiment 1 was not accompanied by performance decrements. Still, a previous study by 
Lorist and coworkers (2005) also found an attenuation of the Ne in conjunction with stable 
error rates across prolonged task performance. Importantly, the latter effect was not 
confounded by changes in RT, at least within the first 90 minutes of the task. Certainly, it 
remains an issue for further research to precisely determine the factors that have 
counteracted the potentially deteriorating effects of compromised error monitoring on overall 
accuracy in the present study. It might be revealing, however, that the Ne decreased in the 
deterministic learning condition only. Given that the mapping rules were most apparent in this 
condition, overall performance might have been less crucially dependent on the integrity of 
the medial prefrontal action monitoring system during later stages of learning. This would be 
consistent with the finding that overtraining promotes the development of habitual (i.e., 
automatic) responding (e.g., Yin & Knowlton, 2006). 
When does personality matter? Although an increasing number of studies have 
described influences of personality traits on error- and feedback processing (e.g., Balconi & 
Crivelli, 2010; Boksem et al., 2006a, 2008; De Pascalis et al., 2010; Santesso et al., 2011a; 
Tops & Boksem, 2010), the present study failed to obtain evidence for punishment 
sensitivity, trait negative affect, or action vs. state orientation to moderate the impact of 
failure. Only in Experiment 1, there was a small piece of evidence to suggest punishment 
sensitivity moderated the effects of failure on subsequent learning performance. While 
participants in both groups showed comparable overall performance, punishment sensitivity 
predicted poorer learning performance in the failure-feedback group. In the no-failure-
feedback group, by contrast, no relationship between punishment sensitivity and accuracy 
was found. Critically, the impact of failure on Ne and FRN was not modulated by punishment 
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sensitivity, making the behavioural finding difficult to interpret. In the study by Cavanagh and 
colleagues (2011a), high punishment sensitivity was associated with better punishment 
learning under stress. However, in this study punishment learning was defined as loss-
related learning rate. A computational RL algorithm was used to estimate this parameter, 
which obviously provided different information than overall accuracy rates and post-error 
accuracy. Further differences that may have contributed to the disparate findings include the 
nature of the experimental manipulation (social-evaluative stress vs. self-relevant failure), the 
learning paradigm, and the conditions for the assessment of the effects of stressors (during 
stress manipulation vs. after failure induction). 
Moreover, it is important to note that the effect was not replicated in Experiment 2. On 
the one hand this might indicate that self-relevance of the learning task acted as an 
additional stressor that triggered the influence of trait vulnerability on performance. On the 
other hand, it might simply reflect that the effect in Experiment 1 was an artefact. Rather than 
punishment sensitivity, state orientation was expected to moderate the behavioural effects of 
failure (Kuhl, 1981). Contrary to this prediction, however, state orientation modulated the 
posttest Ne amplitude in the no-failure-feedback group in Experiment 1. State-orientation has 
been associated with unintended rumination and prolonged preoccupation with an aversive 
event (Kuhl, 1994). Thus, it is conceivable that state-oriented participants became more 
vigilant to internal error cues when the task was linked to intelligence. In support of this view, 
state-oriented individuals are characterized by heightened levels of negative affect, particular 
in response to challenges (Brunstein & Olbrich, 1985) and are more vulnerable to depressive 
symptoms (Rholes, Michas, & Shroff, 1989), both of which have been associated with 
enhanced Ne amplitudes. 
No further modulatory influence of personality was obtained. Unexpectedly, trait 
measures did also not moderate the susceptibility to mental fatigue. This is inconsistent with 
previous research demonstrating that traits, such as punishment sensitivity, are related to 
persistence thus preserve task engagement (Tops & Boksem, 2010). However, most of the 
studies that found a relationship between personality and electrophysiological markers of 
performance monitoring used response conflict tasks such as the flanker task. In these tasks, 
accuracy typically accounts for a comparatively small proportion of variance in the Ne 
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amplitude. By contrast, in the present learning task, performance differences contributed to a 
considerable amount of variance in the Ne (mean R2 = .16). Critically, the mean accuracy 
rates as well as Ne amplitudes in the present study were likely to represent a composite 
score, intermingling effects of learning and disengagement. So even if there were effects of 
personality, these effects were probably small and therefore difficult to obtain. Other factors 
that may have caused the lack of reliable findings include the potentially reduced reliability of 
the ERP components due to the relatively few number of error trials, the homogeneous 
sample, and the small sample size. Hence, it is clearly premature to discard the hypothesis 
that personality may play an important role in determining the impact of affective/motivational 
challenges on error and feedback processing during subsequent learning. 
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8. Experiment 3 
Statement of Problem and Research Goals 
The first experiments suggested that self-relevant failure triggered heightened 
vigilance to internal indicators of performance errors, possibly reflecting a shift towards a 
reactive, error-driven mode of behaviour control. Experiment 3 further explored the impact of 
motivational/affective context by investigating the extent to which the effects of negatively 
motivated reactive engagement differ from those of positively valenced motivational 
manipulations. Specifically, the study aimed to determine the impact of trial-by-trial variations 
of appetitive vs. aversive motivation on error processing and learning. 
Reward incentives have been shown to enhance executive control processes and to 
improve behavioural efficiency (Hübner & Schlösser, 2010; Krawczyk, Gazzaley, & 
D’Esposito, 2007; Pessoa & Engelmann, 2010; Savine, Beck, Edwards, Chiew, & Braver, 
2010). Yet, only comparatively few studies have investigated the effects of punishment (or 
avoidance) motivation on executive control (Engelmann & Pessoa, 2007; Savine et al., 2010; 
Small et al., 2005). Available evidence indicates that punishment incentives can be as 
effective as reward incentives in promoting cognitive performance. However, it has been 
proposed that distinct brain regions/mechanisms might mediate the motivational effects of 
rewards vs. punishments on control processes (Davidson, Ekman, Saron, Senulis, & Friesen, 
1990; Gray, Braver, & Raichle, 2002; Higgins, 1997; Harmon-Jones, Lueck, Faern, & 
Harmon-Jones, 2006; Small et al., 2005). 
An important aspect in examining the effects of appetitive vs. aversive motivation on 
learning mechanisms obviously concerns the processing of performance feedback. As was 
already discussed in the theoretical part of this thesis, several studies addressed the 
question of how outcome value affects feedback processing. Most studies indicated that the 
FRN evaluates outcomes in a binary fashion as good or bad (e.g., Gehring & Willoughby, 
2002; Hajcak, et al., 2006; Sato et al., 2005; Toyomaki & Murohashi, 2005) and tracks their 
relative rather than absolute value (Holroyd et al., 2004). By contrast, the feedback-evoked 
P300 appears to be sensitive to the magnitude (but not valence) of the outcome (Yeung & 
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Sanfey, 2004). Interestingly, recent findings suggest that feedback processing might proceed 
from an earlier coarse evaluation of the outcome as good or bad to a more fine-grained 
analysis incorporating both valence and magnitude (e.g., Goyer, et al., 2008; Kreussel et al., 
2011, Philastides et al., 2010). In the cited studies, however, the feedback stimulus itself 
carried the motivational information. Thus, it remains unknown whether the processing of 
feedback stimuli indicating “only” the appropriateness of the response is sensitive to 
motivational/affective manipulations. 
Another relevant question concerns the influence of reward vs. punishment motivation 
on monitoring of internal performance cues. Previous research suggested that the specific 
impact of appetitive vs. aversive motivational cues on the activity of the medial prefrontal 
performance monitoring system is largely determined by individual differences in reward vs. 
punishment sensitivity. For instance, Boksem and coworkers (2008) demonstrated that highly 
punishment sensitive individuals showed a larger Ne to errors associated with monetary 
losses compared to those associated with reward omission. By contrast, highly reward 
sensitive individuals showed a larger Ne in the reward omission condition compared to the 
loss condition. The authors explained their findings by assuming that highly punishment and 
reward sensitive individuals experienced errors as more or less aversive in the two 
conditions. Another study compared to effects of punishment (errors were followed by 
unpleasant tones) and reward motivation (correct responses resulted in monetary gains) in 
high- vs. low-socialized individuals (Dikman & Allen, 2000). Whereas the Ne did not differ 
between the two conditions in high-socialized individuals, low-socialized participants 
exhibited reduced Ne amplitudes in the punishment condition. 
However, there are several factors that may have limited the generalizability of the 
described findings. First, the findings of Dikman and Allen (2000) were potentially 
confounded by the fact that rewarding and punishing cues differed on several dimensions, 
such as modality and quality. Second, in the Boksem et al.’s (2008) study appetitive vs. 
aversive motivation was manipulated in a between-subjects design. Therefore, the critical 
contrasts involved different subjects. A further problem was the small sample size of only 14 
participants in the punishment and reward condition, respectively. Moreover, a closer 
inspection of their data suggests that the reported effects were mainly driven by differences 
 149 
in the punishment condition, whereas personality differences did not appear to modulate the 
amplitudes in the reward condition. In the punishment condition, high punishment and low 
reward sensitivity were associated with a larger Ne than low punishment and high reward 
sensitivity. This was further corroborated by the observation that the Ne significantly 
correlated with punishment sensitivity24 in the punishment condition only, whereas no reliable 
correlations were found between the Ne and either reward or punishment sensitivity in the 
reward condition. 
Notably, Potts (2011) recently reported larger Ne amplitudes for errors resulting in 
monetary losses compared to errors resulting in failure to obtain monetary rewards, 
indicating that appetitive and aversive motivation differentially engage the medial prefrontal 
performance monitoring system. Given that gain and loss anticipation is associated with the 
induction of positive and negative affective states, respectively, this view is also in line with 
findings by Wiswede et al. (2009a) discussed earlier. The authors showed that the 
presentation of negative but not positive affective pictures led to an increase in Ne amplitude.  
Similarly, a recent study demonstrated that the induction of positive affect was associated 
with an attenuation of the Ne in a subsequent working memory task (van Wouwe, Band, & 
Ridderinkhof, 2011). 
It should be noted, however, that incentive manipulation has not consistently been 
found to affect the Ne (Chiu & Deldin, 2007; Potts, George, Martin, & Barratt, 2006b). 
Critically, two studies that failed to show Ne modulations, suffered from potential 
methodological weaknesses. Chiu and Deldin (2007) used a block design to compare 
reward, punishment, and neutral condition. The experiment started with a neutral block, 
followed by reward and punishment block that were counterbalanced across participants. 
Hence, it cannot be ruled out that the effects of incentive manipulation were distorted by 
disengagement25 (Tops & Boksem, 2010) and context effects (Holroyd et al., 2004). Further 
potential confounding factors in a block design include habituation, attentional, strategic or 
                                                 
24There was also a marginally significant negative correlation between reward sensitivity and Ne amplitude in the 
punishment condition. The (unexpected) effects of reward sensitivity on the Ne in the punishment condition were 
potentially driven by a negative correlation between punishment and reward sensitivity obtained in this study. 
25 Indeed, largest Ne amplitudes were found in the neutral condition. Moreover, the findings by Luu et al. (2000) 
suggest that reward and punishment block might have been differentially affected by disengagement. 
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anticipatory effects. In the study by Potts and colleagues (2006b), incentive value was coded 
by the identity of the center letter in a flankers task (T or N). Thus, on each trial, the reward 
(punishment) cue was flanked by four punishment (reward) cues. It is also arguable whether 
the incentive information was available early enough to effectively bias early error processing 
as reflected in the Ne. Furthermore, in both studies, the monetary rewards and punishments 
were relatively small (5 Cent) and hence rather unlikely to have a strong 
motivational/affective consequences. 
Additional evidence for a differential impact of appetitive and aversive motivation on 
performance monitoring comes from human fMRI studies. In particular, Taylor and 
colleagues (2006) found greater activation of the rACC in response to errors associated with 
losses compared to those associated with failure to gain. By contrast, both error types 
elicited larger activation of the dACC than did errors in a neutral condition. From their 
findings, the authors concluded that the loss-related activation of rACC reflected the affective 
appraisal of more costly errors, whereas the incentive-related activation of the dACC 
indicated increased motivation. Moreover, Simões-Franklin and coworkers (2010) showed 
that motivational influences modulate tonic activity in the dACC but phasic error-related 
activity in the rACC. The authors suggested that the tonic activity in the dACC reflected more 
cautious performance and increased proactive control, whereas the phasic activity in the 
rACC was linked to reactive control in conjunction with affectively more salient errors. These 
findings are broadly consistent with the idea that both the rACC and the dACC contribute to 
Ne generation, with activity in the rACC reflecting the “affective” component of error 
processing (Luu et al., 2003; van Veen & Carter, 2002). 
In fact, electrophysiological studies provided some evidence for functional 
dissociations between rACC and dACC in error and feedback processing. Holmes and 
Pizzagalli (2008) found increased error-related rACC and mPFC responses in the Ne time-
window for depressed participants compared to healthy controls. Another study investigated 
dissociations in error processing as a function of OC-symptomatology using a flankers task 
and a probabilistic learning task (Cavanagh et al., 2010b). In the flankers task, individuals 
with high OC-symptomology exhibited larger Ne amplitudes than those with low 
symptomatology. Source analysis revealed comparable error-related dACC power in both 
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groups, but greater error-related rACC power in the High-OC group. This result is in line with 
the notion that greater rACC activation underlies the larger Ne amplitude in high OC 
individuals. By contrast, the Ne was smaller in the High-OC compared to the Low-OC group 
during probabilistic learning. Moreover, the Low-OC group showed relatively increased error-
related rACC activation and decreased error-related dACC activation. On the basis of these 
findings, the authors concluded that dissociable medial prefrontal systems may support 
performance monitoring in the two types of tasks. Furthermore, Santesso and colleagues 
(2011a) showed that the increase in FRN amplitude to negative feedback in individuals with 
high trait level negative affect was associated with greater rACC but not dACC activation. 
Although important insights have been gained from these studies, critical questions 
on the role of motivational-affective processes in performance monitoring remain unsolved. 
On the one hand, ERP studies examining the influences of reward and punishment 
motivation rarely reported how the putative motivation-related differences in error processing 
relate to flexible behavioural adaptation. Interestingly, an early study by Gehring and 
colleagues (1993) found larger Ne amplitudes in conjunction with more pronounced error-
related behavioural adjustments (response squeeze, post-error slowing, error correction rate) 
for errors resulting in higher monetary losses. This finding, however, remains somewhat 
ambiguous because the incentive manipulation was confounded with error probability and a 
different weighting of speed vs. response errors. On the other hand, neither of the 
electrophysiological studies focusing on differential contributions of rACC and dACC involved 
an experimental manipulation of affective-motivational significance. Therefore, they did not 
provide a straightforward test of the putative involvement of the rACC in processing the 
affective salience of an error. Furthermore, due to the relatively low temporal resolution of the 
BOLD signal, it remains unclear whether the pattern of error-related activity in the rACC 
observed by Taylor et al. (2006) and Simões-Franklin et al. (2010) indeed reflects processes 
in the latency range of the Ne. 
Thus, Experiment 3 examined whether manipulations of incentive value modify error 
and feedback processing – as reflected in the Ne, FRN, and Pe – and how these 
modulations relate to behavioural adaptations during reinforcement learning. Specifically, the 
study aimed to determine (1) whether penalizing errors in terms of losing vs. not winning 
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money differentially affects Ne, FRN, and Pe over the course of learning, (2) how error-
related neural activities in dorsal and rostral ACC are affected by this incentive manipulation, 
and (3) whether incentive-related modulations in Ne amplitude and underlying source activity 
predict goal-directed behavioural adjustments during learning. EEG source localization was 
performed using standardized Low-Resolution Electromagnetic Tomography (sLORETA, 
Pascual-Marqui, 2002). 
Study Design 
 A feedback-based learning task was applied that included three different incentive 
conditions. In the gain condition, correct responses were rewarded with a win (50 Cent), 
whereas incorrect responses led to a neutral outcome (0 Cent). In the loss condition, 
incorrect responses were penalized with a loss (50 Cent), whereas correct responses 
resulted in a neutral outcome (0 Cent). In the neutral condition, both correct and incorrect 
responses led a neutral outcome (0 Cent). Gain, loss, and neutrals trials were presented in a 
pseudo-random order throughout the learning task. In order to minimize strategic 
adjustments in response speed across the incentive conditions, that is, more accurate but 
slower responding on gain and loss compared to neutral trials, the same adaptive response 
deadline algorithm as in Experiment 1 and 2 was used. Responses that exceeded the 
deadline were handled as errors in terms of monetary pay-off. Since the first experiments 
showed that participants learned very quickly, the number of stimulus repetitions within a 
learning block was considerably reduced. 
Research Predictions 
 The rationale for the incentive manipulation used in this study was to alter the 
motivational and affective salience of erroneous and correct responses. Although one would 
intuitively expect monetary rewards and penalties to improve task performance, the empirical 
evidence on this issue is mixed (Bonner, Hastie, Sprinkle, & Young, 2000; Camerer & 
Hogarth, 1999). In fact, a meta-analysis by Bonner and coworkers (2000) found beneficial 
effects of incentives only in about half of the studies. Notably, Dambacher and colleagues 
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(2011) showed that in speeded response tasks punishing slow responses rather than 
punishing erroneous responses resulted in performance improvements. In addition, Chiew & 
Braver (2011) suggested that preparatory cues are critical for advantageous incentive-related 
effects to occur. However, it remains unclear whether the cue has to contain response-
relevant information to be effective. For instance, Hajcak and coworkers (2005) presented 
cue indicating the value of points that could be won on the next trial but did no find incentive-
related performance improvements. Thus: 
Prediction 1: (a) Applying a deadline procedure and penalizing errors emphasized 
both accuracy and speed in the current study. Therefore, given the findings by Dambacher et 
al. (2011), accuracy should be moderately improved in the gain and loss condition compared 
to the neutral condition. (b) It has been suggested that losses have a higher impact on 
behavioural decisions than do gains of equivalent magnitude (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). 
Still, evidence in support of the notion that penalties have more pronounced influences on 
cognitive performance than rewards is scarce. Hence, it is unclear whether participants put 
more emphasis on avoiding losses than obtaining rewards. (c) Furthermore, it is an open 
question whether the impact of the incentive manipulation changes with learning. However, 
as the task is more challenging at the beginning of learning, it conceivable that limited 
resources are allocated more efficiently to loss and gain trials during early stages of learning. 
The results of Experiment 1 and 2 suggested that participants learned quickly. Thus, 
the large number of trials contained in the bins as well as motivational disengagement might 
have disguised the effects of learning on Ne and FRN. As the number of stimulus repetition 
was considerably smaller in the present study, the predictions were: 
Prediction 2: (a) The Ne increases as learning progresses. (b) The FRN decreases 
over the course of learning. 
Previous research showed that motivationally and affectively more salient errors are 
associated with a larger Ne than less salient errors (Gehring et al., 1993; Hajcak et al., 
2005). Specifically, it has been demonstrated that the Ne is greater for errors resulting in 
monetary losses compared to those resulting in reward omission (Potts, 2011). Moreover, 
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the results of the first study point to a relationship between the neural processes underlying 
the Ne and learning-related behavioural adaptation and indicate that the Ne may be a marker 
of aversively motivated reactive control. Moreover, the first study showed that the effects of 
failure were more pronounced the better participants were able to represent the correctness 
of their responses. It is unclear, however, whether failure to gain leads to changes in Ne 
amplitude compared to a neutral condition. Whereas a reduction of the Ne has been found 
after the induction of positive affect (van Wouwe et al., 2011), others failed to obtain such an 
effect for trial-by-trial manipulations of affective state (Wiswede et al., 2009a). Therefore, the 
predictions were: 
Prediction 2: (a) The Ne is larger for errors resulting in losses compared to those 
resulting in failure to gain or neutral outcomes. (b) The Ne for errors resulting in failures to 
gain is smaller or comparable to the Ne on neutral trials. (c) The Ne magnitude predicts 
error-related behavioural adjustments, i.e., post-error accuracy. (d) The relationship between 
Ne amplitude and post-error accuracy is more pronounced for errors resulting in monetary 
losses than those resulting in neutral outcomes. (e) The effects of incentive motivation on the 
Ne amplitude are more pronounced during later stages of learning. 
To my knowledge, no prior study explicitly addressed the question of how the 
motivational/affective significance of a cognitive task per se influences the processing of 
performance feedback. Yet, larger FRN amplitudes have been found in individuals scoring 
high on punishment sensitivity and trait level negative affect (e.g., Balconi & Crivelli; 
Santesso et al., 2011b). However, Experiment 1 and 2 revealed only little evidence for an 
influence of self-relevant failure on feedback processing. 
Although previous research suggested that the FRN classifies outcome value in a 
binary and context-dependent fashion, more recent evidence indicates that the FRN might 
also code aspects related to the magnitude of an outcome (e.g., Hoyer et al., 2008; Kreussel 
et al., 2011). In particular, it has been shown that larger losses and smaller gains are 
associated with relatively larger FRNs. However, more pronounced learning-related 
modulations have been found in the ERPs to positive feedback (e.g., Eppinger et al., 2008, 
2009). Therefore, it was reasoned that the effects of reward and punishment motivation on 
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feedback processing might differ for positive and negative feedback. Hence, the predictions 
were: 
Prediction 3: (a) The FRN in terms of the difference between positive and negative 
feedback is larger in the gain and loss condition compared to the neutral condition. (b) The 
FRN to positive and negative feedback is differentially modulated in gain vs. loss condition. 
(c) The effects of incentive motivation on the FRN change over the course of learning. 
 Furthermore, previous research and the findings of Experiment 1 and 2 suggest that 
the Pe is rather unaffected by motivational/affective manipulations. Nonetheless, the Pe has 
been associated with conscious error detection (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001; Steinhauser & 
Yeung, 2010) and the motivational significance of an error (Overbeek et al., 2005). In 
particular, the Pe is thought to reflect activity of a more slowly operating deliberate error 
monitoring system that complements neural processes underlying the Ne (Overbeek et al., 
2005). Thus, it was difficult to formulate a well-founded hypothesis on the impact of the 
present incentive manipulation on the Pe:  
Prediction 4: (a) The Pe increases with learning. (b) It is an open question whether 
the Pe is sensitive to incentive value. 
It has been proposed that the rACC is involved in affective aspects of error 
processing and contributes to variations of the Ne due to affective/motivational 
manipulations. Source localisation studies have established a link between enhanced error-
related activity in the rACC and increased Ne amplitudes in OCD and depression (Cavanagh 
et al., 2010b; Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2008). At the same time, evidence from fMRI studies 
points to a link between enhanced activity in the dACC and incentive-related increases in 
effort and between increased activity in the rACC and affective salience of errors. Thus: 
Prediction 5: (a) Errors in the loss condition are associated with greater activity in the 
rACC during the Ne time window than errors in the gain or neutral condition. (b) Errors in 
gain and loss condition are associated with greater activity in the dACC during the Ne time 
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window compared to errors in the neutral condition. (c) Error-related activity in dACC and 
rACC differentially predict behavioural adjustments in the three incentive conditions. 
Methods 
Participants 
Twenty-two undergraduate students volunteered to participate in this study for 
payment (8 Euro per hour) or course credit. Participants had normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision, no self-reported history of neurological or psychiatric diseases and were free from 
psychoactive medication or drug use. Two participants were excluded because they did not 
commit enough errors to obtain reliable measures of Ne (at least 15 error trials in each 
condition). Data from two additional participants had to be discarded due to technical 
problems during EEG recording. The effective sample thus included 18 subjects (11 females; 
mean age 24.83 years; age-range 19 to 33 years). All gave informed written consent in 
accordance with the protocols approved by the local ethics committee of Saarland University 
prior to the start of the experiment. 
Stimuli and Task 
During the learning task, participants were presented with different coloured images 
of objects (Snodgrass & Vanderwart, 1980) and were required to press one of two response 
keys, after which either the word “RICHTIG” (“correct”), “FALSCH” (“incorrect”) or “ZU 
LANGSAM” (“too slow”) was shown. Participants had to infer the correct stimulus-response 
mappings by trial and error on the basis of the feedback information. Stimuli were assigned 
to one of three incentive conditions (gain, loss, and neutral outcome). Each imperative 
stimulus was preceded by a cue that indicated the incentive value of the upcoming target. 
The gain cue informed participants that they would win 50 Euro Cents if they responded 
correctly but 0 Euro Cents if they responded incorrectly or missed the response deadline 
(see Trial Procedure). Conversely, the loss cue indicated that participants would lose 0 Euro 
Cent if they responded correctly but 50 Euro Cents if the response was incorrect or too slow. 
On neutral trials, there was no chance to gain or lose money (see Table 3). Participants were 
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instructed to use the cue information in order to maximize their profit. At the end of the 
experiment, all received the same monetary bonus (7.50 Euro). 
Tabelle 3. Overview of the three incentive conditions 
  
Payoff 
Incentive Condition Correct Incorrect 
Gain Condition +50 Cent ±0 Cent 
Loss Condition ±0 Cent −50 Cent 
Neutral Condition ±0 Cent ±0 Cent 
 
Trial Procedure 
On each trial the incentive cue appeared in the center of the screen for 400 ms. After 
a 400 ms delay, a central fixation cross was displayed for a randomly jittered interval of 250 
to 500 ms, followed by the presentation of the target stimulus for 500 ms. Stimuli were 
presented on a light gray background. As in Experiment 1 and 2, an adaptive response 
deadline was applied. Based on the proportion of time-out trials, the response window was 
individually adjusted in steps of 100 ms within an overall range of 400 to 1000 ms. After the 
key press, a blank screen was displayed for 500 ms and then visual feedback was provided 
for again 500 ms. The next trial started after a randomly jittered 500 to 800 ms interval (see 
Figure 22 for a schematic overview of the trial procedure). 
 
Figure 22: Schematic overview of trial procedure 
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Experimental Procedure 
Prior to the learning task, participants completed a short questionnaire about 
demographics and health. The learning task consisted of a short practice block (45 trials) and 
ten experimental blocks, with self-paced breaks every 30 trials. During the breaks, 
participants were presented with a screen displaying two vertical bars. Participants were told 
that the height of the left bar represented the maximum amount of money that theoretically 
could be earned up to that point, whereas the height of the right bar represented the amount 
of money they had actually earned. They were further told that it was impossible to choose 
correctly on every trial and that therefore the right bar was always smaller than the left one. 
Within one block, two stimuli were assigned to each incentive condition, yielding a total of six 
new stimuli per learning block. Within one block, two stimuli were assigned to each incentive 
condition, yielding a total of six new stimuli per learning block. For all three incentive 
conditions, one stimulus was mapped to the left response key and the other one to the right 
response key. Each stimulus was presented 15 times in pseudo-randomized order 
throughout the learning block, with the same stimulus appearing not more than two times in a 
row. The assignment of stimuli to incentive condition and response key was randomized 
across participants. To avoid ceiling effects in learning, invalid feedback was provided on 12 
trials within each block. Only valid trials were included in the analyses. 
Electrophysiological Recording 
The EEG was recorded from 58 Ag/AgCl electrodes arranged according to the 
extended 10-20 system, referenced to the left mastoid, using Brain Amp DC Recorder 
(BrainVision recorder acquisition software). Data were sampled at 500 Hz in DC mode with a 
low-pass filter at 70 Hz. Impedances were kept below 5 kΩ. Electrodes placed on the outer 
canthi of the two eyes and on the infra- and supra-orbital ridges of the left eye recorded the 
horizontal and vertical electrooculograms. The data were re-referenced offline to the linked 
mastoids and band-pass filtered from 0.1 to 30 Hz. The impact of blinks and eye movements 
was corrected using an independent component analysis algorithm implemented in the 
BrainVision Analyzer Software Package (Brain products, Gilching, Germany). Trials 
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containing EEG activity exceeding ± 100 µV, changing more than 50 µV between samples or 
containing DC drifts were eliminated by a semiautomatic artefact inspection procedure. 
Data Analyses 
Behavioural data analyses. Responses exceeding the adaptive deadline were 
excluded from further analyses (gain: M = 0.05, SD = 0.01; loss: M = 0.05, SD = 0.01; 
neutral: M = 0.06, SD = 0.01). Mean RTs were 440 ms (SD = 45 ms) in the gain condition, 
437 ms (SD = 43 ms) in the loss condition, and 444 ms (SD = 46 ms) in the neutral condition. 
Neither the proportion of time-out trials nor the RTs did significantly differ between the 
incentive conditions (p-values > .16), suggesting that the adaptive response deadline 
successfully prevented more accurate at the expense of slower responding in gain and loss 
condition. To examine the course of learning, each block was split into five bins. The bins 
were created according to the number of stimulus repetitions, i.e., Bin 1 contained 
presentations 1-3 of the respective stimuli, Bin 2 presentations 4-6, and so on. Within each 
bin, mean accuracy rates were computed for the three incentive conditions. To analyse trial-
to-trial behavioural adjustments, post-error accuracy (“incorrect-switch” performance) was 
determined by calculating mean accuracy rates for the next presentation of a given stimulus 
after an erroneous response, separately for each incentive condition. In addition, post-correct 
accuracy (“correct-stay” performance) was determined as mean accuracy rate for the next 
presentation of a given stimulus after a correct response. 
ERP analyses. The response-locked and feedback-locked epochs were baseline 
corrected with respect to the average voltage during a -200 to -50-ms-pre-response interval 
and a 100-ms-pre-stimulus interval, respectively. As in Experiment 1 and 2, the Ne was 
quantified after 15 Hz low-pass filtering at electrode FCz as the peak-to-peak difference in 
voltage between the most negative peak between -50 and 100 ms and the largest positive 
peak in the prior 100 ms. Similar to the first study, there was no clear negative peak following 
correct responses. Since visual inspection of the waveforms clearly indicated that the correct 
response-related positivity did not differ between the there incentive conditions, in a second 
step, difference waveforms were created by subtracting the activity on correct trials from the 
 160 
activity on error trials (∆Ne). The ∆Ne was defined as the mean amplitude in a 20 to 60 ms 
post-response time window covering the peak of the difference wave in each incentive 
condition and each bin. Analogous to Experiment 1 and 2, the Pe was measured as the 
mean amplitude between 200 and 400 ms after the response at electrode Pz. Similarly to the 
Ne, the FRN was quantified twofold. In a first step, the FRN was defined as peak-to-peak 
voltage difference between the most negative peak in a 200 to 400 ms time window after 
feedback onset and the preceding positive peak in a 150 to 300 ms post-feedback interval at 
electrode FCz, separately for positive and negative feedback. In a further step, ∆FRN 
amplitude was determined by subtracting the activity after correct feedback from the activity 
after negative feedback. Because reliable peak detection proved to be difficult for the 
difference waveforms, mean voltage in the period from 280 to 320 ms post-feedback was 
calculated to define the ∆FRN amplitude. This time window was chosen based on the 
average peak latency of the FRN (300 ms). To examine learning-related changes in Ne, 
FRN, and Pe, EEG epochs were averaged separately for each incentive condition for the first 
(Bin 1) and the second half of trials within each block (Bin 2).  
In addition, although cue-related preparatory processes were not the focus of this 
investigation, the cue-locked P300 as well as the contingent negative variation (CNV) that 
precedes task-relevant stimuli were evaluated. Importantly, both components have been 
associated with changes in voluntary and effortful control of performance (e.g., Falkenstein, 
Hoormann, Hohnsbein, & Kleinsorge, 2003; Gevins et al., 1990). To analyse cue-related 
processing during the foreperiod, epochs covering the cue-target interval were created and 
baseline-corrected with respect to a 100 ms pre-cue interval. The analysis of the P300 and 
CNV amplitude in the cue-target interval included a grid of 4 × 5 electrodes over frontal, 
central, and parietal regions (5 rows from frontal to parietal, each including the midline and 
two inner/outer left and right electrodes: F7, F3, Fz, F4, F8; FC5, FC3, FCz, FC4, FC6; C5, 
C3, Cz, C4, C6; CP5, CP3, CPz, CP4, CP6; P5, P3, Pz, P4, P6). The P300 was quantified 
as mean amplitude measure in a 300 to 600 post-cue interval. The CNV amplitude was 
calculated as the mean voltage within a 200 ms time window before target onset. I chose to 
evaluate the terminal (target-locked) CNV to avoid confounding influences of the preceding 
P300. 
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sLORETA analysis. Standardized intra-cerebral current density power underlying the 
response- and feedback-related ERPs were computed using sLORETA (Pascual-Marqui, 
2002). This EEG source localization technique provides a solution to the inverse problem by 
assuming similar activation of adjacent neuronal clusters, without a priori specification of the 
number of active neural sources. The solution space is limited to cortical gray matter and 
hippocampi and consists of 6239 voxels (voxel size: 5 mm3). sLORETA calculates the 
current density power (in amperes per square meter, A/m2) at each voxel, expanding the 
minimum norm inverse solution by taking into account the variance of the actual sources and 
measurement noise (Hämäläinen & Ilmoniemi, 1984). Before statistical testing, current 
density power was subject-wise normalized to a total power of 1 and log-transformed at each 
sampling point. Activity was then averaged within a 20 ms time interval centered on the peak 
of the Ne (24-44 ms). Within each of the three incentive conditions, error-correct contrasts 
(voxel-by-voxel) were calculated and subjected to non-parametric permutation tests as 
implemented in the sLORETA software package. Following Cavanagh and colleagues 
(2010b), Region of Interest (ROI) analyses were performed for the rostral and dorsal 
subdivision of the ACC. Voxels were assigned to the dACC (BA 24’ and 32’) and rACC (BA 
24 and 32) based on their (x,y,z)- coordinates in the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) 
space according to the following rule: dACC if z > 15 and y < 35, else rACC (for illustration, 
see Figure 23). The log-transformed standardized current density values were averaged 
across all voxels within the two ROIs. 
 
Figure 23: Illustration of the definition of rACC and dACC ROIs (displayed on the sLORETA template) 
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Statistical analyses. Accuracy and ERP data were analysed using repeated measures 
analyses of variance (ANOVAs). Whenever necessary, the Geisser-Greenhouse correction 
was applied (Geisser & Greenhouse, 1958) and corrected p-values are reported together 
with uncorrected degrees of freedom and the epsilon-values (ε). Pearson’s correlations were 
calculated to examine the relation between Ne amplitude and behavioural measures. 
Fisher’s z tests were used to test the difference between Pearson’s correlation coefficients. 
Results 
Behavioural Data 
Overall accuracy. Figure 24 illustrates how mean accuracy rates increased across 
learning in each of the three incentive conditions. This was confirmed by an incentive 
condition (gain, loss, and neutral) × bin (Bins 1-5) ANOVA that yielded a significant main 
effect of bin [F(4,68) = 76.60, p < .001, ε = .45]. Moreover, a significant main effect of 
incentive condition was obtained [F(2,34) = 6.90, p < .01], indicating that mean accuracy 
rates differed as a function of trial value. Contrasts revealed accuracy to be higher on gain 
and loss trials compared to neutral trials [F(1,17) = 7.94, p < .05], as well as on loss trials 
compared to gain trials [F(1,17) = 5.18, p < .05]. 
 
Figure 24: Mean accuracy learning curves for the three incentive conditions. Error bars indicate standard errors. 
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Trial-to-trial behavioural adaptations. An ANOVA with the factors correctness (correct-
stay vs. incorrect-switch) and incentive condition (gain, loss, and neutral) yielded significant 
main effects of correctness [F(1,17) = 143.58, p < .001] and incentive condition [F(2,34) = 
10.24, p < .001] that were qualified by a significant interaction between correctness and 
incentive condition [F(2,34) = 4.10, p < .05]. Separate analyses for correct and incorrect 
choices revealed a significant effect of incentive condition for incorrect-switch performance 
[F(2,34) = 8.86, p < .01], but not for correct-stay performance [F(2,34) = 2.26, p = .12]. 
Contrasts showed that participants were more likely to switch the response key following 
incorrect choices in the loss condition compared to gain and neutral condition [F(1,17) = 
17.73, p < .01], whereas there was no significant difference in incorrect-switch performance 
between gain and neutral condition (F < 1) (see Figure 25). 
 
Figure 25: Correct-stay and incorrect-switch performance for the three incentive conditions. Error bars indicate 
standard errors 
In summary, participants showed highest accuracy in the loss condition, followed by 
gain and neutral condition. This finding indicates that they were able to improve their 
performance in order to maximize their profit, with being even more motivated to avoid 
potential losses than to obtain potential rewards. A stronger bias to avoid negative outcomes 
was also evident from trial-to-trial adjustments in behavioural choices. Participants switched 
more often to the correct response key when incorrect choices were associated with 
monetary losses, whereas correct-stay performance was not affected by trial incentive value. 
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ERP data 
Cue-target interval 
Figure 26 shows the cue-locked grand-average ERP waveforms for the three 
incentive conditions at electrode Pz. Motivationally relevant (gain, loss) cues were followed 
by a larger centro-parietal positivity (P300) than neutral cues. An ANOVA with the factors 
incentive condition (gain, loss, neutral) and site on the P300 amplitude revealed a significant 
main effect of site [F(14,238) = 49.80, p < .001, ε = .17], indicating that the P300 was largest 
at centro-parietal midline sites. Moreover, a reliable main effect of incentive condition 
[F(2,34) = 54.00, p < .001, ε = .80] showed that the P300 amplitude was greater for the gain 
and loss condition compared to the neutral condition [F(1,17) = 71.97, p < .001, ε = .80], 
whereas no differences were found between gain and loss condition (F < 1). The effect of 
incentive condition was most pronounced at centro-parietal sites, reflected in a significant 
interaction between incentive condition and site [F(28,476) = 4.40, p < .01, ε = .17]. 
Figure 27 presents the target-locked ERP waveforms in the cue-target-interval at 
electrode Cz. As illustrated in the Figure, a negative slow wave (tCNV) developed about 600 
ms after cue onset at fronto-central recording sites. Visual inspection suggested that the 
tCNV amplitude did not differ for the three incentive conditions. This was confirmed by the 
statistical analysis that yielded a significant main effect of site only [F(14,238) = 19.11, p < 
.001, ε = .21]. 
 
Figure 26: Cue-target-interval: Cue-locked ERPs for the three incentive conditions at electrode Pz 
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Figure 27: Cue-target-interval: Target-locked ERPs for three incentive conditions in the cue-target-interval at 
electrode Cz. Note that the difference between neutral condition and gain/loss condition reflects the P300 effect 
(see Figure 27) that is temporally smeared due to the jittered cue-target-interval.  
Response-locked ERPs 
Incentive-related modulations in the Ne. Figure 28 presents the ERPs to correct and 
incorrect responses in Bin 1 and Bin 2 for the three incentive conditions at electrode site 
FCz. Following incorrect responses the Ne was evident as a negative deflection that 
increased over the course of learning and appeared larger for loss trials than gain or neutral 
trials. The peak-to-peak measures of the Ne were subjected to an ANOVA with the factors 
incentive condition (gain, loss, neutral) and bin (Bin 1 vs. Bin 2). A significant main effect of 
bin [F(1,17) = 6.74, p < .05] confirmed the learning-related increase in Ne amplitude from Bin 
1 to Bin 2. Moreover, the analysis yielded a significant main effect of incentive condition 
[F(2,34) = 7.63, p < .01]. Contrasts revealed the Ne to be larger on loss trials compared to 
gain und neutral trials [F(1,17) = 11.30, p < .01], whereas no amplitude difference was found 
between gain and neutral condition (F < 1). 
Analysis of difference waves (∆Ne) corroborated these findings. The ∆Ne amplitude 
reliably varied across bins [F(1,17) = 27.95 , p < .001] and incentive conditions [F(1,17) = 
4.35 , p < .05]. Consistent with the peak-to-peak measure, the ∆Ne was significantly greater 
on loss trials compared to gain and neutral trials [F(1,17) = 8.04 , p < .05], but did not differ 
between gain and neutral condition (F < 1). Thus, error processing was specifically affected 
by outcome valence, reflected in larger Ne amplitudes for errors associated with losses but 
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not for failures to obtain rewards. For reasons of parsimony, only analyses involving peak-to-
peak measures are reported in the following sections. 
 
Figure 28: Response-locked ERPs at electrode FCz to correct (solid lines) and incorrect (dashed lines) responses 
displayed separately for the three incentive conditions and the two bins. Dotted lines represent difference waves 
(error minus correct) 
Loss-related Ne increase does not reflect differences in overall performance. To 
ensure that the larger loss-related Ne amplitude was not a simple consequence of 
differences in overall accuracy, a second analysis was run after removing four subjects who 
clearly performed better in the loss than in the gain condition. The remaining sample showed 
higher accuracy in gain and loss compared to neutral condition [F(1,13) = 5.13, p < .05], but 
performed equally well in gain (M = 0.78, SD = .06) and loss condition (M = 0.78 SD = .07) (F 
< 1). Nonetheless, the Ne was significantly larger in the loss condition compared gain and 
neutral condition [F(1,13) = 6.18, p < .05], whereas no amplitude difference was found 
between the latter two conditions (p-values > .12). 
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Ne amplitude predicts loss avoidance. The analyses of the accuracy and ERP data 
indicate that loss but not gain anticipation specifically modulates error processing and error-
induced learning as reflected in larger Ne amplitude and better incorrect-switch performance. 
In order to examine the relation between Ne and error-related behavioural adaptations in 
more detail, correlation analyses between Ne amplitude (averaged across the two bins) and 
performance scores (overall accuracy, correct-stay and incorrect-switch performance) were 
conducted, separately for the three incentive conditions (see Figure 29). Reliable correlations 
were obtained between the Ne on loss trials and incorrect-switch performance in the loss 
condition [r = −.59, p < .05] as well as in the gain condition [r = −.49, p < .05]. The magnitude 
of the loss-related Ne did not predict correct-stay performance or overall accuracy in any 
incentive condition (p-values > .14), demonstrating the specificity of the above findings. 
Furthermore, there were no significant correlations between Ne amplitude in gain or neutral 
condition and any performance score (p-values > .18). Separate analyses for the two bins, 
however, revealed a significant correlation between Ne amplitude and incorrect-switch 
performance during later stages of learning (Bin 2) in the gain condition [r = −.47, p < .05]26. 
By contrast, no reliable relationships between Ne amplitude and performance measures 
were found for the neutral condition (p-values > .54). Importantly, the correlation between Ne 
and incorrect-switch performance was significantly larger significantly in the loss condition 
compared to the neutral condition [z = −2.12, p < .05]. Yet, the correlation coefficients did not 
significantly differ between gain and neutral condition27 [z = −1.20, p = .23] or gain and loss 
condition [z = 1.12, p = .26]. 
Summary of Ne findings. To summarize, the Ne was larger the loss condition 
compared to gain and neutral condition. This effect did not change as a function of learning 
and did not reflect differences in overall performance. Importantly, the Ne reliably predicted 
error-related behavioural adjustments in the loss condition only. These findings strongly link 
the neural processes underlying the Ne to aversively motivated behavioural control. 
                                                 
26 In the loss condition, the Ne correlated significantly with incorrect-switch performance in Bin 1 and 2 (p-values < 
.05). 
27 However, in Bin 2, the correlation between Ne and incorrect-switch performance differed significantly between 
gain and neutral (p < .05). 
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Figure 29: Correlation between Ne amplitude at electrode FCz (averaged across the bins) and incorrect-switch 
performance, separately for the loss condition (r = -.59, p < .05), the gain condition (r = -.27, n.s.), and the neutral 
condition (r = .09, n.s.). 
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 Error Positivity. The Pe amplitudes (see Figure 30) were subjected to an ANOVA with 
the factors incentive condition (gain, loss, neutral), bin (Bin 1 vs. Bin 2) and feedback type 
(positive vs. negative). The analysis yielded a reliable main effect of incentive condition 
[F(2,34) = 3.94, p < .05], indicating that the ERPs were more positive-going in the gain and 
loss condition compared to the neutral condition [F(1,17) = 4.56, p < .05]. There was also a 
trend towards larger amplitudes in the loss compared to the gain condition [F(1,17) = 3.30, p 
= .087]. Furthermore, the analysis showed that the Pe increased with learning, reflected in 
significant main effects of feedback type [F(1,17) = 13.03, p < .01] and bin [F(1,17) = 7.35, p 
< .05] and an interaction of feedback type and bin [F(1,17) = 11.95, p < .01]. Follow-up 
analyses that were split by feedback type showed that the positivity on error trials (p < .001) 
but not on correct trials (p = .90) became larger as learning progressed. 
  
Figure 30: Response-locked ERPs at electrode Pz to correct (solid lines) and incorrect (dashed lines) responses 
displayed separately for the three incentive conditions and the two bins. Dotted lines represent difference waves 
(error minus correct) 
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Thus, the Pe increased with learning. In addition, there was a larger positivity on both 
erroneous and correct responses in the gain and loss condition compared to the neutral 
condition. 
Feedback-locked ERPs 
Feedback-related negativity. The ERPs to positive and negative feedback in the three 
incentive conditions are presented in Figure 31. From visual inspection, it appeared that 
there were only small amplitude differences between positive and negative feedback. 
Irrespective of feedback valence, largest FRN amplitudes were elicited in the neutral 
condition. The peak-to-peak measures of the FRN were analyzed using an ANOVA with the 
factors incentive condition (gain, loss, neutral), bin (Bin 1 vs. Bin 2) and feedback type 
(positive vs. negative). The analysis yielded a reliable main effect of feedback type, indicating 
that the was larger FRN after negative compared to positive feedback [F(1,17) = 5.24, p < 
.05]. Furthermore, a significant main effect of incentive condition was obtained [F(2,34) = 
6.54, p < .01]. Contrasts revealed that the FRN was greater in the neutral condition 
compared to gain and loss condition [F(1,17) = 13.41, p < .01], but did not differ between 
gain and loss condition (p = .41). The analysis of the ∆FRN amplitude produced qualitatively 
similar results to the analysis of the original waveforms and is not reported here. 
Control analysis of the P300. Figure 31 illustrates that the FRN amplitude may have 
been confounded by differences in the feedback-evoked P300. Therefore, mean amplitudes 
in a 300 to 400 ms post-feedback interval at electrode Pz were analysed using the same 
ANOVA design as for the FRN amplitudes. The analysis yielded reliable main effects of 
feedback type [F(1,17) = 7.94, p < .05] and learning condition [F(2,34) = 5.64, p < .01] that 
were qualified by an interaction of feedback type and learning condition [F(2,34) = 3.93, p < 
.05]. Separate analyses showed that the P300 to positive feedback did not differ between the 
three incentive conditions (p = .72). By contrast, negative feedback elicited larger P300 
amplitudes in the gain condition compared to loss and neutral condition (p < .01), whereas no 
differences were found between the latter two conditions (p = .38). Furthermore, the analysis 
revealed a significant main effect of bin [F(1,17) = 5.70, p < .05] and an interaction of bin and 
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feedback type [F(1,17) = 14.05, p < .01]. Separate analyses showed that the P300 
decreased from Bin1 to Bin 2 for positive feedback (p < .001) but not for negative feedback 
(p = .75). Hence, if anything, the P300 might have attenuated the FRN after negative 
feedback in the gain condition. As can be seen from Figure 31, this would decrease rather 
than increase the differences between the incentive conditions28. 
 Thus, better learning in the motivationally significant gain and loss conditions did not 
appear to be accompanied by more differentiated monitoring of positive and negative 
feedback as reflected in the FRN. 
 
Figure 31: Feedback-locked ERPs at electrode FCz to positive (solids lines) and negative (dashed lines) 
displayed separately for the three incentive conditions and the two bins. 
  
                                                 
28 In a further control analysis, feedback-locked epochs were transformed to current source density (CSD) 
estimates (Kayser & Tenke, 2006). CSD acts as a spatial filter that amplifies the representation of local potentials 
and attenuates broadly distributed/distal activities, thereby removing spatial redundancy caused by volume 
conduction and by this attenuating the influence of overlapping ERP components. However, this analysis yielded 
a qualitatively similar pattern of findings for the FRN as the analysis of the original waveforms. 
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sLORETA Analysis 
Whole-brain analysis. Figure 32 shows sLORETA images for the error-correct 
contrast, separately for the three incentive conditions. Whole-brain analysis revealed that 
parts of the posterior cingulate and precuneus were less active on incorrect than correct 
trials, particularly in gain condition. Moreover, in the loss condition, greater error-related 
activity was found for a large cluster of voxels in the midcingulate and the adjacent SMA and 
pre-SMA. By comparison, on neutral trials, errors were mainly characterized by greater rACC 
activity (all p-values < .05, corrected for multiple comparisons). 
Gain Condition Loss Condition Neutral Condition 
   
Figure 32: Voxel-by-voxel sLORETA statistical threshold images (x = -4) for the error > correct contrast in the 
three incentive conditions displayed on the MNI templates. Hotter colours indicate relatively higher activity for 
errors; cooler colours indicate relatively lower activity for errors. 
ROI analysis29. Standardized current density power for dACC and rACC ROI were 
subjected to an ANOVA with the factors incentive condition (gain, loss, and neutral), 
correctness (correct vs. incorrect), and ROI (dACC vs. rACC) yielded a reliable main effect of 
ROI [F(1,17) = 12.94 , p < .01] as well as significant interactions between correctness and 
ROI [F(2,34) = 5.72, p < .05, ε = .70] and incentive condition, correctness, and ROI [F(2,34) = 
4.25, p < .05]. Separate ANOVAs for the two ACC subregions revealed a significant 
interaction between incentive condition and correctness for the dACC ROI only [F(2,34) = 
4.24, p < .05]. Contrasts showed that the error-correct difference in dACC activity was 
                                                 
29 As the whole-brain analysis identified error-related source activity in areas other than the ACC for the loss 
condition, additional analyses were conducted that included further areas such as the BA6, BA8, and BA9. These 
analyses yielded findings that were qualitatively similar to the reported results of for the ACC ROIs. 
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significantly larger in the loss condition than in gain and neutral condition [F (1,17) = 9.70, p < 
.05], but did not differ between gain and neutral condition (p = .28) (see Figure 32). Indeed, 
dACC power was significantly enhanced following errors on loss trials only [t(17) = 3.38, p < 
.01]. Thus, the pattern of dACC activation largely reflected the modulation of the Ne 
amplitude across the incentive conditions, whereas no evidence for incentive-related 
differences in rACC reactivity was found. The latter result appears somewhat discrepant with 
the whole-brain analysis that revealed phasically increased rACC activation in the neutral 
condition but not in the gain or loss condition. Given that the significant cluster in the whole-
brain contrast contained a much smaller number of voxels than the rACC ROI, it is likely that 
non-responsive voxels attenuated the differences between the incentive conditions in the 
ROI analysis. 
Incentive-specific relations between ROI activity, Ne amplitude, and behavioural 
adaptation. To examine the relationship between subregional cingulate activation and Ne 
amplitude more specifically, multiple regression analyses were conducted for the three 
incentive conditions with error-related rACC and dACC power as predictors. On gain trials, 
both error-related dACC and rACC activation reliably predicted larger (i.e., more negative) 
Ne amplitudes (ß = −.42 and −.68, t = −2.67 and −4.35, p < .05 and .01, respectively; R2 = 
.64). Similarly, greater rACC activation was positively related to Ne magnitude in the neutral 
condition. There was, however, only a marginally significant relation between dACC activity 
and Ne on neutral trials (ß = −.53 and −.38, t = − 2.88 and −2.11, p < .05 and .054, 
respectively; R2 = .56). In the loss condition, only dACC power reliably predicted Ne 
amplitude (ß = −.71, t = −3.93, p < .01; R2 = .52). Importantly, when the effect of dACC/rACC 
activation during correct trials was partialled out, the same pattern of correlations between 
residual error-related ROI values and Ne amplitude emerged. 
In a second step, incorrect-switch performance was regressed on error-related rACC 
and dACC power. In the gain condition, greater error-related rACC activity predicted more 
efficient post-error behavioural adjustments (ß = .62, t = 3.12, p < .01, R2 = .41). Similarly, 
rACC power scaled with incorrect-switch performance in the neutral condition (ß = .48, t = 
2.13, p = .05). Interestingly, there was also a significant negative relation between dACC 
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activation and incorrect-switch performance (ß = −.57, t = − 2.57, p < .05), indicating that 
reduced dACC power during errors was accompanied by higher error correction rates on 
neutral trials (R2 = .36). In contrast, neither rACC nor dACC power were significantly related 
to error-related behavioral adjustments in the loss condition (ß = .25 and .30, t = 1.06 and 
1.24, p = .30 and .23, respectively; R2 = .16). However, including gain-related dACC power 
into the equation increased the predictive power of loss-related dACC activation. Greater 
dACC power predicted better incorrect-switch performance in the loss condition when dACC 
power on gain trials was controlled for (ß = .84, t = 2.28, p < .05, R2 = .33). Thus, it appeared 
that dACC power in the gain condition suppressed criterion-irrelevant variance of dACC 
power in the loss condition. This “error” variance might reflect a valence-independent effect 
of motivation on dACC reactivity. No other suppressor effects were obtained in this analysis. 
The pattern of findings did not change when the effect of dACC/rACC activation during 
correct trials was accounted for30. 
Summary of findings. To summarize, dACC activation was larger following errors than 
correct responses and predicted Ne amplitude in the loss condition. Moreover, when 
accounting for dACC power on gain trials, loss-related dACC reactivity predicted incorrect-
switch performance. Although the whole-brain analysis failed to reveal reliable differences in 
ACC activation between incorrect and correct trials in the gain condition, both error-related 
rACC and dACC power predicted Ne magnitude. Moreover, greater rACC power was 
associated with better incorrect-switch performance. For the neutral condition, sLORETA 
contrasts revealed higher rACC power following errors compared to correct responses. In 
line with this, error-related rACC activity predicted Ne amplitude as well as incorrect-switch 
performance. In contrast to the loss condition, dACC activity was inversely related to 
incorrect-switch performance. 
Taken together, these findings indicate that the contribution of different cingulate 
subregions to error processing and learning-related behavioural adaptation varied as a 
                                                 
30 No significant relations were found between correct-stay performance and dACC/rACC activity following correct 
responses. 
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function of the specific task context. However, there was no evidence to suggest that greater 
rACC activation underlies the larger Ne amplitude for errors resulting in monetary losses. 
Instead, differences in dACC power appeared to underlie the increase of the Ne in the loss 
condition compared to gain and neutral condition. Conversely, for the latter two conditions, 
rACC power was associated with larger Ne amplitudes and more efficient error-related 
behavioural adjustments, possibly reflecting a complementary role of this brain region when 
action monitoring functions subserved by the dACC are less dominant. 
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9. Discussion of Experiment 3 
The main goal of this study was to investigate the impact of appetitive and aversive 
motivation on performance monitoring and goal-directed behavioural adjustments during 
feedback-based learning. To this end, the study examined modulations in the amplitude of 
Ne, FRN, and Pe across different incentive conditions, in which errors led to (1) failure to 
gain, (2) losses or (3) neither of both. In particular, the present research aimed to determine 
whether larger Ne amplitudes for motivationally and affectively more salient errors reflect a 
differential involvement of dorsal and rostral cingulate subregions in error processing and the 
initiation of subsequent behavioural changes. To this end, an EEG source localization 
technique known as standardized Low-Resolution Electromagnetic Tomography (sLORETA, 
Pascual-Marqui, 2002) was employed. 
Summary of Main Findings 
The present findings show that participants performed better in the loss condition than 
in the gain condition and worst in the neutral condition. These differences in overall accuracy 
were largely driven by a higher tendency to adjust responses after errors associated with 
monetary losses, whereas trial value did not affect correct-stay performance. In the loss 
condition, errors elicited a larger Ne compared to gain and neutral condition. By contrast, no 
differences in Ne amplitude were found between gain and neutral condition. Importantly, the 
incentive-related Ne modulation was not a mere consequence of differences in overall 
performance and hence improved error detection (cf. Yeung, 2004), as enhanced loss-
related Ne amplitudes were also found for a subsample of participants who performed 
equally well in gain and loss condition. Notably, inter-individual differences in Ne amplitude 
on loss trials correlated with incorrect-switch performance, suggesting a functional link 
between the loss-related Ne enhancement and aversively motivated behavioural 
adjustments. In contrast to previous fMRI findings, source localization revealed greater error-
related dACC reactivity on loss trials but greater rACC reactivity on neutral trials. While 
phasical dACC activation scaled to the size of the Ne in each of the three incentive 
conditions, greater phasical rACC activation predicted larger Ne amplitudes and improved 
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error-related behavioral adjustments in the gain and neutral condition only. Rather than a 
functional distinction between “cognitive” vs. “affective” aspects of error processing, these 
findings point to a more complex interplay among the cingulate subdivisions in mediating 
adaptive behaviour control. 
Learning-related Changes in Ne, FRN, and Pe 
 Learning-related changes in the Ne. Importantly, the present study demonstrated that 
the Ne increased with learning. This finding is line with previous research indicating that 
learning-related modulations in the Ne can be observed when learning blocks are relatively 
short and hence include a small number or trials (e.g., Eppinger & Kray, 2011). Hence, in 
simple two-choice decisions, the Ne appears to grow larger during early stages of learning 
only. By contrast, the learning-related increase in the correct response-related positivity was 
much less pronounced than in Experiment 1 and 2. Together, these findings corroborate the 
notion that the two components reflect dissociable processes, possibly both related to 
behavioural adaptation but operating at more rapid vs. slower time-scales (Eppinger et al., 
2008, 2009). 
 However, an alternative view on the putative positivity on correct trials has been put 
forward as well. Ridderinkhof and cowokers (2003) observed that error-preceding correct 
trials are characterized by faster responses and an increased positivity in the time range of 
the Ne. The authors concluded that these phenomena indicate deficient performance 
monitoring processes, increasing the error probability on the next trial. Using CSD 
transformation, Allain and colleagues (2004) showed that the error-preceding positivity 
actually reflects an attenuation of the CRN, which they assumed is functionally similar to the 
Ne. Indeed, fMRI studies showed an error-preceding activation increase in default mode 
regions of the brain and a concurrent decrease of activation in brain regions supporting 
effortful task-related processing, including pMFC and OFC (Eichele et al., 2008). In the 
current study, similar to the findings by Allain et al. (2004), response-locked current source 
density (CSD) ERPs revealed a clear Ne-like wave on correct trials. This negativity 
decreased with learning in the gain and neutral condition. Thus, the learning-related increase 
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in the correct response-related positivity in these conditions might also reflect the reduced 
engagement of effortful monitoring processes, possibly related to a decrease in task 
demands. By contrast, in the loss condition, the amplitude of the Ne-like wave did not change 
across bins, but appeared generally somewhat smaller than in gain and neutral condition. In 
sum, the current findings indicate that it remains a challenging task for future research to 
disentangle the different influences contributing to learning-related changes in the response-
locked ERPs. 
The FRN does not change with learning. Unexpectedly, the changes in the Ne over 
the course of learning were not accompanied by modulations in the FRN. This finding is in 
sharp contrast with the predictions of the R-L theory (Holroyd & Coles, 2002). Moreover, the 
present results are inconsistent with previous studies that showed pronounced changes in 
the FRN to positive feedback as learning progressed (Cohen et al., 2007; Eppinger et al., 
2008, 2009). Notably, the lack of learning-related modulations of the FRN in the present 
study did not appear to reflect influences of reward or punishment motivation on feedback 
processing, as it was also evident in the neutral condition. One might argue that the learning 
blocks were too short to obtain reliable effects of learning on the FRN. However, at least two 
factors render this unlikely. First, there was a marked increase in Ne amplitude in the present 
experiment. Second, in the Eppinger et al.’s studies (2008, 2009) the most pronounced 
reduction in the ERPs to positive feedback occurred very early in learning, i.e., from first to 
second bin. Still, visual inspection of the feedback-locked ERPs in the study of Eppinger and 
colleagues suggests that the feedback-evoked P300 decreased with learning for positive 
and, albeit less clearly, for negative feedback. By contrast, in the present study, the P300 
decreased with learning only for positive but not for negative feedback. Hence, differential 
effects in the feedback-evoked P300 might account for the disparate findings. In sum, 
however, the current data are difficult to reconcile with the literature. 
Learning-related changes in the Pe. Consistent with the results of Experiment 1 and 
2, the Pe became larger as participants were better able to represent the correctness of their 
responses. As opposed to the first study, however, the current analyses revealed an 
increasing positivity for erroneous responses only. This finding parallels the less pronounced 
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increase in the correct response-related positivity and might indicate a stronger confounding 
effect of the stimulus-evoked P300 on the response-locked ERPs in Experiment 1 and 2. 
Effects of Appetitive and Aversive Motivation on Error Processing and Learning 
Monetary incentives improve learning performance. In line with previous findings 
(Hübner & Schlösser, 2010; Pessoa & Engelmann, 2010; Savine et al., 2010), the accuracy 
data showed that monetary incentives in gain and loss condition enhanced task 
performance. Furthermore, mean accuracy rates were higher in the loss condition than in the 
gain condition, indicating that participants were more strongly motivated to avoid losses than 
to obtain rewards. This is consistent with the often observed phenomenon that losses have a 
higher impact on decision making than do gains of equivalent magnitude, commonly referred 
to as ‘loss aversion’, (e.g., Ariely, Huber, & Wertenbroch, 2005). Moreover, participants made 
use of the incentive cues from very early stages of learning, suggesting that higher trial value 
promoted the mobilization of processing resources, most notably attentional effort (Sarter, 
Gehring, & Kozak, 2006), thereby enabling a faster establishment of adequate S-R-
mappings. 
In support of this notion, gain and loss cue elicited larger P300 amplitudes than 
neutral cue, which is consistent with other reports showing that this ERP component is 
sensitive to the stimulus-inherent motivational or emotional significance (e.g., Keil et al., 
2003; Yeung & Sanfey, 2004; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005). Given that the P300 has been 
linked to the encoding and updating of task context (Donchin & Coles, 1988), the amplitude 
modulation is likely to reflect a more convenient representation of the current task-specific 
environment on gain and loss trials compared to neutral trials. Alternatively, it has been 
proposed that the neural processes underlying the P300 optimize goal-directed information 
processing by amplifying the neural response to motivationally significant events 
(Nieuwenhuis, Aston-Jones, & Cohen, 2005). However, this increase in selective attention is 
thought to facilitate encoding and maintenance of the eliciting stimulus, i.e., the incentive 
cue. Therefore, in order to promote learning, a larger P300 should also be elicited by the 
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imperative stimulus. Yet, no differences between the incentive conditions were found for the 
target-locked P30031. 
In addition, the beneficial effects of gain and loss cues on learning performance might 
reflect more deliberative, strategic allocation of processing resources, such as the 
preferential use of rehearsal strategies for motivationally more significant items. Although the 
CNV is thought to reflect voluntary mobilization of resources for task-relevant processes 
(Falkenstein et al., 2003), no amplitude differences were found between the incentive 
conditions. Still, it should be noted that the study by Falkenstein and coworkers (2003) used 
a speeded-response task that did not require participants to learn the mapping rules. Thus, in 
their study, the incentive-related CNV increase was likely to reflect effortful stimulus, 
cognitive, and motor preparatory processes in the service of fast and accurate responding. 
By contrast, in the current learning task, incentive cues might have promoted mnemonic 
processes more strongly32. Indeed, it appears from visual inspection of the learning curves 
that accuracy differences between the loss conditions were most pronounced at the 
beginning of learning. This would be consistent with the view that the impact of incentives on 
task performance decreased with a reduction of working memory demands. However, the 
effect was statistically not reliable, possibly due to the fact that incentive-related effects were 
generally small compared to the more pronounced learning-related changes in accuracy. 
Aversive motivation increases the behavioural impact internal error cues. Notably, a 
more fine-grained analysis of accuracy data in terms of trial-to-trial behavioural changes 
revealed influences of incentive condition on incorrect-switch performance only, whereas 
correct-stay performance was not affected by incentive value. Participants were most likely to 
change their responses after errors that resulted in monetary losses. No differences in error-
related behavioural adjustments were found between gain and neutral condition. Crucially, 
the effects of incentive value on trial-to-trial behavioural adjustments were mirrored by 
                                                 
31 Of note, the lack of differences in the target-locked P300 suggests that the differences in Ne amplitude were 
unlikely to reflect unspecific effects of arousal or orienting. 
32 However, when participants were explicitly asked for their experiences with the learning task during debriefing, 
they did not report the purposeful use of those strategies. In fact, most of them indicated that they did not pay 
much attention due the incentive cues but rather focused on learning the mapping rules. 
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modulations in Ne amplitude. Consistent with previous research (Gehring et al., 1993; Hajcak 
et al., 2005; Potts, 2011), the Ne was enhanced for motivationally and affectively more 
salient errors. Crucially, the Ne was sensitive to punishment but not to reward omission, 
reflected in larger Ne amplitudes on loss trials compared to gain and neutral trials, whereas 
the Ne did not differ between gain and neutral condition. This pattern of findings is in line with 
a number of recent reports (Holmes & Pizzagalli; Potts, 2011; Wiswede et al., 2009a). 
Similar to the present study, Potts (2011) found larger Ne amplitudes for errors 
resulting in monetary losses compared to those resulting in reward omission during a 
flankers task. Thus, by avoiding potential confounding effects inherent in a block design and 
assuring sufficient motivational/affective relevance of the incentive manipulation, the present 
study was able to demonstrate robust effects of punishment motivation on error processing 
and error-related behavioural adjustments. In particular, the current data fit the results of 
Experiment 1 and 2 and provide strong evidence for the view that appetitive and aversive 
motivation differentially bias performance monitoring. One of the most striking findings of the 
present study, however, was the close resemblance of the experimental effects on Ne and 
incorrect-switch performance. This further substantiates the notion of a specific functional link 
between the neural processes underlying Ne generation and subsequent strategic 
behavioural adjustments (Cavanagh et al., 2009; Debener et al. 2005; Frank et al., 2005, 
Holroyd & Coles, 2002). 
Extending these findings, the present data show that aversive motivation specifically 
enhances the relationship between the neural processes underlying the Ne and behavioural 
adaptation. This was indicated by a significant correlation between Ne amplitude and 
incorrect-switch performance in the loss condition. By contrast, no significant relation 
between Ne and error-related behavioural adjustments was seen in the neutral condition. 
Interestingly, the Ne also predicted incorrect-switch performance during later stages of 
learning in the gain condition. On the one hand, these results are consistent previous 
research that closely links ACC functioning to aversively motivated behaviour control (Frank 
et al., 2005; Hajcak & Foti, 2008; Shackman et al., 2011; Tops & Boksem, 2010). On the 
other hand, they support the idea that motivational/affective influences on cognitive 
performance are not restricted to an unspecific “energizing” function, but are associated with 
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a sharpening of task-related neural processing (Pessoa & Engelmann, 2010, Savine & 
Braver, 2010). On this view, the correlation between Ne amplitude and incorrect-switch 
performance during later stages of learning in the gain condition might indicate that 
motivational impact of rewards evolves more slowly, possibly not until a certain performance 
level in the loss condition has been established. However, the Ne is thought to reflect 
reactive, evaluative control. Hence, the current findings do not preclude the possibility that 
appetitive motivation may trigger other forms of neural enhancement or optimization. For 
instance, some researchers proposed an explicit link between reward motivation and 
proactive control (Braver et al., 2007; Harmon-Jones et al., 2006; Savine et al., 2010). In the 
present study, the analysis of cue-related ERPs did not appear to provide much support for a 
reward-related increase in proactive control. Yet, this might reflect insensitivity of the 
measurements to such processes33. 
In contrast to aversive motivation, reward motivation did not result in an increase of 
the Ne. This is consistent with a study by Holmes and Pizzagalli (2010) that also failed to 
obtain reliable Ne differences between reward and non-reward trials in a Stroop task. 
Moreover, the finding fits demonstrations that short-term induction of negative but not 
positive affect on a trial-by-trial level is associated with an increase in Ne amplitude 
(Wiswede et al., 2009a). Yet, van Wouwe and coworkers (2011) found that the induction of 
positive affect by presenting short movie clips led to a subsequent reduction of the Ne 
compared to the induction of neutral affect. A similar effect has been reported for embodied 
positive affect (Wiswede, Münte, Krämer, & Rüsseler, 2009c). 
The discrepant findings might reflect differences in the nature of the specific affective 
manipulations. In the latter two studies, the reduction in Ne amplitude was attributed to 
positive affect-related increases of tonic DA in the striatum, which is thought to effectively 
reduce the error-related phasic dips in dopaminergic activity and hence to attenuate the Ne 
(Frank et al., 2004; Frank & O’Reilly, 2006). By contrast, the successive presentation of 
motivationally and affectively salient cues is assumed to result in phasic changes of DA 
(Schultz, 2002; 2006; 2007). These cue-related phasic increases in dopaminergic activity are 
                                                 
33 Indeed, Harmon-Jones and cowokers (2006) demonstrated that high levels of approach motivation were 
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likely to exert modulatory effects on prefrontal working memory function such as enhanced 
maintenance and stabilization of task-relevant information during subsequent processing of 
the imperative stimulus (Cools & D’Esposito, 2011; Durstewitz & Seamans, 2002). 
Importantly, the beneficial effects of increased prefrontal DA have been shown to improve 
error processing as reflected in the Ne (De Bruijn et al., 2004; Tieges, Ridderinkhof, Snel, & 
Kok, 2004; van Wouwe et al., 2011). Hence, the different susceptibility of the Ne to positive 
affect-related manipulations might be due to distinct characteristics of dopaminergic activity 
in the striatum and the PFC. 
In any case, the lack of differences in Ne magnitude between gain and neutral 
condition is noteworthy since theoretical accounts that relate the Ne to the significance of an 
error would predict a larger amplitude on gain trials (Luu et al., 2003; Olvet & Hajcak, 2008). 
The observed incentive-related modulations of the Ne are also not readily accommodated by 
a conceptualization in terms of a “pure” reward prediction error (Holroyd & Holes, 2002) or 
increased conflict (Botvinick et al., 2001). According to TD RL algorithms, the magnitude of 
the PE should be the same for (1) a zero outcome when a gain has been expected and (2) a 
loss when a zero outcome has been expected (e.g. Schultz, 2002). Thus, while a 
dopaminergic reward prediction error signal might constitute one determinant of the Ne, it is 
conceivable that interactions between ACC and other neural systems involved in the 
representation of specific reinforcer value (e.g., the amygdala and the OFC; Frank & Claus, 
2006; Pessoa, 2008; Tremblay & Schultz, 1999, 2000) are reflected in the measured scalp 
potential as well. The conflict monitoring theory also cannot fully account for the present 
findings, largely for the same reasons as in Experiment 1 and 2. According to the conflict 
monitoring theory the larger Ne in the loss condition reflects increased post-error conflict due 
to enhanced processing of the target stimulus after the production of the erroneous 
response. However, the analyses of performance-matches subgroups showed that the 
putative strengthening of attentional focus in the loss condition is not necessarily 
accompanied by better performance. Instead the present findings suggest that aversive 
                                                                                                                                                        
primarily associated with increased relative frontal activity asymmetry (RFA). 
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motivation led to heightened vigilance to internal performance cues, possibly resulting in an 
“amplification” of the conflict signal but not higher conflict per se. 
Interestingly, the incentive-related Ne modulation did not change as a function of 
learning, that is, errors in the loss condition elicited a larger Ne, irrespective of whether they 
occurred during earlier or later stages of learning. Thus, even in case of uncertain responses, 
error processing differed considerably between loss trials on the one hand and gain and 
neutral trials on the other. By contrast, in Experiment 1 and 2, the effect of failure on the Ne 
was more pronounced during later phases of learning, that is, as participants were better 
able to represent the correctness of their responses. However, it is difficult to directly 
compare these experiments with the current study. First, in Experiment 1 and 2, the learning 
task involved a greater number of stimulus repetitions. Therefore, the two bins represented 
other phases of learning than in Experiment 3. Indeed, the Ne did not change across pretest 
in Experiment 1 and 2, whereas a pronounced learning-related increase was observed in the 
present study. Hence, it is possible that the amplitude differences would have become larger 
with prolonged learning in Experiment 3. Second, the results of Experiment 1 and 2 are 
based on a comparison between two different test phases (pre- and posttest), whereas 
incentive value was manipulated within the same learning phase in the current study. 
However, the current finding of an early reactivity of the medial prefrontal 
performance monitoring system to punishment cues seems consistent with other research 
that showed enhanced ACC activation in conjunction with pain avoidance when response 
uncertainty was high (Diener, Kuehner, & Flor, 2010). Similarly, unpredictable threat has 
been found to evoke stronger activity in the ACC than predictable threat (Alvarez, Cen, 
Bodurka, Kaplan, & Grillon, 2011). Thus, the present data are in line with the notion that a 
core function of the ACC is to enable appropriate behaviour in the face of threat and 
uncertainty (Shackman et al., 2011). 
In sum, the data discussed in this section showed that aversive but not appetitive 
motivation is associated with a heightened responsivity to internal error cues and more 
efficient error-related behavioural adjustments. The findings further corroborate the notion of 
a close link between performance monitoring – as reflected in the Ne – and aversively 
motivated instrumental control. Importantly, the accuracy data as well as the cue-locked 
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ERPs showed that the sensitivity of the Ne to losses was unlikely to reflect unspecific 
motivational factors such as higher effort or arousal. Instead, the pattern of results appeared 
to indicate a highly specific processing bias towards the avoidance of losses, i.e., the most 
aversive response outcomes. 
Monetary incentives do not clearly affect the FRN. As was the case for the failure 
manipulation in Experiment 1 and 2, trial-by-trial manipulations of appetitive and aversive 
motivation did not appear to substantially affect feedback processing as reflected in the FRN. 
The analysis only revealed that the FRN was larger in the neutral condition compared to gain 
and loss condition, for both positive and negative feedback. Thus, the present data are in line 
with previous studies indicating that the processes underlying the FRN encode outcome 
valence but not magnitude and operate in a context-dependent fashion (Hajcak et al., 2006; 
Holroyd et al., 2004; Yeung & Sanfey, 2004). Nevertheless, more recent findings suggested 
that the FRN might also be sensitive to the magnitude of rewards (Goyer et al., 2008; 
Kreussel et al., 2011). However, in these studies, the feedback stimulus itself provided 
information about the magnitude of wins or losses, whereas in the present study the 
feedback indicated only the correctness of the response. Therefore, the “magnitude-aspect” 
was much less salient. Importantly, it has been shown that the FRN appears to be sensitive 
to the most salient information the feedback stimulus provides (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004). 
Consistent with this notion, only feedback type (correct vs. incorrect) affected the FRN in the 
present study. 
A related but somewhat different explanation for the lack of specific incentive-related 
modulations in FRN amplitude concerns the participants’ ability to maintain the cue-related 
information in working memory. Note that participants had to relate the feedback information 
about the correctness of their response to the representation of item-specific incentive value. 
This was a quite complex operation that presumably took longer time than the rapid 
evaluation of feedback information as reflected in the FRN. One might predict that individual 
differences in working memory capacity would play a decisive role in determining the ability 
to perform these computations. However, no evidence for such a modulatory influence of 
working memory capacity (assessed by a modified version of the Digit Ordering Test; Cooper 
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et al., 1991) was found in the present study. Nonetheless, a closer inspection of individual 
ERP waveforms revealed a remarkable variability in the FRN effects, suggesting that other 
variables moderated the effects of appetitive vs. aversive motivation on feedback processing. 
Given that the FRN has been suggested to reflect the value of an outcome relative to the 
specific task goal (Holroyd et al., 2006), interindividual differences in the definition of this task 
goal could account for some variance. While some participants may have primarily focused 
on the information the feedback provided for learning, others may have focused more 
strongly on wins and losses. In the latter case, the FRN would be expected to differentiate 
less clearly between positive feedback in the loss condition and negative feedback in the 
gain condition. 
Though incentive cues did not differentially affect the processing of positive vs. 
negative feedback, the FRN was generally larger in the neutral condition compared to gain 
and loss condition. A similar pattern of more negative amplitudes to both positive and 
negative feedback has been found in highly punishment sensitive individuals (Balconi & 
Crivelli, 2010) as well as in children compared to young adults (Hämmerer, Li, Müller, & 
Lindenberger, 2011) and has been proposed to indicate heightened sensitivity to feedback. 
On this view, the present finding would reflect reduced vigilance to feedback in the 
motivationally more significant gain and loss condition, which seems counterintuitive. In 
addition, previous research established a link between a more negative FRN on correct 
feedback trials and diminished processing of positive feedback (Cohen et al., 2007; Eppinger 
et al., 2008, 2009). Given that the neutral condition was motivationally less salient, it would 
make sense to assume that participants were less vigilant to positive feedback. However, the 
same logic would imply that participants were more sensitive to negative feedback in the 
neutral condition. Hence, the present finding is difficult to integrate with previous data and 
warrants further investigation. 
Taken together, the current results are in line with Experiment 1 and 2 as well as 
other studies reporting dissociations between FRN and Ne (Eppinger et al., 2008; 2009; 
Gründler et al., 2009; Hajcak et al., 2003) and provide a further challenge to the assumptions 
of the R-L theory (Holroyd & Coles, 2002). 
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Monetary incentives do not clearly affect the Pe. Similar to the FRN, the Pe was 
largely unaffected by the incentive manipulation. Errors that were more costly in terms of 
monetary loss or failure to gain did not elicit a larger Pe compared to errors without those 
consequences. As was discussed with respect to the lack of failure-related effects in the first 
study, this finding is hard to reconcile with an ‘affective-processing’ hypothesis (Falkenstein 
et al., 2000). At the first glance, this finding seems also inconsistent with notion that the Pe 
reflects the motivational significance of an error and is functionally related to the stimulus-
evoked P300 (Overbeek et al., 2005). Yet, it should be mentioned that the analysis revealed 
a larger positivity after correct and incorrect responses in the loss condition compared to gain 
and neutral condition. Thus, one might argue that both correct and incorrect responses were 
more salient on loss trials. Overbeek and colleagues (2005) proposed that Pe might reflect 
the activity of a more slowly operating deliberate performance evaluation system. Analogous 
to what has been suggested for the medial prefrontal performance monitoring system and 
the CRN on correct trials (Allain et al., 2004; Ridderinkhof et al., 2003), the enhanced 
positivity in the time range of the Pe might indicate a stronger recruitment of this putative 
parallel system in the loss condition. Interestingly, this would also imply that the two parallel 
systems are differentially engaged by correct and erroneous responses as only the Ne but 
not the correct response-related positivity was affected by incentive value. 
The Contribution of Cingulate Subregions to Error Processing 
A specific aim of the present study was to determine whether larger Ne amplitudes for 
motivationally and affectively more salient errors reflect a differential involvement of dACC 
and rACC in error processing and the initiation of subsequent behavioural adjustments. It has 
been suggested that the rACC evaluates the affective and motivational significance of an 
error, thereby directly accounting for variations in the scalp-recorded Ne (Luu et al., 2003; 
van Veen & Carter, 2002). Although this assumption has received some support from fMRI 
studies (e.g., Taylor et al., 2006, Simões-Franklin et al., 2010), it has not explicitly been 
tested utilizing the high temporal resolution of ERPs. 
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Notably, the present data speak against a direct contribution of the rACC to the loss-
related Ne enhancement. Only in the neutral condition, the rACC was more active following 
errors than correct responses, whereas in the loss condition, errors were followed by greater 
phasical activity in parts of the dACC and the neighboring SMA and pre-SMA. On gain trials, 
no significant activation differences were obtained between correct and incorrect responses 
for either of the cingulate subregions. Thus, the Ne enhancement on loss trials appears to 
reflect a stronger recruitment the dorsal rather than rostral ACC. Further corroborating this 
notion, only dACC power but not rACC power predicted the magnitude of the Ne in the loss 
condition. Yet, there was no reliable correlation between error-related dACC activation and 
incorrect-switch performance. This was somewhat surprising, given the relationship between 
Ne and error-related behavioural adjustments in the loss condition. Interestingly, when dACC 
activation on gain trials was included as an additional regressor, the predictive power of 
dACC activation on loss trials was substantially increased. Thus, it appeared that dACC 
power in the gain condition suppressed irrelevant variance of dACC power in the loss 
condition. Given that this effect was not observed for error-related dACC power in the neutral 
condition, it might be related to non-specific motivational influences on dACC reactivity in 
gain and loss condition that are not directly reflected in Ne amplitude. In any case, the lack of 
a direct relationship between error-related phasic dACC activity and incorrect-switch 
performance in the loss condition suggests that a more complex action-regulation circuitry 
underlies Ne generation. 
By contrast, on gain and neutral trials, both error-related dACC and rACC reactivity 
were related to Ne amplitude, a finding that has also been reported by studies combining 
ERP and fMRI measures (e.g., Mathalon, Whitfield, & Ford, 2003). Furthermore, rACC 
activation predicted incorrect-switch performance in these two conditions. This finding 
suggests two important conclusions. First, it indicates that not only the dorsal but also the 
rostral ACC is critically involved in implementing adaptive behaviour control. This view is 
consistent with previous studies demonstrating increased coupling between rACC and lateral 
PFC after errors or high conflict (e.g., Etkin, Egner, Peraza, Kandel, & Hirsch, 2006; Holmes 
& Pizzagalli, 2008). Second, the fact that the relationship between error-related rACC 
activation and incorrect-switch performance was observed in the gain and neutral condition 
 189 
but not in the loss condition suggests that it was not driven by higher affective or motivational 
salience. In particular, these results contrast with previous fMRI studies that report increased 
rACC activation in response to more costly errors (Simões-Franklin et al., 2010; Taylor et al., 
2006). Given the comparatively low temporal resolution of the BOLD signal, however, it 
cannot be ruled out that the activation differences in these investigations did not reflect 
neural mechanisms underlying the Ne but resulted from later phases in error processing 
(e.g., conscious appraisal of an error) or even feedback processing. Furthermore, in the 
current study, participants performed a reinforcement learning task, whereas the above 
mentioned fMRI studies employed a response competition task (Taylor et al., 2006) and a 
Go-NoGo task (Simões-Franklin et al., 2010). Given that the nature of task has been shown 
to play a pivotal role in determining the differential recruitment of cortical systems within the 
mPFC (Cavanagh et al., 2010b), varying task demands might account to some extent for the 
divergent pattern of findings. 
Taken together, the current findings indicate that the extent to which the Ne amplitude 
reflects the engagement of dorsal and rostral ACC differs as a function of task context. 
However, rather than reflecting the “cognitive” vs. “affective” component of error processing, 
the two cingulate subdivisions may subserve complementary functions in the adaptive 
regulation of cognition and emotion (Mohanty et al., 2007; Pizzagalli, 2011). In particular, the 
present data are consistent with the recent suggestion that dorsal parts of ACC and mPFC 
might also support affective appraisal processes (Etkin, Egner, & Kalisch, 2011) and that the 
rACC mediates behavioural adaptation (e.g., Etkin et a., 2006; Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2008; 
Mohanty et al., 2007). Although the rapid affective appraisal of on-going performance 
certainly plays a key role in error processing and might also be highly relevant for learning 
(Phelps & Le Doux, 2005; Sander, Grafman, & Zalla, 2003), the present findings do not 
support the notion that the Ne directly indicates an affective or motivational monitoring 
function of the ACC. Instead, they emphasize the ACC’s sensitivity to discrepancies between 
on-going behaviour and current task goals and its involvement in implementing adaptive 
behavioural change. 
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10. General Discussion 
The aim of the present thesis was to investigate the impact of the motivational and 
affective context of an action on the neural mechanisms of error and feedback processing 
during reinforcement learning. This question was addressed in three experiments by utilizing 
the high temporal resolution of event-related potentials (ERPs). In particular, this thesis 
focused on three ERP-components thought to reflect neural signals that are used to guide 
goal-directed behavioural adjustments: the error negativity (Ne), the feedback-related 
negativity (FRN), and the error positivity (Pe). Experiment 1 and 2 examined how self-
relevant failure performance monitoring processes – indexed by Ne, FRN, and Pe – and the 
ability to use error signals for behavioural adaptation in a subsequent feedback-based 
learning task. To this end, two phases (pre- and posttest) of a probabilistic learning task were 
applied. Between pre- and posttest, participants performed a visual search task described as 
diagnostic of intellectual abilities. In this task, participants were assigned to one of two 
conditions in which they received either failure feedback (failure-feedback-group) or no 
feedback (no-feedback-group). In order to disentangle the effects of failure exposure and 
motivational disengagement over the course of posttest, Experiment 1 and 2 used different 
posttest instructions. In the first experiment, the posttest was described as indicative of 
intellectual abilities to ensure high self-relevance. By contrast, in the second experiment, the 
posttest was described in neutral terms. Experiment 3 aimed to determine whether 
manipulations of appetitive vs. aversive motivation by means of monetary incentives 
modulate performance monitoring and learning-related behavioural adjustments. A further 
goal was to explore whether dorsal and rostral subregions of the anterior cingulate cortex 
(ACC) differentially contribute to error processing, depending on the motivational significance 
of an error. 
The following general discussion is divided into three parts. In the first part, I will 
discuss implications of the present findings on learning-related changes in Ne, FRN, and Pe. 
The second part focuses on the most central issues of the present research, namely the 
impact of failure manipulation and appetitive vs. aversive motivation on the mechanisms of 
performance monitoring and learning. In the third part, I will summarize the limitations if the 
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present study, followed by the outline of directions for future research and a general 
conclusion. 
Learning-related Changes in the ERP-correlates of Error- and Feedback Processing 
A specific aim of this thesis was to replicate and extend findings by Eppinger and 
colleagues (2008, 2009) indicating that learning does not only affect the processing of errors 
and negative feedback, but also the processing of correct responses and positive feedback. 
These and similar findings gave rise to an on-going debate on the question as to whether 
response- and feedback-locked positivities are primary determinants of experimental 
variations in Ne and FRN, respectively (Eppinger et al., 2008; Foti et al., 2011; Holroyd et al., 
2008). In particular, Eppinger and coworkers (2008, 2009) showed the correct response-
related positivity increased as learning progressed, whereas the feedback-locked positivity to 
positive feedback decreased with learning. In order to integrate these findings with the R-L 
theory (Holroyd & Coles, 2002), Eppinger and colleagues suggested that the positive 
potentials may reflect phasic increases in midbrain dopaminergic activity, i.e., positive PEs, 
that inhibit the ACC. According to this view, phasic increases rather than dips in midbrain 
dopaminergic activity drive learning in the ACC. 
Does the correct response-related positivity reflect a learning signal? Consistent with 
the findings by Eppinger and colleagues (2008, 2009), the correct response-related positivity 
increased over the course of learning in each of the present studies. However, this increase 
was much more pronounced in Experiment 1 and 2 compared to Experiment 3. Interestingly, 
the opposite pattern was observed for the Ne. Whereas the Ne did not change with learning 
in Experiment 1 and 2, a pronounced learning-related enhancement in Ne amplitude was 
found in Experiment 3. Given that the learning blocks included much more trials in first two 
experiments compared to the third experiment, these findings indicate that the Ne changes 
on rapid time-scales at the beginning of learning only, while the correct response-related 
positivity demonstrates a slower, continuous increase over the course of learning. Thus, the 
two components are unlikely to reflect neural manifestations of the same dopaminergic PE 
signal. If this would be the case, continuously increasing reward prediction as reflected in the 
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correct response-related positivity should be associated with a similarly increasing negative 
PE indexed by the Ne (e.g., Niv & Montague, 2008; Schultz, 2002). Importantly, the notion 
that the two components reflect dissociable processes was further corroborated by their 
different susceptibility to affective/motivational manipulations. Only the Ne – but not the 
correct response-related positivity – was modulated by the experience of self-relevant failure 
(Experiment 1 and 2) and the motivational/affective significance of an error in terms of 
monetary losses (Experiment 3). 
Yet, this could simply mean that the Ne does not reflect a negative PE. As was also 
noted by Eppinger et al. (2008, 2009), considerable evidence indicates that the ACC is 
critically involved not only in monitoring for negative events, but also in reward-motivated 
behaviour (Amiez et al., 2005; Liu, Hairston, Schrier, & Fan, 2010; Magno, Simões-Franklin, 
Robertson, & Garavan, 2008; Matsumoto et al., 2007). Indeed, it has been suggested that 
the ACC’s basic function is to signal the need for behavioural change, irrespective of whether 
things are going better or worse than expected (Magno et al., 2008). Nonetheless, the 
current data raise some doubt on the assumption that the response-related positivity reflects 
a dopaminergic learning signal. In Experiment 1 and 2, the correct response-related positivity 
increased not only in the two learning conditions but also in the chance condition, as well as 
from pre- to posttest. Critically, the amplitude modulations were not accompanied by 
performance improvements. Although these changes might have reflected stimulus-evoked 
P300 activity, they underscore that component overlap constitutes a major obstacle when 
isolating the learning-related part of the response-locked positivity. In fact, it seems plausible 
to assume that stimulus-locked components could be responsible for the effects in the 
response-locked ERPs. For instance, a gradually increasing positivity over midline central 
sites has been demonstrated for successive stimulus presentations in an extended 
continuous recognition memory task (e.g., van Strien, Hagenbeek, Stam, Rombouts, & 
Barkhof, 2005). This repetition effect has been suggested to reflect memory strength. Similar 
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effects have been attributed to increasing decision confidence (e.g., Finnigan, Humphreys, 
Dennis, & Geffen, 2002)34. 
Several analysis techniques have been developed to deal with the problem of 
component overlap. One of these methods is known a current source density (CSD) 
transformation (Kayser & Tenke, 2006). CSD acts as a spatial filter that amplifies the 
representation of local neuroelectric activity and attenuates broadly distributed and/or distal 
activities. Applying this technique on response-locked ERPs in Experiment 3 revealed a Ne-
like wave on correct trials that decreased with learning in the gain and neutral condition, 
whereas in the loss condition, this negativity was already diminished in the first bin. Even 
more pronounced learning-related decreases in the negativity on correct trials were observed 
when transforming the ERPs in Experiment 1 and 2. This finding is consistent with the 
proposal that a decreasing negativity contributes to the learning-related dynamics in the 
ERPs to correct responses (Allain et al., 204; Ridderinkhof et al., 2003). In the context of the 
present study, this effect could reflect the reduced need to engage effortful monitoring 
processes as the representations of the mapping rules become increasingly robust. 
Consistent with this view, it has been shown that the ACC is more strongly involved in early 
stages of learning, whereas other regions such as the posterior cingulate contribute to action 
selection during later stages of learning (Gabriel, Burhans, Talk, & Scalf, 2002). Moreover, 
the findings by Pietschmann et al. (2008) discussed earlier bear close resemblance to the 
CSD-transformed data of Experiment 3 and support the idea that higher learning demands 
require a stronger engagement of the medial prefrontal performance monitoring system. 
                                                 
34 Another potentially relevant factor directly concerns the impact of response latencies on ERP activity. As 
Makeig and Onton (2011) pointed out, the P300 is time-locked to the response rather than the stimulus. Crucially, 
the authors showed that a more distinct (i.e., less temporally “smeared”) P300 follows the response by about 100 
ms and that this positivity is much stronger with short RTs. A closer inspection of response latencies in 
Experiment 1 and 2 revealed that the amplitude of the correct response-related positivity was significantly 
correlated with RT in each of the three learning conditions (r-values > −.31, p-values < .08). By contrast, no 
significant correlation was found between Ne amplitude and RT (r-values < −.22, p-values > .22). Although 
Eppinger and colleagues (2008, 2009) did not report RT data, it is conceivable that response latencies also 
decreased as a function of learning in their studies and hence might have contributed to the pronounced 
response-locked positivity in the deterministic and probabilistic learning condition. Clearly, this issue warrants 
further investigation. 
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To summarize, the present data strongly suggest that dissociable neural processes 
underlie the Ne and the response-locked positivity on correct trials. However, the current 
studies failed to substantiate the view that the correct response-related positivity reflects a 
reward-related learning signal. Future studies should combine sophisticated analysis 
techniques such as principal component analysis (PCA) or independent component analysis 
(ICA) with computational modelling to provide stronger tests of this proposal. 
The FRN does not change with learning. In contrast to the ERP-correlates of internal 
error processing, the FRN did not vary with learning in any of the three experiments included 
in this thesis. This is consistent with the findings by Eppinger and colleagues (2008, 2009) for 
negative feedback trials. Yet, the current studies also failed to obtain learning-related 
modulations in the ERPs to positive feedback. This was somewhat surprising, given that the 
learning paradigm in Experiment 1 and 2 was very similar to that used by Eppinger and 
colleagues (2008, 2009). One explanation of this discrepancy is that the learning bins in 
Experiment 1 and 2 contained a larger number of trials and might have been insensitive to 
modulations in the FRN at the beginning of learning. However, the lack of learning-related 
changes in the FRN in Experiment 3 questions this assumption. Instead, similar to the 
response-locked ERPs, a direct comparison of the three experiments points to a potentially 
confounding effect of the stimulus-evoked P300. In Experiment 1 and 2, the ERPs to both 
positive and negative feedback became less positive as learning progressed, presumably 
reflecting a reduction of the stimulus-evoked P300 (Walsh & Anderson, 2011; Yeung, 
Holroyd, & Cohen, 2005; Yeung & Sanfey, 2004). This effect was most pronounced in the 
deterministic learning condition, supporting the notion that participants paid less attention to 
the feedback stimulus after they have developed an internal representation of the correct 
response (see Figures 16 and 22). In Experiment 3, the amplitude reduction was less 
prominent and limited to positive feedback trials (see Figure 32). Thus, the stimulus-evoked 
P300 appears to show a different time-course of changes over the course of learning for 
positive and negative feedback that may have contributed to the learning-related decrease in 
‘feedback-related positivity’ observed in former studies (Cohen et al., 2007; Eppinger et al., 
2008, 2009). 
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However, a number of studies have supported the notion of a reward-related positivity 
in the feedback-locked ERP (Foti et al., 2011; Potts et al., 2006a). For instance, Foti and 
colleagues (2011) applied principal component analysis to dissociate a reward-specific 
positivity from the P300. As for the response-locked ERPs it might be a promising avenue for 
future research to test whether this positive component changes with learning and other 
experimental manipulations in a way consistent with a positive PE signal. 
Importantly, the current data contradict some of the core predictions of the R-L theory 
(Holroyd & Coles, 2002) by showing that the FRN does not change with learning, whereas 
the Ne increases during early stages of learning only. These findings add to a growing 
number of previous studies indicating that Ne and FRN reflect dissociable neural processes 
(e.g., Eppinger et al., 2008; Gründler et al., 2009; Hajcak et al., 2003; Pietschmann et al., 
2008). Further research is needed to explore more recent ideas according to which reward-
related learning signals are the primary determinant of learning-related variations in the two 
ERP components. 
Affective and Motivational Influences on Performance Monitoring and Learning 
 Of most interest for the present thesis were the effects of the failure manipulation 
(Experiment 1 and 2) and incentive manipulation (Experiment 3) on the neural mechanisms 
of error and feedback processing and the ability to use internal and external performance 
cues for behavioural adaptation. Consistent with previous findings (Brunstein & Gollwitzer, 
1996; Hübner & Schlösser, 2010; Krawczyk, et al., 2007; Pessoa & Engelmann, 2010; 
Savine, et al., 2010), the behavioural data indicated that the motivational/affective 
manipulations led to an enhancement in task performance in the three experiments. 
Experiment 1 and 2 showed that the experience of self-relevant failure prevented 
motivational disengagement at posttest. However, the lack of additional performance 
improvements in the failure-feedback group in Experiment 1 possibly reflected some 
detrimental effects of the need to cope with the stressful event. In addition, monetary 
incentives resulted in higher accuracy rates in gain and loss condition of Experiment 3. 
Importantly, a closer inspection of the behavioural data in terms of trial-to-trial behavioural 
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adjustments revealed that rather than inducing unspecific motivational effects such as 
increased effort, the motivational/affective manipulations gave rise to strategic changes in 
task performance. Both failure feedback (Experiment 1 and 2) and loss anticipation 
(Experiment 3) were associated with more efficient error-related adjustments, reflected in 
higher post-error accuracy (i.e., incorrect-switch performance). Notably, no incentive-related 
differences were found for correct-stay performance in Experiment 3, demonstrating the 
specificity of the effects. Thus, self-relevant failure and risk of losing money appeared to 
promote negatively motivated engagement directed towards the avoidance of threat and 
punishment. 
In case of the failure manipulation, this result is in line with a number of previous 
findings concerning the influence of social-evaluative stress on learning and memory 
(Cavanagh et al., 2011a; Petzold et al., 2010; Roozendaal et al., Schwabe & Wolf, 2011). 
Typically, these studies reported stress-induced alterations in learning strategies rather than 
overall learning performance. Moreover, the observed strategy shift points to a possible 
explanation for the inconsistent findings regarding the impact of monetary incentives on 
cognitive performance (Bonner et al., 2000; Camerer & Hogarth, 1999), if one assumes that 
the manipulation can trigger both adaptive and maladaptive strategic changes. In support of 
this notion, Dambacher and coworkers (2011) demonstrated that the efficiency of monetary 
incentives in speeded perceptual decision tasks depends on the emphasis on speed vs. 
accuracy, with beneficial effects confined to payoff schemes emphasising speed over 
accuracy. The authors suggested that this might reflect differential contributions of two 
parallel processing routes to decision making, supporting rapid but less precise vs. more 
accurate but slow responses (Trimmer et al., 2008). An interesting possibility following from 
this view is that failure manipulation and loss anticipation could have promoted the 
recruitment of the “accurate-but-slow” decision making system. The efficiency of this 
strategic adjustment, however, was presumably limited by the adaptive response deadline 
that forced participants to respond quickly. Indeed, one reason for the application of the 
response deadline algorithm was to prevent influences of a speed-accuracy-tradeoff. 
Thus, the behavioural findings strongly suggest that the affective/motivational 
manipulations employed in the present experiments did not merely result in an enhanced or 
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reduced recruitment of cognitive resources but also in a differential weighting of the involved 
processing systems, i.e., a redistribution of available resources according to the prevalent 
behavioural goals.  
Failure experiences and loss aversion promote reactive control. Crucially, the Ne 
findings from each of the three experiments involved in this thesis strongly supported the 
notion that self-relevant failure and risk of losing money resulted in a strategic shift towards a 
reactive-defensive orientation to the environment (Braver et al., 2007; Tops et al., 2010). As 
was shown by a failure-related increase in Ne amplitude in Experiment 1 and 2 as well as a 
larger Ne in the loss condition in Experiment 3, aversive motivation was associated with a 
heightened responsitivity to internal cues indicating performance failures. Most strikingly, 
these differences in the processing of internal error information predicted subsequent 
behavioural adjustments, i.e., participants were more likely to learn from past mistakes. 
Reactive behaviour control has been described as adaptive response to the perception of 
threat and discrepancies between intended/predicted and actual states (Tops et al., 2010). In 
particular, this mode of control is thought to strengthen the attentional focus on the current 
situation, to enhance analytic, self-referential processing, and to facilitate rapid behavioural 
adaptation to environmental demands (Tops et al., 2010). Such a strategic change in 
behavioural control appears adequate to overcome the experience of uncontrollable failure 
that challenged participants’ self-definition and presumably induced uncertainty regarding the 
appropriateness of their own actions. Similarly, loss anticipation was likely to establish a 
threatening environmental context in which heightened vigilance to internal indictors of errors 
and discrepancies supported rapid behavioural adjustments in order to avoid harm and 
punishment. 
The results of the present studies are in line with previous research indicating that the 
monitoring processes underlying the Ne reflect interindividual differences in the sensitivity to 
negative and threatening events (e.g., Boksem et al., 2006a; 2008; Frank et al., 2005; 
Hajcak, McDonald, & Simons, 2003; 2004; Tops, Boksem, Wester, Lorist, & Meijman, 2006). 
However, the present data clearly argue against the view that the Ne is a state-independent 
marker of an endophenotype for internalizing and externalizing psychopathology (Clayson et 
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al., 2011; Olvet & Hajcak, 2008). Instead, they corroborate the notion that the medial 
prefrontal performance monitoring system is flexibly recruited depending on how much 
emphasis the individual places on avoiding negative response outcomes (Boksem et al., 
2008; Falkenstein et al., 2000; Gehring et al., 1993; Hajcak et al., 2005; Potts; 2011; 
Wiswede et al., 2009b). Extending these latter findings, the current study established a direct 
link between aversively motivated changes in performance monitoring and the ability to use 
internal error signals for goal-directed behavioural adaptation. 
 Interestingly, the present experiments did not yield clear evidence for increased 
sensitivity to external punishment cues in response to the motivational/affective challenges. 
Only in Experiment 1, failure-related modulations of the FRN suggested a more differentiated 
processing of positive and negative feedback. Experiment 2 failed to replicate this finding 
and rather suggested that the failure experience prevented diminished feedback processing 
due to motivational disengagement. Although the effect was rather subtle and has to be 
interpreted with caution, it might underline an important difference between the impact of 
failure feedback and loss aversion. As was already discussed above, the larger amplitude 
difference between positive and negative feedback could reflect that participants in the 
failure-feedback group relied more strongly on external feedback, possibly reflecting a higher 
need to validate the outcomes of internal monitoring processes. On this view, the failure-
related enhancement in Ne and FRN would indicate an attempt to restore the integrity of the 
performance monitoring system that was challenged through uncontrollable failure. By 
contrast, in Experiment 3, participants’ ability to control aversive consequences was not 
constrained. Thus, there was no reason to “mistrust” the internal judgements of the action 
evaluation system. In this case, aversive motivation appeared to trigger a heightened 
vigilance to internal error information only. 
 The present findings have important implications for theoretical accounts on 
performance monitoring (Bernstein et al., 2005; Botvinick et al., 2001; Falkenstein et al., 
1991; Gehring et al., 1993; Holroyd & Coles, 2002). In particular, the lack of learning-related 
changes in FRN amplitude and the different susceptibility of Ne and FRN to the 
affective/motivational manipulations question the assumption of the R-L theory (Holroyd & 
Coles, 2002) that both the Ne and the FRN are neural manifestations of dopaminergic PEs. 
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Yet, the latter result might be explained within the framework of the R-L theory by assuming 
that aversively motivated reactive-defensive engagement selectively amplifies the magnitude 
and/or impact of negative PEs arising from mismatch detection on the basis of internal 
representations of action value. Nonetheless, the pattern of findings in Experiment 1 and 2 
suggested that the ACC is not only a passive recipient of dopaminergic learning signals. 
Rather, the failure-related modulations in Ne amplitude appeared to reflect altered ACC 
functioning in conjunction with active behavioural coping and systematically changed cost-
benefit analyses in response to the stressful experience (Amat et al., 2005; Pascucci et al., 
2007; Boksem & Tops, 2008). This is in line with ample evidence for a top-down biasing, 
model-based influence of the ACC and other prefrontal structures on neural circuits 
mediating habitual, model-free control (Daw et al., 2005; Doll et al., 2009; Frank et al., 2005; 
Huys & Dayan, 2009; Miller & Cohen, 2001). Specifically, it has been suggested that the 
ACC determines the degree to which the outcome of an action guides learning and future 
behaviour (Behrens & Rushworth, 2008), fitting the specific link between Ne amplitude and 
behavioural adjustments observed in the current study. 
Thus, the current data are consistent with proposals that the ACC and the 
surrounding mPFC - the proposed source(s) of the Ne - are critically involved in the 
processing of mismatch and punishment and the initiation of behavioural change (Blair et al., 
2006; Cavanagh et al., 2009; Magno et al., 2008; Shackman et al., 2011; Wrase et al., 2007). 
Indeed, the detection of mismatch or conflict may be a common functional characteristic of all 
midfrontal negativities thought to originate from mPFC, including FRN, CRN, and N200 (cf. 
Cavanagh et al., 2010a; Folstein & van Petten, 2008). The idea that the Ne reflects some 
kind of a mismatch signal is shared by most of the major theoretical accounts on the Ne. 
Importantly, the present findings emphasize that theories such as the error/mismatch 
detection hypothesis (Bernstein et al., 1995; Falkenstein et al., 1991; Gehring et al., 1993) 
and the conflict monitoring theory (Botvinick et al., 2001) have to incorporate the notion that 
the mismatch signal can be used to adapt future behaviour in a way that is unlikely to reflect 
an unspecific increase of attentional effort (Sarter et al., 2006). Instead, the present findings 
indicate a highly specific processing bias towards the avoidance future failure, possibly 
reflecting a differential weighting of negative response outcomes in the computation of action 
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values (Rushworth & Behrens, 2008; Cavanagh et al., 2010a; Frank et al., 2005; Jocham et 
al., 2009). 
In contrast to neurocomputational models of performance monitoring such as the R-L 
theory and the conflict monitoring theory, affective/motivational proposals (Luu et al., 2003; 
Olvet & Hajcak, 2008) are less specified, making competitive tests more complicated. 
However, the present data argue against the notion that the Ne merely reflects an affective 
response in terms of a subjective emotional experience, such as distress or regret. Given 
that participants showed better performance in the gain condition compared to the neutral 
condition in Experiment 3, on would expect the higher motivational and affective significance 
of reward omission to result in larger Ne amplitudes. This was not observed. In fact, a 
conceptualization of the Ne in terms of a subjective affective experience appears hard to 
reconcile with findings suggesting that the occurrence of the Ne does not depend on 
conscious error recognition (Endrass et al., 2007; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001). In particular, the 
present study failed to confirm the assumption that the rACC evaluates the affective and 
motivational significance of an error, whereas the dACC is involved in more “cognitive” 
aspects of error processing (Luu et al., 2003; van Veen & Carter, 2002). Importantly, the 
proposal of Luu and colleagues (2003) largely relied on the identification of a rACC source 
for the Ne. Yet, the source localization results of Experiment 3 did not reveal greater rACC 
activation for affectively more significant errors. Instead, the findings suggested that the 
cingulate subdivisions may subserve complementary functions in the adaptive regulation of 
cognition and emotion (Mohanty et al., 2007; Pizzagalli, 2011).  
Potential mechanisms mediating the effects of failure and loss aversion. Although the 
present findings highlight the need to explore the performance monitoring system in terms of 
both cognitive and affective/motivational mechanisms, the precise nature of the processes 
that mediate the observed effects of failure feedback and loss aversion remains to be 
determined. 
Pessoa and Engelmann (2010) proposed three abstract ways of how 
motivational/affective influences may interact with task-specific cognitive processes. A first 
scenario suggests that cognition and motivation/affect are segregated both at a functional 
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and neuroanatomical level and influence task performance independently through parallel 
routes. Given the ample evidence against a clear-cut segregation of affective and cognitive 
processes, it may prove difficult to provide evidence for this notion (Pessoa 2008; Pessoa & 
Engelmann, 2010; Salzman & Fusi, 2010). Nonetheless, some studies suggested that under 
certain conditions influences of attention and motivation/affect might be dissociable 
(Bendiksby & Platt, 2006; Vuilleumier, Armony, Driver, & Dolan, 2001). Hence, it remains a 
challenge for future research to test whether “non-cognitive” mechanisms affect performance 
monitoring and learning. 
Second, it was proposed that the effects of motivational/affective variables are 
mediated by cognitive processes. On this view, self-relevant failure and loss aversion would 
have led to an increase in attentional effort, resulting in more efficient target processing 
(Clayson et al., 2011; Sarter et al., 2006; Yeung, 2004). As outlined above, there were 
several reasons to suggest that the present findings did not exclusively reflect higher effort or 
focused attention. Most importantly, the observed effects pointed to aversively motivated 
strategic changes in task performance rather than an unspecific performance improvement. 
By contrast, appetitive motivation was not associated with altered functioning of the medial 
prefrontal performance monitoring system as reflected in Ne and FRN, emphasising the 
specificity of the effects. However, non-specific motivational effects clearly played a role in 
mediating the effects of failure and incentive manipulation. This was indicated by the findings 
that (1) self-relevant failure effectively preserved task engagement (Experiment 2) and (2) 
monetary incentives improved overall accuracy (Experiment 3). 
The third proposal on the nature of the relationship between cognition and 
affect/motivation assumes that they constitute highly integrated processes that are not clearly 
decomposable (Pessoa & Engelmann, 2010). Indeed, the ACC is considered a central hub in 
which affectively and motivationally relevant information is linked to motor areas (Bush et al., 
2000; Shackman et al., 2011), fitting the notion that this structure was critically involved in 
mediating the effects of failure and loss aversion on task performance. Consistent with recent 
suggestions (Shackman et al., 2011), the present work did not yield evidence in support of a 
segregationist view of ACC functioning, with the dorsal and rostral ACC involved in cognitive 
and affective aspects of error processing, respectively. Instead, greater error-related dACC 
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activation was observed in the loss condition, whereas the rACC was more active following 
errors compared to correct responses in the neutral condition only. However, given the 
limited number of studies that analysed source activity underlying the Ne, it is difficult to fully 
interpret the pattern of subregional activation differences. 
Further candidate regions for the integration of motivational and affective influences 
with task-specific processing include the OFC and the amygdala. In support of this notion, 
Wrase and coworkers (2007) showed that not only ACC activation but also activity in lateral 
OFC predicted behavioural adaptation following punishing outcomes in a monetary incentive 
delay task. This is in line with the suggestion that the OFC contributes to rapid learning-
related adaptations on a trial-to-trial basis, possibly reflecting the active maintenance of 
negative reinforcement values in working memory (Frank & Claus, 2006; Frank et al., 
2007a). Note, the OFC is functionally and anatomically closely connected to the amygdala 
(Murray & Izquierdo, 2007) and has been strongly implicated in the representation of the 
reward value of stimuli (Kringelbach et al., 2003; O’Doherty et al., 2001; Plassmann et al., 
2007; Rushworth et al., 2007). Furthermore, both amygdala and OFC are closely connected 
to both the ventral striatum and the midbrain DA system, which led some researchers to 
suggest that the two structures are critically involved in the computation of the PE (Maia, 
2009). Specifically, the amygdala has been shown to encode a PE during avoidance learning 
(Prevost et al., 2011; Yacubian et al.; 2006). Together with the current finding that aversive 
motivation was specifically associated with more efficient trial-to-trial behavioural 
adjustments following errors, the above evidence suggests that structures like the OFC and 
the amygdala might have contributed to the observed effects of failure and loss aversion. 
Moreover, given that the present effects were specifically linked to aversive 
motivation, it seems worth noting that the amygdala has been hypothesized regulate the 
engagement of appetitive and aversive behavioural systems (Pessoa, 2008; Prevost et al., 
2011; Salzman & Fusi, 2010). In fact, accumulating evidence suggested that dissociable 
albeit overlapping neural circuits might be involved in the control of behaviour by appetitive 
and aversive cues (Gray et al., 2002; Small et al., 2005; Tops et al., 2010; Wrase et al., 
2007; Yacubian et al., 2006). The present research suggests a close link between aversive 
motivation and the activity of the medial prefrontal performance monitoring system as 
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reflected in the Ne. However, there was no evidence for influences of the 
motivational/affective manipulations on the response- and feedback-locked positivities on 
correct trials. Future studies may probe the relationship between these putatively reward-
related components and appetitive motivation using more sophisticated EEG analysis 
techniques. 
Finally, cognitive and motivational/affective processes might be integrated by the 
activity of neuromodulator systems (Pessoa, 2008; Pessoa & Engelmann, 2010; Tops et al., 
2010). In particular, it has been suggested that affect- and motivation related DA dynamics 
lead to sharpening of task-specific processing by improving the neuronal signal-to-noise ratio 
in target structures (Durstewitz & Seamans, 2002; Pessoa & Engelmann, 2010). On this 
view, gain and loss cues in Experiment 3 might have triggered heightened dopaminergic 
activity, possibly mediated by valuation regions such as the amygdala and the OFC. 
Enhanced prefrontal DA levels could in turn support working memory functions of OFC and 
dlPFC, whereas enhanced striatal DA levels could support flexible updating of task-relevant 
contents (Cools & D’Esposito, 2011; Frank et al., 2007a). Moreover, DA has been shown to 
promote rapid memory formation in hippocampus and surrounding MTL regions (Shohamy & 
Adcock, 2010). Still, one could argue that the DA system responds to reward but not 
punishment cues (Schultz, 2000, 2006, 2007), making dopaminergic mechanisms unlikely to 
facilitate task-related processing in the loss condition. However, recent studies demonstrated 
even greater activation in valuation regions, including VTA and ventral striatum, when 
participants learned to avoid losses than when they learned to attain gains, supporting the 
notion that motivational/affective relevance of an event might determine activity in reward-
related regions (McKell Carter, MacInnes, Huettel, & Adcock, 2009; Niznikiewicz & Delgado, 
2011). In addition, down-regulation of mesolimbic and mesocortical DA transmission is 
thought to play a central role in mediating the effects of mental fatigue (Chaudhuri & Behan, 
2000, 2004; Sarter, et al., 2006). Specifically, the ACC it has been assigned a pivotal role in 
determining the changes in dopaminergic activity based on cost-benefit analyses (Boksem & 
Tops, 2008). Thus, dopaminergic mechanisms were likely to contribute to the differential 
effects of prolonged task performance in the failure-feedback and no-failure-feedback groups 
in Experiment 1 and 2.  
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Of note, there is evidence indicating that the activity of the midbrain DA system is 
strongly affected by modulations in cholinergic activity (Zhou, Wilson, & Dani, 2003). Indeed, 
a bias towards reactive avoidance has been primarily associated with cholinergic 
mechanisms (Tops et al., 2010). In particular, acetylcholine has been implicated in the 
expectancy of uncontrollability and uncertainty, suggesting that cholinergic mechanisms – 
possibly working in tandem with DA - might have mediated the failure-induced shift towards 
reactive control.  
A parallel error evaluation mechanism underlying the Pe? One of the most robust 
findings of the present research was that the Pe increased with learning. Thus, in contrast to 
the Ne and the FRN, the Pe appeared to be sensitive to gradual changes in the strength of 
response representations. Nonetheless, the Pe was largely unaffected both by the failure 
induction and the incentive manipulation employed in the present thesis. Moreover, the Pe 
did not predict learning-related trial-to-trial behavioural adjustments. The current findings thus 
corroborate the view that distinct aspects of error processing are reflected in Ne and Pe. 
Thus far, however, a detailed theory on the functional significance of the Pe is lacking. Most 
notably, Overbeek and coworkers (2005) proposed that the Pe might signify the activity of a 
slower more deliberate system that evaluates the motivational significance of salient errors 
and operates in parallel to the rapid preconscious system underlying the Ne (see also 
Ridderinkhof et al., 2009). Although this evaluative system is also thought to mediate post-
error adaptation, these effects might differ from the learning-related behavioural adjustments 
the present study focused on. First, Ridderinkhof and colleagues (2009) stated that errors 
have to be sufficiently salient to trigger the adaptation mechanisms associated with the Pe. 
Thus, it is conceivable that errors in the feedback-based learning task were simply not salient 
enough. In support of this view, Pe amplitudes were considerably smaller in the current 
experiments than those observed in other studies using response conflict tasks. Second, the 
proposed functional similarity between Pe and P300 suggests a relationship to the 
mobilization of processing resources for immediate error correction rather than strategic 
changes in post-error behaviour (cf. Overbeek et al, 2005). Nonetheless, the present data 
are consistent with previous studies that also failed to obtain modulations in Pe amplitude 
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due to motivational/affective manipulations (Clayson et al., 2011; Wiswede et al., 2009b). In 
sum, available evidence thus seems somewhat inconsistent with the idea that the Pe is 
related the evaluation of the motivational significance of an error. Indeed, it has been 
demonstrated that the Pe might reflect a delayed stimulus-related P300 rather than response 
monitoring processes per se (Shalgi, Barkan, & Deouell, 2009). As was the case for the 
correct response-related positivity, the latter finding could also explain why the Pe increased 
with learning and further highlights the problems arising from component overlap in 
interpreting response-locked ERPs. 
Limitations of the Present Study and Directions for Future Research 
Though the present thesis provided important new insights in the neural mechanisms 
of performance monitoring and learning, some limitations should be addressed that have to 
be taken into account when interpreting the results. A basic shortcoming inherent to the ERP 
approach is the need to average across a relatively large number of trials to obtain reliable 
measures of the ERP components. This results in very long experimental sessions and 
makes the data susceptible to effects of fatigue. This effect is even more problematic when a 
pre-post-design is applied - as was clearly evident from the data of the no-failure-feedback 
group in Experiment 2. However, as was discussed above, the additional motivational 
manipulation proved extremely helpful in disentangling the effects of the failure manipulation 
and fatigue in the two experiments. 
Moreover, the pre-post design limited the absolute number of trials in pre- and 
posttest. Therefore, the bins might have been too large to adequately represent learning-
related dynamics of Ne and FRN in Experiment 1 and 2. Indeed, the findings of Experiment 3 
showed that the Ne exhibited learning-related modulations when the learning blocks included 
a reduced number of trials. Yet, the FRN did not increase over the course of learning in 
either experiment, indicating that methodological problems were not the primary reason for 
the lack of findings. In addition, it should be noted that the core findings of the present study 
did not critically depend on the modulation of Ne and FRN over the course of learning. In 
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fact, the findings of Experiment 1 and 2 mainly reflected pre-post amplitude differences. 
Similarly, in Experiment 3, no interaction of incentive condition and learning was obtained. 
Another potentially critical point was the use of a between-subjects-design in 
Experiment 1 and 2. Therefore, one cannot definitely preclude the possibility that the present 
findings were attributable to pre-experimentally existent group differences, particularly in view 
of the fact that the sample sizes were relatively small. To control for confounding influences 
of baseline differences in learning performance, participants in the experimental groups were 
matched for overall accuracy at pretest. Moreover, the experimental groups did not differ with 
respect to the personality measures. Nonetheless, the analysis of the feedback-locked ERPs 
in Experiment 2 suggested that some group differences were present already at pretest. It 
was all the more important that Experiment 2 largely replicated the findings of Experiment 1, 
thereby considerably increasing the trustworthiness of the experimental effects. 
However, the small sample sizes might have been particularly problematic for the 
analysis of interindividual differences. Though previous studies also included relatively small 
samples (e.g., Boksem, 2006a; 2008), the present design was complex and involved 
additional sources of variance such as learning performance that were likely to disguise the 
effects of trait differences. Thus, an increase in statistical power would be desirable. 
Nevertheless, it should be mentioned that in the present study the relationship between 
personality measures and ERP correlates of error and feedback processing was also weak 
when the pretest data of all participants were collapsed. Yet, one may criticize that the 
present study used a very homogeneous sample. Indeed, the sample included a high 
proportion of first-year psychology students. Nonetheless, the descriptive statistics of the 
covariates for the total sample did not reveal deviations from the norms (means and standard 
deviations). Therefore, limited variance was unlikely to account for the lack of significant 
findings. 
A further limitation of the present study was the use of between-subject analyses to 
test for relationships between the ERP components and behavioural adjustments. Although it 
would be highly desirable to analyse the effects of motivational/affective manipulations, ERP 
measures and behavioural adjustments in an intra-subject design, the current experiments 
 207 
did not include a sufficient number of trials to perform those contrasts. Future studies may 
include multiple sessions to ensure larger numbers of error trials. 
Furthermore, the comparatively low spatial resolution (~1-2 cm) of the sLORETA 
source localization technique potentially limits the conclusions that can be drawn from the 
analysis of subregional ACC activity in Experiment 3 (Pizzagalli, 2007). It should be noted, 
however, that the validity of the algorithm has been confirmed by a number of studies using 
fMRI (e.g., Mulert et al., 2004), PET (Zumsteg, Friedman, Wennberg, & Wiesner, 2005), and 
intracranial recordings (Zumsteg, Wennberg, Treyer, Buck, & Wiesner, 2006). Specifically, 
the ACC has been shown to be localized correctly by this method (Pizzagalli et al., 2004). 
In addition, the Ne has been characterized as part of an ongoing theta oscillation 
underlying the joint functioning of a distributed action monitoring network (Luu et al. 2004, 
Trujillo & Allen, 2007). There is considerable evidence indicating that non-phase-locked 
spectral perturbations rather than the phase-locked ERP might correspond to the blood-
oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) signal measured by fMRI (Engell, Huettel, & McCarthy, 
2011). Hence, the discrepancies between the current localization results and previous fMRI 
findings regarding the sensitivity of the rACC to the motivational and affective salience of an 
error may be reflective of non-phase locked dynamics in the activity of the medial prefrontal 
action monitoring circuitry. Future studies using functional connectivity analyses of fMRI data 
or combing blind source separation (independent component analysis) and time-frequency 
analyses of EEG data should be helpful tools in elucidating the functioning of this network. 
Finally, it should be noted that the present study did not fit the behavioural data to a 
computational RL model. On the one hand, the estimation of parameters such as learning 
rate or PE would allow more stringent tests of theoretical accounts like the R-L theory 
(Holryod & Coles, 2002). On the other hand, computational modelling is a promising tool to 
shed light on the specific mechanism of motivational/affective influences on cognitive 
performance. 
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Conclusions 
Taken together, the present experiments provided the first evidence that modulations 
in error processing due to motivational/affective manipulations are associated with 
corresponding changes in the ability to use these error signals for learning-related 
behavioural adjustments. Consistent with previous research that has established a link 
between the Ne and the evaluation of the affective and motivational significance of an error 
(e.g., Gehring et al., 1993; Hajcak et al., 2005; Luu et al., 2003), exposure to uncontrollable 
failure (Experiment 1 and 2) and risk of losing money (Experiment 3) led to an increase of the 
Ne during a feedback-based learning task. These findings were extended by the observation 
that the Ne amplitude enhancement was accompanied by more efficient error-related 
behavioural adaptation. Crucially, the increase in Ne amplitude was not a mere consequence 
of better overall performance but was specifically accompanied by higher post-error 
accuracy. Therefore, the effect is unlikely to reflect an unspecific increase of attention or 
arousal. Instead, it indicated a shift towards reactive-defensive control, denoting the 
tendency to recruit control processes when a negative event has already occurred (as 
opposed to ‘proactive control’; Braver, Gray, & Burgess, 2007; Tops, Boksem, Luu, & Tucker, 
2010). Failure feedback and loss anticipation thus appear to induce an environmental context 
in which participants are particularly vigilant to potential threats and negative response 
outcomes, presumably facilitating rapid behavioural adaptation to emergent demands (Tops 
et al., 2010). This is line with previous research that has established a relation between the 
activity of the medial prefrontal action monitoring system and sensitivity to negative stimuli 
and events (Boksem et al., 2006b; Cavanagh et al., 2011a; Frank et al., 2005; Hajcak & Foti, 
2008). 
In summary, the present findings offer support for the notion that the Ne constitutes 
an aversive teaching signal mediating adaptive behavioural changes after maladaptive 
decisions. Although the engagement of the underlying medial prefrontal system is dependent 
on the motivational and affective context of an action, the Ne does not appear to directly 
reflect the affective appraisal of an error. Instead, a threatening context in terms of monetary 
losses specifically strengthened the relationship between Ne amplitude and error-related 
 209 
behavioural adjustments. In particular, source localization of the Ne suggested that the 
extent to which rostral parts of the ACC contribute to Ne generation is not determined by the 
motivational and affective salience of an error. Rather than reflecting the “cognitive” vs. 
“affective” component of error processing, dorsal and rostral cingulate subregions might 
subserve complementary and partially overlapping control functions in the service of adaptive 
regulation of cognition and emotion. The results of the current investigation are consistent 
with a more recent view according to which the common denominator of ACC activation in 
studies of cognitive control, negative affect, and pain is the need to guide action selection in 
the face of uncertainty and threat (Shackman et al., 2011).  
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12. Appendix 
RT Data Analyses 
Experiment 1 
 RT data (see Table 4) were subjected to an ANOVA with the between-subject factor 
feedback group (no-failure feedback vs. failure feedback), and the within-subjects factors test 
phase (pre- vs. posttest), learning condition (deterministic, probabilistic, and chance 
condition), and correctness (correct vs. incorrect). The analysis yielded a significant main 
effect of test phase [F(1,33) = 60.29, p < .001], indicating that response latencies decreased 
from pre- to posttest. Moreover, we found reliable main effects of learning condition [F(2,66) 
= 23.51, p < .001] and correctness [F(1,33) = 23.68, p < .001] that were qualified by 
interactions between learning condition and correctness [F(2,66) = 7.19, p < .002], and test 
phase, learning condition, and correctness [F(2,66) = 7.28, p < .002]. Follow-up ANOVAs 
yielded a significant interaction between learning condition and correctness for posttest 
[F(2,66) = 23.13, p < .001, ε = .76] but not for pretest (F < 1). At posttest, responses were 
faster on incorrect than correct trials (p < .001). Contrasts revealed that this difference 
increased with feedback validity (p-values < .001). No main effect or interaction involving the 
factor feedback group approached significance (p-values > .10).  
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Tabelle 4. Mean RT (Standard deviation) in the three learning conditions for the no-failure 
feedback group and the failure feedback at group pre- and posttest (Experiment 1). 
RT No-failure feedback group Failure feedback group 
 Correct Incorrect Correct Incorrect 
Pretest     
Deterministic learning 432 (28) 425 (45) 442 (27) 440 (39) 
Probabilistic learning 441 (29) 441 (49) 449 (33) 448 (38) 
Chance condition 439 (27) 436 (39) 449 (29) 445 (35) 
Posttest     
Deterministic learning 406 (28) 382 (33) 395 (33) 377 (31) 
Probabilistic learning 406 (31) 394 (37) 400 (33) 390 (29) 
Chance condition 406 (33) 406 (30) 395 (33) 396 (33) 
 
Post-error RT data analyses. Post-error RT data (see Table 5) were analyzed using 
an ANOVA with the factors feedback group, test phase, learning condition, and correctness. 
The analysis yielded a reliable main effect of test phase [F(1,33) = 60.96, p < .001], 
indicating that post-error RT decreased from pre- to posttest. Moreover, we found significant 
interactions between test phase and learning condition [F(2,66) = 5.22, p < .019, ε = .76] and 
test phase, learning condition, and correctness [F(2,66) = 3.81, p < .028]. Follow-up analyses 
showed that the decrease in post-error RT was more pronounced for the deterministic and 
probabilistic learning condition compared to the chance condition on incorrect trials [F(1,33) = 
20.13, p < .001] but not correct trials (F < 1). In addition, a reliable interaction between 
feedback group, correctness, and learning condition was obtained [F(2,66) = 4.54, p < .015]. 
Separate ANOVAs revealed a significant interaction between feedback group and 
correctness only for the deterministic learning condition [F(1,33) = 6.52, p < .017], reflecting 
that response latencies were relatively shorter on incorrect trials in the no-failure feedback 
group. No further effect of feedback group was found to be reliable (p-values > .12). 
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Tabelle 5. Mean post-error RT (Standard deviation) in the three learning conditions for the 
no-failure feedback group and the failure feedback at group pre- and posttest (Experiment 1). 
Post-error RT1 No-failure feedback group Failure feedback group 
 Correct Incorrect Correct Incorrect 
Pretest     
Deterministic learning 446 (42) 437 (58) 451 (37) 468 (68) 
Probabilistic learning 448 (41) 449 (52) 455 (34) 456 (47) 
Chance condition 438 (40) 434 (40) 449 (30) 446 (34) 
Posttest     
Deterministic learning 403 (30) 385 (44) 394 (38) 387 (37) 
Probabilistic learning 408 (32) 397 (41) 399 (35) 385 (40) 
Chance condition 405 (33) 410 (30) 394 (36) 396 (32) 
1Note that post-error RT refers to the next repetition of a given stimulus after a variable number of intervening 
items. 
Experiment 2 
 Consistent with Experiment 1, RT decreased from pre- to posttest [F(1,31) = 76.30, p 
< .001] (see Table 6). As was indicated by a significant interactions between feedback group 
and test phase, [F(1,31) = 12.46, p < .002] and feedback group, test phase and learning 
condition [F(2,62) = 3.28, p < .045], this decrease was more pronounced for the no-failure 
feedback group, particularly in the probabilistic and chance condition compared to the 
deterministic learning condition [F(1,31) = 5.90, p < .022]. Furthermore, the analysis yielded 
significant main effects of learning condition [F(2,62) = 51.05, p < .001, ε = .87] and 
correctness [F(1,31) = 42.26, p < .001] that were qualified by an interaction between learning 
condition and correctness [F(2,62) = 38.11, p < .001, ε = .87]. Follow-up analyses revealed 
that erroneous responses were faster than correct responses in the deterministic and 
probabilistic learning condition [F(1,31) = 53.50 and 18.04, respectively, p-values < .001] but 
not in the chance condition [F < 1]. 
 259 
Tabelle 6. Mean RT (Standard deviation) in the three learning conditions for the no-failure 
feedback group and the failure feedback at group pre - and posttest (Experiment 2). 
RT No-failure feedback group Failure feedback group 
 Correct Incorrect Correct Incorrect 
Pretest     
Deterministic learning 442 (31) 411 (30) 424 (25) 402 (21) 
Probabilistic learning 449 (36) 439 (31) 430 (20) 423 (29) 
Chance condition 452 (37) 451 (37) 429 (25) 430 (22) 
Posttest     
Deterministic learning 407 (34) 378 (26) 408 (28) 380 (30) 
Probabilistic learning 404 (29) 394 (25) 414 (25) 401 (24) 
Chance condition 403 (35) 399 (30) 411 (31) 412 (28) 
 
Post-error RT data analyses. Post-error RT (see Table 7) decreased from pre- to 
posttest [F(1,31) = 62.61, p < .001]. A significant interaction between feedback group and 
test phase [F(1,31) = 9.46, p < .005], reflected a greater pre-post difference in post-error RT 
for the no-failure feedback group. Furthermore, we found significant main effects of learning 
condition [F(2,62) = 8.04, p < .002] and correctness [F(1,31) = 26.72, p < .001], as well as an 
interaction between learning condition and correctness [F(2,62) = 51.05, p < .001, ε = .87]. 
Follow-up analyses showed that response latencies were shorter on incorrect than correct 
trials in the deterministic and probabilistic learning condition [F(1,31) = 19.50 and 15.56, 
respectively, p-values < .001] but not in the chance condition [F < 1]. 
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Tabelle 7. Mean post-error RT (Standard deviation) in the three learning conditions for the 
no-failure-feedback group and the failure-feedback group at pre- and posttest (Experiment 2) 
RT No-failure feedback group Failure feedback group 
 Correct Incorrect Correct Incorrect 
Pretest     
Deterministic learning 439 (33) 419 (43) 429 (25) 412 (33) 
Probabilistic learning 454 (41) 445 (38) 431 (23) 431 (33) 
Chance condition 453 (41) 450 (36) 428 (24) 430 (22) 
Posttest     
Deterministic learning 405 (31) 390 (38) 415 (34) 391 (31) 
Probabilistic learning 402 (30) 384 (25) 419 (27) 391 (27) 
Chance condition 401 (33) 399 (29) 411 (33) 414 (31) 
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13. Abbreviations 
 
A-O action-outcome 
ACC anterior cingulate cortex 
ACS-90 Action Control Scale 
ANCOVA analysis of covariance 
ANOVA analysis of variance 
BAS behavioural approach system 
BfS Befindlichkeitsskala 
BG basal ganglia 
BIS behavioural inhibition system 
COMT catechol-O-methyltransferase 
CR conditioned response 
CS conditioned stimulus 
CSD current source density 
DA dopamine 
DA-RPE dopamine reward prediction error 
dACC dorsal anterior cingulate cortex 
DC direct current 
ERP event-related potential 
dlPFC dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
FFS fight-flight system 
fMRI functional magnetic resonance imaging 
FRN feedback-related negativity 
HPA hypothalamus-pituitary adrenal 
MANOVA multivariate analysis of variance 
MDD Major depressive disorder 
MFC medial frontal cortex  
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MNI Montreal Neurological Institute 
mPFC medial prefrontal cortex 
ms millisecond 
MTL medial temporal lobe 
NA negative affect 
Ne error negativity 
OCD obsessive compulsive disorder 
OFC orbitofrontal cortex 
PA positive affect 
PANAS Positive Negative Affect Scale 
Pe error positivity 
PE prediction error 
PFC prefrontal cortex 
PRO prediction of response-outcome 
R-O response-outcome 
rACC rostral anterior cingulate cortex 
RCZ rostral cingulate zone 
RL reinforcement learning 
RST reinforcement sensitivity theory 
RT reaction time 
S-O stimulus-outcome 
S-R stimulus-response 
sLORETA standardized low-resolution electromagnetic tomography 
SMA supplementary motor area 
SNc zona compacta of the substantia nigra 
(t)CNV (terminal) contingent negative variation 
TD temporal difference 
UR unconditioned response 
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US unconditioned stimulus 
vmPFC ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
VTA ventral tegmental area 
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14. Annotation 
Some oft the data reported in this thesis are also included in the following manuscripts: 
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the electrophysiolgical signature of error monitoring during subsequent learning. 
Cognitive, Affective, and Behavioral Neuroscience, 12, 34-51. 
Unger, K., Heintz, S., & Kray, J. (2012). Punishment sensitivity modulates feedback 
processing but not error-induced learning. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 6:186. 
Unger, K. & Kray, J. (submitted). Differential effects of gain vs. loss anticipation on 
performance monitoring and error-induced learning. 
